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Abstract
Prolonged experience of high and long-term unemployment has led many 
governments to a renewed interest in active labour market policies. In particular, 
targeted wage subsidies have been seen as a means of both directly getting long­
term unemployed people into work, and improving their future prospects of finding 
and keeping jobs.
We examine three issues. Firstly, we look at the macroeconomic theory of targeted 
wage subsidies, and, to a lesser extent, job search assistance, within efficiency wage, 
union bargaining and search theoretic frameworks. Subsidies directly increase labour 
demand, but we also find that their effectiveness is enhanced by general equilibrium 
effects from targeting: wage pressure is reduced; and the average quality of the 
unemployed pool rises as long-term unemployed workers are removed from it, 
increasing the incentives for other firms to open vacancies.
Secondly we address the optimal degree of policy targeting, using an extension of 
the Mortensen-Pissarides job creation and destruction model. We argue that there 
are real gains to targeting the long-term unemployed, but also diminishing returns. 
Hence, as the level of policy expenditure rises, the extent of targeting should fall. 
Simulating the model for the UK, we find that policy could have a significant impact 
on equilibrium unemployment, with more modest welfare gains.
Finally, we look at longer-term employability effects by evaluating the Australian 
Special Youth Employment Training Program (SYETP). Controlling for selection 
bias using a bivariate probit, we find that participation increased the chances of 
having a job by 26% between 8 and 13 months after subsidy expiry, and 20% a year 
later. Much of this gain arose from retention of initially subsidised jobs, but even 
excluding this, participants were significantly more likely to be employed in subsequent 
years than if they had not gone on the programme.
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Introduction
In 1934, the economist Irving Fisher wrote to Franklin D Roosevelt urging the 
President to ‘stimulate reemployment in private industry’ rather than through ‘slow, 
clumsy, inefficient and costly’ public works, which needed a ‘double shift from relief 
to public works and from public works to normal jobs’ (cited in Allen, 1977). 
Roosevelt, although apparently interested, was not convinced. In the 1980s and 
1990s, persistent high and long-term unemployment, together with a perceived failure 
of direct job creation and training schemes, has led a number of governments back 
to Fisher’s conclusions. Wage subsidies, in particular subsidies targeted at the long­
term unemployed, have become an increasingly popular policy choice for governments 
striving to cut the unemployment queues.
This thesis is an attempt to evaluate the likely success of such policies, from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. Our findings are broadly favourable for 
advocates of targeted wage subsidies. Taking a macroeconomic approach, we argue 
that policy can reduce equilibrium unemployment, and that many of the concerns 
that have dominated evaluations of past programmes are based on a partial equilibrium 
view that is misplaced. We show that there are positive externalities to persuading 
firms to hire the long-term unemployed, and hence that targeting subsidies can 
increase their effectiveness.
However, we also show that there are diminishing returns to targeting. Whilst these 
never nullify the gains, they do imply that an excessive concern with the long-term 
unemployed, to the complete exclusion of policy for the short-term unemployed, is 
not generally optimal.
Finally, we evaluate a particular targeted wage subsidy, Australia’s Special Youth 
Employment Training Program (SYETP) to assess whether there are long-term 
gains to participation. We find that subsidies offer more than simply a temporary 
respite from unemployment. Instead there are lasting gains. Participants’ chances of 
having a job in subsequent years are substantially increased.
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We start with a survey of the existing literature on active labour market policies 
(ALMP), particularly focusing on those policies which directly increase the probability 
of transitions from unemployment to employment, hence avoiding the need for the 
‘double shift’ which concerned Fisher. We argue that there are three broad strands 
to the theoretical literature, and that each can be seen to underlie one of three 
principal empirical approaches.
The oldest approach, dating back to Pigou (1993) and Kaldor (1936), emphasises 
the direct effect of subsidies on firms’ labour demand. Correspondingly, empirical 
studies of wage subsidies have attempted to separate out net job creation 
(additionality) from those subsidised jobs that would anyway have been offered 
(deadweight) or which would otherwise have gone to someone else (substitution 
and displacement). Theorists in this tradition have generally argued the case for 
subsidies, but the empirical evidence has been much weaker, with less than 30% 
additionality in most studies.
A second approach is based on the outflow rates of different groups of unemployed 
workers. If programmes reduce the outflow rates of participants for their duration, 
but increase them subsequently, then there will be a trade-off. Shorter programmes, 
and those with larger gains and smaller losses, will be more effective. Empirically, 
studies of job search assistance have concentrated on outflow rates. Most of these 
studies have suggested that participants secure modest gains from programmes that 
generally incur modest costs.
The third approach looks at wage-setting. Baily and Tobin’s (1977) seminal paper 
argued that the Phillips’ Curve could be ‘cheated’ by shifting labour demand towards 
workers who exerted little inflationary pressure. More recently, however, this approach 
has been used to argue that active labour market policy may be counterproductive 
because the very gains to unemployed workers, observed in partial equilibrium, will 
reduce the disutility of unemployment that offsets wage pressures in general 
equilibrium. Empirically, there have been a number of attempts to assess the impact 
of ALMP on wage-setting, and more generally on unemployment, at a 
macroeconomic level. Most of these have proved somewhat inconclusive, due to 
considerable difficulties with both data and identification of programme effects.
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We believe that all three approaches contain genuine insights, but that papers in 
each strand have too often ignored the arguments of the others. We attempt to draw 
on all three traditions in building theoretical models of targeted wage subsidies, and 
to a lesser extent, job search assistance.
In Chapter 2, we develop a general theoretical framework for looking at ‘transition- 
based’ active labour market policies, those which seek directly to affect the probability 
of transiting from unemployment to employment. We incorporate both wage pressure 
and outflows in general equilibrium, but ignore, for the moment, labour demand. 
We find that if policy increases the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed, relative 
to the short-term unemployed, then wage pressure will fall with either Shapiro- 
Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wages or union bargaining. The gains made by the long­
term unemployed are discounted more heavily by wage-setters than the losses to 
short-term unemployed workers who now face greater competition for jobs. With 
fixed labour demand, unemployment then also falls.
We then extend the model, introduced heterogeneity among the unemployed. We 
find that, if workers with naturally low outflow probabilities can be identified, then 
policy targeted on them can be effective even if the short-term unemployed are 
eligible. Because workers with low outflow probabilities will make up a 
disproportionate part of the long-term unemployed, targeting them implicitly targets 
the long-term unemployed, and the same discounting effect arises.
In Chapter 3 we develop explicit models of targeted wage subsidies and job search 
assistance, using a search theoretic framework. This allows us to introduce labour 
demand effects into the model. Modelling job search intensity as an endogenous 
choice highlights the importance of interactions between job search assistance and 
‘actively seeking work’ requirements in the unemployment benefit system. If policy 
simply cuts the cost of search, without imposing binding limits on the amount of 
search undertaken, it may have perverse effects. The short-term unemployed will 
reduce the amount of search they undertake, anticipating lower future costs, whilst 
the long-term unemployed will take part of the reduced cost as extra consumption. 
In addition, wage pressure will rise in the same way as if unemployment benefits had 
been increased.
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However, where the benefit system imposes binding constraints on search intensity, 
these negative effects can be avoided, and job search assistance can reduce 
unemployment. Increasing a binding constraint on the long-term unemployed is 
similar to cutting unemployment benefits, lowering wage pressure. At the same 
time, the long-term unemployed search harder, as do the short-term unemployed, 
who now anticipate a lower utility of remaining unemployed.
We go on to model wage subsidies, under the assumption that falling outflow rates 
with unemployment duration arise from genuine state dependence: long-term 
unemployed workers are less desirable than the short-term unemployed, either 
because of skill attrition or employer discrimination. One firm’s hiring decision is 
then an externality for other firms. Hiring a short-term unemployed worker reduces 
the average quality of the remaining unemployed pool faced by other firms with 
vacancies. A subsidy targeted at the hiring of long-term unemployed workers can 
overcome this externality, increasing the average quality of the pool of unemployed 
workers faced by other firms, which will respond by opening more vacancies. In 
addition, there is a direct effect of the subsidy on labour demand, and the wage 
pressure effect identified in Chapter 2. We find that subsidies unambiguously reduce 
unemployment.
Our emphasis on policies targeted on the long-term unemployed follows the general 
trend in policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Most active labour market policy, outside of 
the US, has been focused primarily or exclusively on long-term unemployed workers. 
However, whilst we argue in Chapters 2 and 3 that there are gains to targeting the 
long-term unemployed, it does not automatically follow that the short-term 
unemployed should be excluded completely. We extend our framework in Chapter 4 
to consider the optimum targeting of subsidies between long- and short-term 
unemployed workers.
Firms respond to the level of subsidy per hire. Government, however, is concerned 
with the total cost, which increases with both the subsidy per hire and the number 
of hires. Hence, at a given level of total expenditure, the greater the outflow rate of 
the target group, the less the level of subsidy per hire. We show that this leads to 
diminishing returns to targeting, and that it is not necessarily optimal to target 
policy exclusively onto the long-term unemployed.
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In addition, Chapter 4 extends our model to include endogenous job destruction, 
using the Mortensen-Pissarides.(1994) framework. Deadweight, substitution and 
displacement all arise endogenously in our model, as do wage pressure effects and 
externalities from targeting. By simulating the model for the UK economy, we are 
able to estimate the net effect of these various components that have dominated the 
debate about targeted wage subsidies. We find that, for reasonable structural 
parameters, a properly targeted wage subsidy policy could lead to significant 
reductions in equilibrium unemployment and modest gains in welfare, but at the 
cost of some increased taxation.
We would have liked to have tested our theory direcdy, using macroeconomic evidence 
of the effects of policy on aggregate unemployment. However, there remain 
formidable difficulties to such studies. Aggregate data on the policy stance is often 
poor, and may conceal more than it reveals. Changes in the rules or operation of a 
programme may have more impact than variations in measures of expenditure or 
numbers of programme placements. Beyond this, even a clean measure of the policy 
stance would suffer from endogeneity. Policy is likely to respond to changes in 
unemployment at least as much as unemployment to changes in policy. A lack of 
suitable instruments has dogged previous attempts to estimate the macroeconomic 
effects of active labour market policies. This led us to the view that we could not 
produce a convincing macroeconomic estimate of the effect of wage subsidies with 
the data available.
Instead, therefore, we preferred to look at another issue that has had considerable 
prominence in the policy debate: the longer-term employability effects of wage 
subsidies. Using data from the list sample of the Australian Longitudinal Survey, we 
assess the effect of participation in the Special Youth Employment Training Program. 
This allows us to confirm a critical assumption of our models, that, once hired, 
subsidised workers are not systematically laid off when the subsidy expires, but instead 
have a tenure distribution similar to regular employees. Indeed, the principal effect 
of subsidies on tenure appears to be to extend otherwise very short duration jobs.
Programme participants appear to have been drawn from those otherwise less likely 
to gain employment. We use a bivariate probit analysis to control for selection bias, 
and estimate the effect of going on the SYETP, between June 1984 and October
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1985, on the subsequent probability of being employed in the following two years. 
We find that programme participation has a large, positive and significant effect on 
employment prospects in both years. Even if we exclude retained, but initially 
subsidised, jobs, there is a positive effect from participation. SYETP participants 
who lose their initially subsidised jobs are more likely to get another job than if they 
hadn’t gone on the programme.
The New Deal
A central aim of the UK government’s recently introduced New Deal and other 
welfare-to-work policies is to promote employability: ‘so that people keep in touch 
with the labour market when they lose their jobs, continue to remain part of the effective 
supply of labour and avoid long-term benefit dependency’ (HM Treasury, 1997, p. 34). 
Both job search assistance and wage subsidies play a major part in the New DeaL
Our findings suggest that these elements at least of the New Deal will reduce 
unemployment in the short-term, and help participants avoid long-term benefit 
dependency, by increasing their long-term employability. By increasing the average 
quality of the pool of unemployed workers, wage subsidies increase the capacity of a 
given number of unemployed workers to fill vacancies: the effective supply of labour. 
Job search assistance works similarly, by increasing the efficiency of the matching 
process. Empirically, our findings suggest that a period of subsidised employment 
confers a substantially increased probability of subsequent employment, not only 
beyond the subsidy period, but for at least two years thereafter, and even for those 
young people who subsequendy re-enter unemployment.
The New Deal for 18-24s consists of a period of intensive job search assistance, the 
Gateway, which is mandatory for all 18-24 year olds unemployed for more than 6 
months. For those who do not exit during the Gateway, there are then four options: 
a subsidised job, full-time education and training, a placement in the voluntary sector, 
or on an environmental taskforce. Participation is again mandatory. Of the four 
options, the wage subsidy is expected to be the largest, and provides a subsidy of £60 
per week for 26 weeks, combined with a £750 training grant. Participating firms are 
required to provide the equivalent of one day per week training for 26 weeks, so that 
the subsidy includes an element of in-work (but potentially off-the-job) training, as 
well as a wage subsidy.
II
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We do not model the complex interactions between different programmes, and 
between programmes and benefit receipt, involved in the New Deal for 18-24s, and 
indeed this thesis was near completion before the design of the programme was 
finalised. However, our findings are supportive of two main elements of the 
programme: job search assistance with a mandatory job search requirement in the 
Gateway, and a targeted wage subsidy.
We suspect that this combination will be more effective than either policy individually, 
although it is not something we explicitly model. An initial period of mandatory job 
search will compensate for any tendency for job search intensity to dip prior to 
eligibility for the subsidy, in anticipation of greater returns to subsequent search. It 
should also serve to cut deadweight on the much more expensive wage subsidy 
element, since although job search assistance programmes generally have modest 
results, it seems reasonable to suppose that many of those helped would otherwise 
constitute deadweight on the subsidy.
The New Deal for 25+ is closer to our models, comprising a ^75 per week subsidy 
paid for 26 weeks, for which unemployed workers aged 25+ and unemployed for at 
least 2 years, are eligible. Our findings imply that this should unambiguously reduce 
unemployment. The New Deal for lone parents, the New Deal for disabled people 
and the New Deal for partners of unemployed people all place considerable emphasis 
on job search assistance, although in each case it will be voluntary. Our findings for 
job search assistance in the absence of a search mandate are ambiguous. However, 
these programmes are targeted at the economically inactive, who are not currently 
searching at all, and hence cannot reduce their search in response to lower search 
costs.
Again, this is beyond the scope of our models, but initial estimates from the New 
Deal for lone parents (Hales, Shaw and Roth, 1998) found that it reduced the numbers 
of lone parents in pilot areas claiming Income Support by between 1 and 2 percentage 
points in its first 9 months of operation. The interaction of employment programmes 
and transitions into employment from economic inactivity, rather than 
unemployment, would clearly merit further research.
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Causes o f  unemployment
A great deal of research has been carried out over the past two decades to try to 
explain the causes of the rise in, particularly European, unemployment. It would be 
fair to conclude that no consensus has arisen from this effort, nor does it seem likely 
that a single cause can be isolated for the rise. We do not propose to discuss the 
merits or demerits of particular theories and explanations in themselves: to do so 
with any justice would take us far beyond the scope of this thesis. Surveys can be 
found in Layard et al (1991) and Bean (1994).
But it is fair to ask how the theories we put forward, and our findings about how 
unemployment might be reduced, interact with the various leading views on the 
causes of unemployment. A starting point is that we examine only effects arising 
from within the labour market itself. Furthermore, we look only at equilibrium 
unemployment. It is certainly arguable that the initial rise in European unemployment 
in the 1970s and early 1980s owed more to cyclical factors, and broad macroeconomic 
policy, than to increased distortions in the labour market. But the scope for more 
expansionary macroeconomic policies to reverse the rise seems distinctly limited 
(Bean, 1997).
Instead, we would need considerable persistence in unemployment to explain why 
the macroeconomic policies of the early 1980s and early 1990s led to high 
unemployment throughout most of those decades in many European countries. A 
number of such persistence mechanisms have been proposed, most rooted within 
the labour market. The main exception is persistence through the capital stock, 
where it is argued that a shock to aggregate demand or employment leads to capital 
decumulation. When the shock is reversed, the employment can only recover 
gradually, because of the need to rebuild the capital stock. We make no attempt to 
model the capital stock, but there is little evidence that firms have been constrained 
by capital shortages in recent years (Bean, 1997).
Three other main explanations for persistence can be found in the literature: insider 
effects (Blanchard and Summers, 1986; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988); hiring and 
firing costs (see for example Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bertola, 1990); and outsider 
effects (Layard and Nickell, 1987; Pissarides, 1992; Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). 
Insider theories argue that wages are set solely by the current set of workers, so that,
13
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following a shock, the reduced number of workers prefer to bid up wages rather 
than allow employment to expand back to its previous level. Although we do not 
directly develop an insider model, we do look at models of union bargaining in 
Chapter 2, where the union is concerned about unemployment only in as far as it is 
a risk which the insiders face. We show there that, by increasing the competition for 
jobs which the short-term unemployed face, a policy targeted at the long-term 
unemployed increases the disutility of unemployment from the perspective of insiders. 
In addition, wages subsidies would reduce the cost to the firm of breaking insider 
power by replacing the entire workforce (provided the subsidy rules allowed this), or 
more gradually, by hiring additional workers in the knowledge that they would become 
insiders in due course, and seek to protect their positions, increasing both employment 
and the long-run profitability of the firm.
We do not model firing costs, but we do include hiring costs in our models in Chapters 
3 and 4. By reducing these hiring costs, wage subsidies increase outflows from 
unemployment, but they will also increase inflows where they are endogenous. This 
is explored in Chapter 4. It is difficult to say much about the impact of firing costs, 
without developing a specific model, since the existing literature shows mainly that 
the effects of firing costs are ambiguous (Bertola, 1990). It is likely that this ambiguity 
will extend into models of active labour market policy that include firing costs: for example, 
Millard andMortensen (1997) andMortensen (1996) find opposite effects of untargeted 
subsidies in models with firing costs modelled in different ways (see Chapter 4).
Our models share a number of features with outsider models, such as Blanchard and 
Diamond (1994) or Pissarides (1992). We develop models in Chapters 2,3 and 4 in 
which there is genuine state dependence, in equilibrium, leading firms to prefer the 
short-term unemployed to the long-term unemployed. Targeted subsidies can offset 
the additional costs faced by firms hiring the long-term unemployed and hence 
mitigate outsider effects. Our approach is clearly consistent with the outsider 
approach, but this is not to say that outsider effects must be a significant cause of the 
rise in unemployment for policy findings to be relevant. The increase in long-term 
unemployment that has been a much documented feature of the rise in unemployment 
(see especially Layard et al, 1991) appears to be primarily a function of declining 
outflow rates at all durations, rather than being a specifically long-term unemployment 
related phenomenon (Machin and Manning, 1998).
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Changes more closely related to individuals’ behaviour may also have been behind 
the rises in unemployment of the 1980s and 1990s. Increased generosity of 
unemployment benefit systems, or changes in the tax wedge, might lead unemployed 
people to search less hard for work, since the returns to finding work, relative to 
remaining on benefits, will fall (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). Job search 
assistance is clearly an appropriate policy response here, provided it can be 
implemented in a way which does not at the same time effectively make the benefit 
system more generous still. These issues are explored in Chapter 3.
Changes in the benefit system might also impact on unemployment through people’s 
incentives to accept job offers. In particular, we would expect more generous benefits, 
and high implicit marginal tax rates arising from benefit tapers, to undermine work 
incentives and raise workers’ reservations wages. Our models have little to say about 
this problem: because of our assumptions about wage setting, workers will always be 
better off in work than on benefits, and will always accept jobs if offered.
In line with the empirical evidence (Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Woodbury and 
Spiegelman, 1987), we assume that subsidies are captured by the firm which receives 
them, rather than being bargained over as part of the wage. Hence if unemployment 
arises from too high reservation wages or poor work incentives it is unlikely that job 
search assistance or wage subsidies would be an effective policy response. Instead, 
either reducing the generosity of out-of-work benefits, or increasing that of in-work 
benefits, would be the appropriate policy response. It is notable in this context that 
the UK government has introduced not just the New Deal, but reforms to the tax 
and benefits system to increase work incentives at the same time.
Increases in mismatch are another possible cause of increased unemployment which 
we do not explicitly consider. Here, we must distinguish mismatch arising from 
geographical factors and a lack of labour mobility, from skills mismatch. If, for some 
reason, concentrations of unemployed workers and vacancies are geographically 
separated, then it is unlikely that policies of job search assistance or wage subsidies 
will be an effective response. Firms face a problem not that the pool of available 
workers is not sufficiently desirable to fill their vacancies, but rather that they are 
not sufficiently mobile. Subsidies might help firms overcome barriers to mobility by 
offering workers mobility grants to meet fixed costs of mobility, but they are unlikely
15
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to be effective where more deep-seated barriers to mobility, such as the structure of 
social housing, are relevant.
However, skills mismatch is implicit in our models. Firms prefer short-term 
unemployed workers to readily available long-term unemployed workers because 
the latter need more training. In general, attaching subsidies to workers with poor 
or redundant skills will increase firms’ incentives to hire them, and bear the costs of 
training them, rather than seek to find workers who already have the required skills. 
However, this assumes that the subsidy, plus the saving in search costs of hiring 
more available workers, is sufficient to bridge the gap between the skills available 
and those required. Provided there are no mass points in the distributions of skills 
available in the population and demanded by firms, this will always be the case on 
the margin. But in the presence of mass points -  for example discrete qualification 
requirements -  subsidies will only be effective if they are sufficiently large to cover 
this gap.
Finally, a number of theories have been put forward related to increases in wage 
pressure, including the tax wedge, changes in the terms of trade, increased union 
power or benefit generosity, and real wage rigidity. Whilst active labour market 
policy does not directly tackle these potential causes of higher wage pressure, we 
show that targeted wage subsidies will reduce wage pressure, and hence would offset 
such effects.
No policy is effective under all circumstances, and active labour market policies are 
no exception. Their effectiveness will depend on the underlying causes of the 
unemployment they seek to reduce. Our models inevitably abstract from some of 
the causes of unemployment that have been suggested, whilst incorporating others. 
But we are convinced that they capture sufficient features of the labour market to 
offer insight: in particular, that the labour market is extremely dynamic; that even at 
long durations unemployed workers have a finite and non-trivial probability of exiting 
into employment, but that that probability falls with duration; that, for the UK at 
least, there is evidence of genuine negative state dependence; that firms will respond 
to the cost of finding suitable workers in deciding whether to offer vacancies; and 
that workers who search harder for jobs are more likely to find them.
16
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If wage subsidies were a panacea for mass unemployment, we would surely know by 
now. However, we believe that too often wage subsidy programmes have been 
undermined by analysis that is both short-term and partial equilibrium. This thesis 
argues that we should expect subsidies to have greater effects on aggregate 
unemployment than those suggested by looking at the experience of participating 
firms alone. Furthermore, we have shown that, at least for participants in one such 
programme, subsidies had a lasting effect, extending years beyond the expiry of the 
subsidy. Viewed from a long-term, macroeconomic, perspective, targeted wage, 
subsidies for the long-term unemployed seem a policy which governments are wise 
to try once again.
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I. Active Labour Market Policy:A Survey
We argue that there are three broad strands to the theoretical literature, and 
that each can be seen to underlie one of three principal empirical approaches.
The first emphasises the direct effect of subsidies on firms* labour demand, 
and empirically attempts to separate out additionality from deadweight, 
substitution and displacement. The empirical evidence has generally been 
weaker than the theoretical claims. A  second approach looks at outflow rates 
of the unemployed and those on programmes. Empirically, studies of job search 
assistance have concentrated on outflow rates, generally finding that 
participants secure modest gains from programmes that incur modest costs.
The third approach looks at wage pressure in a macroeconomic framework 
Shifting labour demand towards workers who eocert little inflationary pressure 
can lead to reductions in unemployment, but active labour market policy will 
be counterproductive i f  it reduces the disutility of unemployment that offsets 
wage pressure. Empirically, there have been a number of attempts to assess 
the impact of ALMP on wage-setting, and more generally at a macroeconomic 
level. Overall, macroeconomicfindings are inconclusive. We believe that all 
three approaches contain genuine insights, but that papers in each strand 
have too often ignored the arguments of the others.
1.1 Introduction
The persistence of mass unemployment in many OECD countries in the 1980s and 
1990s has led to renewed interest in active labour market policies (ALMPs). This 
paper is an assessment of what is known about whether such policies are effective. 
Government labour market policy can be broken down into the passive provision of 
benefits, to support the incomes of the unemployed whilst they seek a new job, and 
active policies designed through one means or another to reduce, rather than simply 
ameliorate, unemployment. We will not consider in-work benefits, although they 
too have attracted increasing interest recently (eg Scholz, 1996; Eissa and Liebman, 
1996; Bingley and Walker, 1997). Following the OECD (1993), we can break down 
active labour market policies into five categories: job search assistance; subsidies to regular 
employment, training; direct job creation; and support for those becoming self-employed.
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Active Labour Market Policy: A Survey
Support for those becoming self-employed is only relevant to a small sub-section of 
the unemployed (US Department of Labor, 1995), and we shall not consider it 
further. Furthermore, we will not consider policies, such as early retirement, which 
aim to reduce the supply of labour. Whilst there may be a role for them in times of 
disequilibrium, there seems little reason to suppose, on either theoretical or empirical 
grounds, that such policies can reduce equilibrium unemployment (Layard etal> 1991).
Of the four remaining types of active labour market policy, two are broadly‘scheme- 
based’ and two ‘transition-based’. Training and direct job creation place the 
unemployed into government schemes, creating a separate labour market state. 
Alternatively, training might be thought of as removing participants from the labour 
force altogether, in the same way as those in full-time education. In addition, with 
scheme-based policies, we may need to distinguish carefully between ‘open’ 
unemployment, which excludes those on schemes, and the total of those unemployed 
and in schemes. If schemes serve merely to ‘park’ the unemployed, then an increase 
in scheme participation may serve only to disguise unemployment, reducing open 
unemployment but not increasing employment. Conversely, subsidies for regular 
employment and job search assistance do not constitute a separate state within the 
labour force, but rather act to increase the probability of transition into employment.
In many countries it has been scheme-based policies that have dominated ALMP 
provision. Sweden in particular, whose commitment to active labour market policy 
has far exceeded that of other countries, has depended principally on job creation 
(‘relief work’) and training programmes. However, a perceived failure of such policies 
has led to renewed interest in alternatives, and we will primarily consider policies 
designed directly to facilitate the transition from unemployment into work: job search 
assistance and wage subsidies. Inevitably, the literature does not neatly follow the 
OECD’s typology, so we will consider some of the existing broader literature on 
active labour market policy. But it is not our intention to provide a comprehensive 
survey of the considerable literature on training programmes or direct job creation.
Whilst these policies have become increasingly popular, particularly as solutions to 
the problems of long-term unemployment, they are not new. The Weimar Republic 
implemented a wage subsidy for six months in 1932, the ‘Papen plan’, (Kopits, 1978), 
whilst Irving Fisher sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to persuade Roosevelt to include
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them in the New Deal (Allen, 1977). As Haveman and Saks (1985, p. 20) argue: ‘It 
is certainly possible that some social scientist or bureaucrat will invent a new program 
to relieve labor market distress quickly and cheaply. But the odds are that the building 
blocks for effective employment and training systems are already available’.
Yet, despite 60 years of experience, these policies remain highly controversial. In 
particular, whilst there is a growing consensus in favour of job search assistance (Fay, 
1996; US Department of Labor, 1995), there is continued disagreement about wage 
subsidies. And whilst there are a large number of microeconomic studies of individual 
programmes, we are still developing the theoretical basis needed for interpreting these 
results in a macroeconomic framework. Moreover, attempts at directly estimating the 
macroeconomic effects of policy have, with a few exceptions, proved inconclusive.
We argue below that most of the existing theoretical literature either fails to address 
the critics of active labour market policy, ignoring their most vital objections, or 
assumes that policy is scheme-based, ignoring policies that directly promote the 
transition into regular employment. Furthermore, much of the empirical literature 
suffers shortcomings arising from the limitations of the theory underpinning it. There 
is a substantial body of evidence on the microeconomic effects of active labour market 
policy, although most studies of wage subsidies look only at the short-term effects. 
But if what we want is to know the impact of policy on equilibrium unemployment, 
then we need to move beyond a microeconomic framework.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 below examines the existing 
theory of active labour market policies. We argue that there are three principal 
approaches within this literature, focusing on labour demand, outflows and wage- 
setting respectively. A fourth approach, using search theory, is beginning to bring 
these different elements together. Corresponding to each of the three main 
approaches, there is a body of empirical evidence. Section 3 looks at the microeconomic 
studies, which can in turn be split into two broad types. Employer-based studies fit the 
labour demand model, whilst employee-based approaches relate to outflow models. 
Section 4 looks at the more limited macroeconomic evidence, which incorporates 
the insights of the wage-setting models. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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1.2 Theory
Three main strands to the theoretical literature can be identified. The first, and 
longest-standing, emphasises the labour demand effects of policy, in particular of 
subsidies. A second approach, running at least as far back as the beginnings of the 
Swedish model, focuses on outflow effects. Finally, more recent literature especially 
has examined the possible interactions of wage-setting and active labour market 
policy. We believe that this third approach can be applied to all active labour market 
policies, but the existing literature has primarily focused on scheme-based policies. 
Each of these strands has genuine insights, and some of the most recent literature 
has attempted to meld all three approaches. In particular, we look briefly at some 
recent papers in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search theoretic tradition. 
However, we believe that this process is only partially complete, especially concerning 
the analysis of transition-based active labour market policy.
Labour demand
Theoretical analysis ofwage subsidies goes back to Pigou (1933) and Kaldor (1936), 
prompted by the German experiment of 1932. Both Pigou and Kaldor assume that 
the subsidy will operate by increasing labour demand at given wages, Kaldor assuming 
a very high wage elasticity of labour demand, not less than three. The underlying 
assumption is that labour costs exceed the (market-clearing) marginal product of 
labour, for unspecified reasons, leading to unemployment. This labour demand 
approach is neatly summed up by Bishop and Haveman (1977, p. 125): ‘The economic 
rationale for [wage subsidies] is straightforward: By reducing the price of labor at 
the margin, employment will be encouraged, unemployment reduced, price pressure 
will be reduced in competitive markets ... and, in the case of marginal stock subsidies, 
entry will be encouraged.’
The 1970s saw the return of mass unemployment and with it renewed interest in 
wage subsidies. The labour demand approach inherent in Kaldor and Pigou was 
extended, most notably by Layard and Nickell (1980). Their argument is essentially 
about boosting demand in the product market, especially for tradable goods. Where 
firms are price-takers, a small drop in the marginal cost of domestic producers will 
lead to large increases in output, increasing employment and improving the balance 
of payments position. Whitley and Wilson (1983) question whether these output
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effects would in fact be as large as Layard and Nickell claimed, using estimates from 
a large-scale macroeconomic forecasting modeL However, in 1979, the UK Temporary 
Employment Subsidy, a redundancy prevention measure, had to be withdrawn after 
objections from the EEC over its success in internationally competitive markets 
(Gregg, 1990). Half of all the subsidy paid went to firms in the highly internationally 
competitive textiles, leather, clothing and footwear industries. This at least suggests 
that the effects of the policy may have been greater than Whitley and Wilson were 
prepared to concede, but at the same time that policies which operate primarily 
through ‘beggar your neighbour’ effects may be unsustainable under the rules of the 
single European market or the World Trade Organisation.
Persistent unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s led to a shift of emphasis towards 
programmes targeted at the long-term unemployed. However, the intellectual 
tradition of Kaldor is still reflected in a number of essentially demand-side analyses 
of wage subsidies. Snower (1994) proposes that the unemployed should be able to 
use part of their unemployment benefit entitlement as a voucher for firms that hire 
them. Because the expected future duration of unemployment is an increasing function 
of actual elapsed duration, the size of the voucher would increase with the duration 
of unemployment. Snower also suggests that higher value vouchers would be available 
to firms which use them for training, although this is not integral to his assumptions.
Snower’s model sets up a labour demand schedule, in which demand shifts out linearly 
with the size of the voucher, at given wages. Firms have revenue function, 
R = a L - \cL} . They hire entrants, who initially receive a wage equal to the benefit 
level, b, and thereafter receive wage w* if they remain with the firm. Turnover is 
exogenous, with per period probability <7. All hires are eligible for a subsidy, v. Hence, 
labour demand is determined by:
(1.1) b + ------ -—  = v +-------
<7 a
The expected present discounted value of the stream of future wages equals the 
subsidy plus the expected present discounted value of the stream of marginal revenue 
products. The incumbent wage, w*y exceeds the market clearing level only because 
of an exogenous firing cost,^ so that:
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(1.2) w* = a-cL  + q f
Whilst it is clear that this is intended to proxy for general distortions in the labour 
market, this approach crucially excludes any influence of the wage subsidy itself on 
the wage setting process. The model is closed by imposing a balanced budget 
requirement, so that the cost of subsidies equals the savings in unemployment benefit, 
which Snower claims to be the novelty of his ‘benefit transfer programme’.
Expressing the value of the voucher as a function of the benefit level provides a way 
of closing off the upper value of the voucher, when combined with the balanced 
budget requirement. However, any alternative financing rule that closed off the upper 
value of the voucher would leave the fundamentals of his proposal intact, regardless 
of whether the value was expressed in terms of benefit levels, or in absolute terms (as 
we prefer in our models). Snower derives a reduction in unemployment purely from 
the labour demand curve shifting out in response to the subsidy. Equations (1.1) and
(1.2) give:
(1.3) cL = v + k where: k = a -  b -  (1 -  o ) f , a constant.
Hence, any level of employment is achievable, provided we can finance the subsidy 
without imposing the costs onto firms. This is only possible because wages here are 
independent of unemployment, and hence of the effect of policy on unemployment. 
Snower reinforces this separation by stating that ‘the long-term unemployment rate 
has little effect on wage inflation’ (1994, p. 66).
Orszag and Snower (1996) extend this analysis to allow for subsidised workers to 
displace existing employees and for the fiscal implications of some subsidies being 
claimed by workers who would anyway have left unemployment (deadweight). 
Unsurprisingly, both displacement and deadweight limit the increment to 
employment that can be achieved for any given budgetary allocation to the scheme. 
However, the basic results remain because of the assumption that wages are 
independent of unemployment generally, or at least of the effects of policy on 
unemployment, an assumption also shared by recent work by Artis and Sinclair 
(1996) and Adnett and Dawson (1996). All these papers argue that wage subsidies
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would unambiguously reduce unemployment, essentially by shifting out the labour 
demand curve at given wages. Fiscal costs can be covered, explicitly or implicitly, by 
savings from unemployment benefits and foregone taxation.
However, the assumption that wages are independent of the effects of policy is a 
strong one, and has come in for considerable criticism (eg Calmfors, 1993). Often, 
this assumption is based on empirical findings that the long-term unemployed do 
not appear to weigh down on inflation in estimates of wage equations (Nickell, 
1987). However, as Nickell points out, there is a very high correlation between the 
proportion of the unemployed who are long-term, and the change in unemployment. 
Hence, we cannot easily distinguish effects arising from the long-term unemployed 
from effects arising from changes in unemployment.
Snower’s (1994) model has attracted attention as much for its simulated findings as 
its theoretical model. A fiscally neutral wage subsidy for the long-term unemployed 
is predicted to reduce unemployment by around 20% in the UK, 30-35% in the 
Netherlands and a staggering 80-90% in Germany. Snower estimates these results 
by assuming that the subsidy, net of deadweight and displacement, has an effect 
equivalent to half the effect of a corresponding permanent wage reduction. He then 
multiplies this through by estimates of the short-run labour demand elasticity from 
Layard et al (1991).
Even allowing for the theoretical simplicity of Snower s model, this approach has 
two substantial disadvantages. Firstly, the parameters used seem excessively generous 
to his proposal. A combined deadweight, substitution and displacement of 50% is 
considerably less than is typically found in empirical estimates (see Section 3 below). 
Snower s ‘subsidy effectiveness co-efficient’, the effect of a subsidy relative to a 
permanent wage reduction, also seems high: Dreze (1997), for example, proposes 
0.15 instead of 0.5.
Secondly, these parameters are essentially arbitrarily chosen. In simulating the impact 
of targeted wage subsidies on the UK economy in Chapter 4, we develop a model in 
which deadweight, substitution and displacement are endogenous. We are then able 
to select parameter values on the basis of empirical evidence, rather than arbitrary 
choice. In contrast to Snower, we find that subsidies never pay for themselves -
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taxes always increase -  whilst the effects on unemployment are more modest than 
Snower implies. Jongen (1998) re-estimates the likely effects of Snower’s proposal 
for the Dutch labour market, using an aggregate general equilibrium model, and 
parameter values from micro-survey data. He also finds more modest unemployment 
effects, about a tenth of those predicted by Snower, and that expenditure on subsidies 
exceeds savings on benefits.
Outflows
It has long been recognised that the existence of frictions in the job-finding market 
can lead to unemployment. The search theoretic approach pioneered by Diamond, 
Mortensen and Pissarides builds a general equilibrium model of the labour market 
around the notion of a matching function. We look at some recent papers in this 
tradition at the end of this section. However, a simpler approach, looking at the 
outflow rates of different groups of unemployed workers in partial equilibrium has 
been more popular in the ALMP literature. In particular, such an approach underlies 
much of the empirical work on job search assistance.
Whilst frictions have often been assumed to be minor in the context of relatively 
laissez-faire labour markets, enhancing search was a central justification for Swedish 
active labour market policy (Robinson, 1995). It was recognised that a ‘solidaristic’ 
wage policy, aimed at reducing differentials in pay, would dampen the incentives for 
labour mobility. Active labour market policy was intended to tackle this problem, by 
promoting the efficient functioning of the labour matching process. A well resourced 
public employment service, with the legal right to be notified of virtually all vacancies, 
would minimise the frictions in matching unemployed workers to jobs. At the same 
time training programmes and mobility grants would enhance worker mobility from 
low productivity industries — which would be particularly squeezed by the demands 
of solidaristic pay -  towards high productivity industries. Thus active labour market 
policy was intended both to reduce mismatch and to substitute for the economic 
incentives for mobility otherwise provided by pay differentials.
Whilst the importance of frictions in the labour market underlay the widespread 
introduction of public employment services, the central role accorded to search in Sweden 
was not widely copied until the onset of large-scale long-term unemployment in the 
1980s. Jackman etal (1989) chart the outward shift of the Beveridge curve in the UK.
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Figure l.liAarnio’s framework
Similar outward shifts in the Beveridge curves have been found for many other countries 
(Jackman et al, 1990), although significantly not for Sweden. Failing to find any evidence 
of increased mismatch Jackm an etaI (1989) conclude that the increase in unemployment 
at given vacancy levels must have arisen from reduced search effectiveness among the 
unemployed. This in turn might have arisen because o f higher benefits, more lax 
enforcement of job search requirements, or the growth in long-term unemployment.
Aarnio (1993) uses a flow equilibrium model in which search efficiency varies between 
different groups o f unemployed workers to model the effects o f active labour m arket 
policy. Policy here is scheme-based, with the government determ ining the flow out 
o f unemployment onto schemes. Workers can exit schemes directly into employment, 
or, if they fail to get a job before the scheme ends, they enter ‘post-program m e 
unemployment’. N o-one goes on a scheme more than once in any unem ploym ent 
spell, but the exit probabilities -  and hence implicitly the search intensity -  vary 
between initial unemployment, post-program me unemployment and program me 
participation. Figure 1.1 shows the flow equilibrium.
N, P  and Up are employment, initial unemployment, programme participation 
and post-programme unemployment; A measures the state o f the aggregate labour 
market, whilst and 0 2 are the search effectiveness o f programme participants 
and post-programme unemployed, relative to the initial unemployed. The government 
determ ines a ,  the inflow in to  program m es, and the m axim um  d u ra tio n  o f  
programmes, D , which determines /3, the outflow from  programmes. T he inflow
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into unemployment, s, is exogenous. We assume an equilibrium in which the numbers 
in each state are constant, and hence the inflows must equal the outflows from each 
state:
(1.4) sN = A[U„+01P+02Up]
(1.5) sN = (Z + a)U„
(1.6) aU„ =(fi+0lX)P
Normalising the total labour force to unity, and solving the flow conditions gives:
(17) U =_____________^ _____________4 ^ 1- i) + ^ r i)]+(.+iK«)
where: U = UQ+P + Up and jx(a) = (p +A.O1)92+(p+A02)a/A
Aarnio concentrates on the case where search intensity falls during the programme, 
but increases once the worker has completed the programme, ie 6X < 1 < 02. Hence 
there is a trade-off and programmes will be more efficient the shorter their duration, 
the greater the gain in post-programme outflow rates, and the less the loss in within- 
programme outflow rates. By differentiating (1.7), we can show that total 
unemployment -  including programme participants -  will fall when programmes 
are expanded (ie a  is increased), provided: p  > X02(l ~ 0X) /  [6 2-1).  pis related to 
the maximum duration of programmes, D, according to:
u-8)
Hence, an increase in placements of the unemployed onto programmes will reduce 
overall unemployment, provided the duration of programmes satisfies:
-1(1.9) D<D* = — logj
02 6X
u dD* n dD* A where: —  > 0,—_ > 0
d6x CX)r
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Hence, the higher are either of the outflow rates, 91 and 9 2 , the longer programmes 
can be. Aarnios model is the closest in spirit to many of the microeconomic empirical 
studies which measure the impact of the programme on outflow rates for participants 
relative to non-participants.
Piggott and Chapman (1995) adopt a similar transition flows model to simulate the 
Australian Job Compact, which guaranteed a programme place to all long-term 
unemployed workers (18 months plus). They incorporate substitution, by allowing 
that outflows from short-term unemployment (the non-target group) fall by some 
proportion of the rise in outflows from the target group. They then use estimates 
from empirical studies of the increase in effectiveness of the target group and the 
substitution effect to simulate the effects of the Job Compact, finding that the net 
budgetary cost is highly sensitive to the parameters used. In particular, estimates 
vary widely according to the effectiveness assumed for the programme. Since, as we 
discuss below, selection biases make this extremely difficult to measure accurately, 
this suggests a wide margin of error is likely in cost-benefit analyses of these policies.
However, this transition flows approach is only a partial equilibrium. Whilst the relative 
outflow rates are a function of the programme design, the overall outflow rate also depends 
on the general state of the labour market, which is left exogenous. In general equilibrium, 
outflows will clearly be affected by wage-setting. As with the labour demand literature, 
these models, and the empirical tradition they reflect, are subject to the criticism 
that the positive effects they find may be offset if ALMP pushes up wage pressure.
Wage-setting
The idea that wage subsidies could operate through the wage-setting, rather than 
the demand side of the labour market, originates with Baily and Tobin (1977). They 
argue that targeted wage subsidies can ‘cheat the Phillips curve’, and hence reduce 
equilibrium unemployment: ‘The basic strategy is simple: Shift labor demand to 
types of workers who are -  because of high unemployment, weak bargaining power, 
rigid wages, or other characteristics -  on relatively flat Phillips curves’ (Baily and 
Tobin, 1977, p. 512). Aggregate wage pressure is thus made a function of policy, and 
by inducing employers to hire workers whose unemployment does little or nothing 
to weigh down on wage inflation, we can reduce the NAIRU.
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Layard (1996) takes a similar view. The long-term unemployed are unattractive to 
employers, and thus do not weigh down on inflation. Hence, if the government has 
an explicit inflation target, it can nonetheless reduce long-term unemployment 
without having to tighten fiscal or monetary policy: ‘if each unemployed person 
becomes more attractive to an employer, then the total number of unemployed people 
required falls’ (Layard, 1996, pp. 9-10). Hence, Layard contends, we should not 
worry that targeted wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed will simply 
substitute short-term unemployment for long-term unemployment. The fact that 
the displaced short-term unemployed worker is still attractive to employers itself 
generates another job. Wages are a function purely of the number of short-term 
unemployed, and hence any increase in short-term unemployment will reduce wage 
pressure, allowing employment to expand to mop up the increase.
However, these models depend on somewhat ad hoc wage equations. Two recent 
models have incorporated advances in the theory of wage-setting, making use in 
particular of union bargaining, efficiency wages and search theory.
Holmlund and Linden (1993) adopt a general equilibrium framework to examine Swedish 
relief work schemes. The model is search theoretic, but the key results derive from the 
wage-setting behaviour. There are three labour market states: employment, unemployment 
and relief jobs. Wages are set by Nash bargaining and are subject to continuous 
renegotiation. Hence the wage will be increasing in the worker’s outside option, which is 
always assumed to be unemployment. The government can determine flows into relief 
jobs, both from the stock of unemployed, and from each period’s new inflow.
Search intensity is assumed to be lower, in general, in relief jobs than unemployment, 
but unlike Aarnio (1993), there is no post-programme state so that worker’s search 
intensity cannot rise in the long-run once they have left the programme. In addition, 
relief work is assumed to be voluntary, so that its utility must be at least as great as 
the utility of unemployment. In the absence of wage-effects, increases in the flows 
into relief jobs must reduce open unemployment, but there will be substantial crowding 
out of regular employment if the search intensity of relief workers is much below 
that of the unemployed.
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However, the wage effects complicate this picture. If the government increases the 
flows from the unemployed stock into relief work, then that increases the expected 
value of unemployment, given that relief work is preferred to unemployment. This 
in turn improves the outside option for the worker, and hence bids up the wage. 
Thus the effects on (open) unemployment will be ambiguous: larger flows into relief 
work will tend to reduce unemployment, although at the cost of crowding out regular 
employment, but higher wages will tend to increase it.
If, instead, the government increases the flows from the unemployment inflow into 
relief jobs, the wage effects will go the other way. In order to be able to take advantage 
of this increased flow, the worker must be employed. Hence, the value of employment 
rises relative to unemployment. This, in turn, lowers the wage, since the worker is 
prepared to work for less in exchange for their improved prospects should they be 
separated in future. In this case unemployment will unambiguously fall.
Holmlund and Linden’s model is interesting both because it is a general equilibrium 
exposition, and because its policy implications directly contradict the suggestions of 
Layard and Snower that policy should be targeted on the long-term unemployed. 
However, their results depend critically on the assumption that it is unemployment 
which is the worker’s outside option. If the possibility of being placed directly into a 
relief job was also taken into account, then an increase in transitions from the 
unemployment inflow into relief work would increase the worker’s outside option in 
the same way as an increase in the flow from the unemployment stock into relief 
work. But to exclude the possibility of relief work from the worker’s outside option 
implies that the government can identify, and exclude, ‘quitters’. This is a strong 
assumption, since ‘quits’ may not be explicit. But if this is possible for the 
unemployment inflow it must also be possible for the subsequent stock, and hence 
‘quitters’ could be permanently excluded from eligibility for relief work. In this case 
relief work would not come into the worker’s outside option at all, and the wage 
would be independent of the flows into relief work.
Thus Holmlund and Linden seem unduly generous in their treatment of programmes 
targeted on the inflow into unemployment. However, they also appear unduly harsh 
on active labour market programmes in general, since they do not allow that 
participation in the programme might make the worker more employable afterwards.
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Caimfors and Lang (1995) produce the most elaborate model o f active labour m arket 
policy yet, addressing these shortcomings. As we can see from Figure 1.2, their 
transitions fram ework is considerably more complex than A arnio’s, or indeed 
Holm lund and Lindens. They use a union bargaining framework, in which the 
worker’s outside option includes all the possible transitions. In  addition they add a 
further labour m arket state, in which workers, whilst unemployed, engage in no 
search. They ‘drop out’ o f the effective labour force, and can exit only through ‘death’. 
This introduces negative duration dependence into the model, since the longer a 
worker is unemployed, the greater their probability o f entering this drop out state. 
Furthermore, by reducing the risk of drop out, active labour m arket programmes 
can serve to reduce negative duration dependence. Figure 1.2 shows the flow equilibrium.
N, U, P  and D  are employment, unemployment, programme participation, and the 
‘drop out’ state respectively. All workers die w ith probability S, and are replaced by 
an equal inflow of 5. New entrants are either unemployed or placed into programmes. 
The government determines the programme inflows from new entrants, employment 
(separations), unemployment and existing programme participants, a b>an, a u and a r 
respectively. Employees are exogenously separated w ith probability s, w hilst the 
unemployed and programme participants have exogenous probability o f dropping 
out, mu> and respectively. Finally, the endogenous probabilities o f re-em ploym ent 
are given by Xu for the unemployed, and Xf  for programme participants.
Figure 1.2 :Caimfors and Lang’s framework
(1-aJs
m
a J l-X -m -8 )
CCS
ah8
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At the aggregate level, the labour demand curve is assumed to be fixed, whilst wages 
are determined by monopoly unions, which maximise the rent from unionisation:
(1.10) UJ
Where: UJ is the utility of union j, N j employment at firm j, v(zJ) the utility of 
wages at firm j y and v the utility of the outside option, an average of the utilities of 
the various non-employment states, weighted according to the transition probabilities. 
The general form of v is somewhat complex, covering more than a page of algebra 
(Caimfors and Lang, 1993). However it is clear that any increase in *7 will bid up 
wages, and hence reduce employment. Any increase in the size of active labour 
market policy will, in general, have three offsetting effects:
i) If relief work is preferred to unemployment, then v will tend to rise;
ii) By reducing negative duration dependence, policy will increase the 
competition among the unemployed for jobs, lowering the probability of 
entering employment, the most desirable transition, and hence reducing v .
iii) Finally, by reducing the risk of dropping out, the least desirable transition, 
v will be increased.
The balance of these effects will vary with the nature of the policy proposed. For 
example, only (ii) will apply to policies targeted at new entrants to the labour force, 
since existing employees will not be eligible for them. Thus policies targeted on new 
entrants will always reduce unemployment.
Furthermore, policies targeted on the long-term unemployed are more likely to 
reduce unemployment than those for which all the unemployed are eligible. Increased 
competition, (ii), imposes an immediate cost on the unemployed, but the gains from 
(i) and (iii) are now only available after at least one period of unemployment. Hence 
the increased utility they bring will be discounted relative to the utility costs of (ii), 
making it more likely that v will fall. Thus Caimfors and Lang contradict Holmlund 
and Linden’s prescription that policy should be targeted on the inflow into 
unemployment, rather than the existing stock.
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The Iron la v /o f  active labour market policy
Whilst Caimfors and Lang’s results are ambiguous in most cases, the possible adverse 
wage effect that they identify will be a feature of any wage-setting model in which 
upwards wage pressure is offset by the utility cost incurred by unemployment. Nash 
bargaining (used in most search models) has this feature, as does the Shapiro-Stiglitz 
shirking model (see Caimfors and Lang, 1993, for a model with Shapiro-Stiglitz 
wage setting). If the labour demand schedule is fixed, then ALMP can only reduce 
unemployment by reducing the expected utility of unemployment (including schemes). 
Caimfors and Lang describe this as the ‘iron law of active labour market policy’.
If labour demand is also increased by policy, then this will mitigate Caimfors and 
Lang’s iron law, but it does not justify ignoring it. The failure of many models of 
active labour market policy in the labour demand and outflow-based traditions to 
consider this criticism renders their positive results questionable.
Snower (1997) claims that the wage-pressure argument is unlikely to apply in practice 
because, at least for those likely to be in receipt of subsidies, wages are determined 
primarily by benefit levels or minimum wage provisions. This is essentially a dual 
labour market approach in which efficiency wages or union bargaining apply only in 
the primary sector, whilst the long-term unemployed are restricted to the secondary 
sector. However, he does not provide a model to back up this argument.
Moreover, Snower must implicitly assume that existing primary sector workers do 
not face an anticipated risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Otherwise, provided 
exiting long-term unemployment, even into the secondary sector, is at all desirable, 
regardless of the means of wage-setting in the secondary sector, increased outflows 
from long-term unemployment will increase the expected utility of unemployment 
for those currently in the primary sector, bidding up primary sector wages. 
Furthermore, if benefits or minimum wages are determined by fixed replacement 
ratios to primary sector wages then this will drive wages up in the secondary sector 
as well. Alternatively, we might assume that the utility of secondary sector 
employment is no higher than that of long-term unemployment. However, the subsidy 
must increase the probability of exiting long-term unemployment into the primary 
sector. Although small, this can never be zero without the exit rate of former primary 
sector workers equalling one, which would tend to bid primary sector wages up
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indefinitely. Hence wages in the secondary sector will have to rise to compensate 
workers for loss of access to subsidy-entidement. Either way, even in a dual labour 
market, wage-pressure effects cannot be ignored.
However, it has also been argued that the wage-pressure effect generates a mechanism 
by which policy might be more, rather than less, effective. Jackman (1994) claims 
that because Swedish active labour market policies are compulsory, they can be used 
as a form of workfare. By making the receipt of benefits contingent on performing 
time consuming tasks, the utility of unemployment can be reduced without 
undermining their income insurance role. Active labour market policies can thus 
reduce wage pressure and also act as a self-selection mechanism to remove the idle 
and fraudulent. Hence ALMP can be effective at the macroeconomic level, even if 
the programmes themselves have no positive effects for their participants.
Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search models
Papers in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search tradition have concentrated 
more on the policy implications of unemployment benefits, rather than active labour 
market policy (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, for a critical evaluation of the 
literature on unemployment benefits). However, whilst they do not explicidy model 
active labour market policy, some papers in the general equilibrium search literature 
contain useful insights. More recendy, the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of 
job creation and job destruction has provided a basis for two attempts to simulate 
the impact of active labour market policies. Both the earlier approach, as in for 
example Pissarides (1990), and the Mortensen-Pissarides model incorporate both 
labour demand and wage setting endogenously.
Pissarides (1984) introduces endogenous search intensity by both unemployed workers 
and firms with vacancies. There are positive externalities to matching, since each 
side saves the other side their costs of search when a match is made. The existence of 
these positive externalities means that search intensities will always be below the 
social optimum. Furthermore, no feasible wage exists that would ensure optimum 
search intensities. Because of the saving on vacancy costs, the social benefits from 
job matching exceed the marginal product of labour. But in order to induce the 
worker to search efficiently, they must receive the full value of their marginal product, 
leading firms to make losses. Hence search intensity will always be inefficiently low
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in the market equilibrium, which might justify government intervention to subsidise 
search or establish public employment agencies.
The interaction of long-term unemployment and reduced matching efficiency is 
investigated in Pissarides (1992). If unemployment duration leads to a loss of skills, 
then the unemployed may become less attractive to firms, leading to a thin market. 
This in turn will reduce the incentive for firms to open vacancies, so that fewer jobs 
come into the market in the next period, the unemployed continue to lose their 
skills, and the thin market can continue. If this thin market externality is sufficiently 
large, there can be multiple equilibria. This framework could offer a justification for 
training or other measures to make the unemployed more desirable to employers.
Davidson and Woodbury (1995) calibrate a search model using results from the 
Illinois Reemployment Bonus experiment (see Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987) 
to estimate the effects of a subsidy paid to employees, specifically to displaced workers. 
They find that the net effects would be small, but both labour demand and wages 
are fixed in their model. Mortensen (1996) and Millard and Mortensen (1997) look 
at various labour market policies using the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of 
endogenous job creation and job destruction. Mortensen (1996) looks mainly at 
active policies, whilst Millard and Mortensen (1997) look mainly at passive policies, 
but do also model a hiring subsidy. As is typical with these models, analytical results 
are ambiguous and both papers use simulated results.
Mortensen looks at three types of subsidy, using simulations for the UK economy: a 
recruitment subsidy offsetting the costs of vacancies; a hiring subsidy offsetting the 
costs of initial training; and a cut in payroll taxes. He finds that all three would 
reduce unemployment, and increase aggregate consumption. Measuring the 
effectiveness of policy by the increase in aggregate consumption for a given increase 
in government expenditure, a recruitment subsidy would be most effective, followed 
by an initial training subsidy, with a payroll tax cut the least effective.
Millard and Mortensens results are less clear-cut. They find that a small hiring/initial 
training subsidy would increase equilibrium unemployment in a model with redundancy 
payments, but reduce unemployment in a model with zero redundancy payments.
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Implications for the  empirical evidence
Attempts to divide a diverse literature into simple categories always involve a degree 
of arbitrariness, and certainly a number of the papers considered above overlap more 
than one category. However, beliefs about the correct theoretical framework for 
analysing active labour market policy have a critical effect on the interpretation of 
the empirical data, and this division of the theoretical literature is matched by a 
division within the empirical studies. Hence, the weight which we give to any 
particular piece of empirical evidence must also reflect the weight we give to each of 
the theoretical approaches outlined.
Most of the labour demand literature implies an unambiguously positive effect for 
policy, and in particular for wage subsidies. Provided the labour demand curve is 
shifted out, unemployment will fall. Empirically this is consistent with studies that 
examine the response of employers to wage subsidies and try to identify the net 
increase in labour demand at firm level.
Within the outflow-based literature, it is generally the case that an increase in the 
search effectiveness of unemployed workers will reduce unemployment, but this 
may be offset by any fall in search during programme participation. Although search 
effectiveness is difficult to measure directly, we can obtain transition rates into 
employment for those who go through the programme relative to those who do not. 
Provided any gains to the participants are not at the expense of non-participants, 
this will give us a measure of the programme’s impact. If this is sufficiently large, 
relative to any drop in transition probability during the programme, then we would 
expect aggregate unemployment to fall. This is the approach underlying studies of 
programme impacts on their participants.
However, if we take into account the role of wage-setting, then neither of the above 
methods is sufficient. Wage pressure effects will only be observable at the macroeconomic 
level, and studies of firms or workers will not detect them. Apparently successful policies 
at the microeconomic level may be offset by induced increases in wage pressure. Conversely, 
even apparendy useless schemes may lower aggregate unemployment if they reduce 
wage pressure among workers keen to avoid ending up on them. Similarly, general 
equilibrium search models can only be tested with macroeconomic data.
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1.3 Microeconomic Evidence
In Section 4 below we consider the existing macroeconomic evidence. Although we 
believe that a macroeconomic framework is needed to assess the overall effect of active 
labour market policy, the technical and data difficulties inherent in such a task should not 
be underestimated. Moreover, the evaluation literature is predominantly microeconomic 
and a number of critical questions can only be answered by looking at the microeconomic 
data. We begin, therefore with the considerable body of microeconomic studies.
We shall concentrate almost exclusively on studies of transition-based policies. There 
have been a number of broader reviews of the microeconomic literature recently 
(OECD, 1993; US Department of Labor, 1995; Fay, 1996), and especially of training 
programmes (Heckman, 1993; Lalonde, 1995) and we refer the reader to these for 
more information on scheme-based policies. Very generally their findings are that:
i) Large-scale, broadly-based training programmes have a poor record in 
enhancing the employment or wages of participants, although it may be 
that effects only show up with a substantial lag and longer-term evaluations 
are required.
ii) Small-scale, well-targeted training programmes can, however, have positive 
effects, at least for adults.
iii) Direct job creation, in either the public or non-profit sectors, seems to have 
few, if any, positive effects for participants.
The apparent failure of many of these scheme-based policies has led to a shift of 
emphasis in a number of countries towards transition-based approaches.
The microeconomic literature can be divided into two broad types. The first, 
concerned particularly with wage subsidies, seeks to assess labour demand effects, by 
separating out net job creation from substitution and deadweight at firm-level. This 
is consistent with the labour demand strand of the theoretical literature, in which 
the aggregate effect is simply the sum of the net increase in labour demand at 
participating firms. The second, consistent with the outflow-based strand of the 
theory, looks at the impact of programmes on their participants, in terms of their 
future employment and earnings potential.
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Deadweight, substitution and displacement
Studies based on employer surveys have generally focused on estimates of the 
deadweight, substitution and additionality generated by wage subsidies. Displacement 
is often discussed, but rarely effectively measured. Slightly varying uses of these 
terms appear within the literature. We shall define them as follows:
•  Deadweight is where the job would have gone to the same person, or another 
member of the targeted group, even in the absence of the policy. Hence the 
policy has had no effect on the firm’s hiring decision and is a pure windfall 
gain to the firm and a deadweight loss to the government.
•  Substitution is where the job would otherwise have gone to a different person, 
not a member of the target group. Hence the policy has changed the firm’s 
hiring decision, but not, at least in partial equilibrium, increased the firm’s 
labour demand.
•  Displacement is where the firm uses a subsidy to gain market share from 
competitors. The subsidised firm hires additional workers which it would 
not have hired without the subsidy. However, the firm’s competitors hire 
correspondingly fewer workers (or lay off existing workers), so that, taking 
the firms together, the effect is the same as for substitution.
•  Additionality is the net increase in jobs created at partial equilibrium level, 
so that additionality equals the total number of subsidised jobs, less 
deadweight, substitution and displacement.
Table 1.1 gives some estimates of these effects from various studies. Some details of 
the programmes evaluated are also included. These results are not all exactly 
comparable, since definitions varied somewhat between evaluations. Results are 
further complicated by the treatment of vacancies which would have been created 
anyway, but were brought forward in response to the subsidy, or that would have 
been created but for fewer hours. Where it is reasonably clear that these vacancies 
would anyway have been created they have been allocated either to deadweight or 
to substitution as appropriate, since in (partial) equilibrium with a permanent 
programme these effects would not lead to a net increase in the number of employees.
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Table I. I: Deadweight, substitution and additionality
Study Programme Country Target Group Subsidy level Results
Ash
Consulting 
(1992) cited 
inNERA  
(1995)
Training and 
Employment 
Grant Scheme 
(TEGS) II
UK Principally young 
or long-term 
unemployed (ltu) 
in high
unemployment
areas.
50% of gross wages 
for those under 25; 
60% for over 25s, for 
up to 26 weeks. 
Employers had to 
provide at least 200 
hours training.
Add: 27% 
Subs: 23% 
Dead: 47%
Atkinson and
Meager
(1994)
Workstart I 
pilots
UK Very-long term 
unemployed 
(vltu), over 2 
years duration 
(over 4 years in 
one area).
£60 pw for 6 months, 
fallowed by £30 pw 
for 6 months.
Add: 18-29% 
Subs: 28-35% 
Dead: 43- 
48%
Dis: low
Bishop and
Montgomery
(1993)
Targeted Jobs 
Tax Credit
US Welfare (AFDC)
recipients,
various
economically
disadvantaged
groups.
50% of first-year 
wages up to $6,000, 
and 25% of second- 
year wages up to 
$6,000.
Add: 13-30% 
Subs: <19% 
Dead: 70%+
Breen and
Halpin
(1989)
Employment
Incentive
Scheme
Ireland Predominantly 
short-term 
unemployed, 13 
weeks plus (15% 
long-term, over 1 
year).
IR£30 (IR£60 for ltu) 
pw for 24 weeks, 
contingent on 
employee remaining at 
the firm (approx. 30- 
50% of gross wages).
Add: 9% 
Subs:21% 
Dead: 70% 
Dis: low
Bushell
(1986)
Young
Workers
Scheme
UK Young workers 
(under 18) paid 
less than £50 pw.
£15 pw for up to 1 
year.
Add: 27% 
Subs: 10% 
Dead: 63%
Byrne and 
Buchanan 
(1994)
Jobstart Austr­
alia
Unemployed over 
6 months, but 
predominantly 
long-term 
unemployed, over 
1 year.
AU$200 pw for 16 
weeks, with lower 
rates for 16-17 year 
olds and shorter-term 
unemployed, rising to 
AU$230 pw for 20 
weeks for adult vltu, 
over 2 years (approx. 
50% of gross wages).
Add: 11.5% 
Subs: 14.5% 
Dead: 74%
Deakin
(1996)
Youth
Employment
Subsidy
UK 16-20 year olds, 
6 months+ 
unemployed.
£10pw for 26 weeks. Add: 12.5% 
Subs: 12.5% 
Dead: 75%
Department
of
Employment
(1978)
Small Firms 
Employment 
Subsidy
UK Any additional 
employees hired 
by small 
manufacturing 
firms in Special 
Development 
Areas.
£20pw for 26 weeks. Add: 25-40% 
Dead: 60- 
75%
de Koning 
(1993) cited 
inNERA  
(1995)
Vermeend- 
Moor Act
Nether­
lands
Very long term 
unemployed, over 
3 years.
Lump sum payment 
of DA4000 plus 
exemption from social 
security taxes (approx 
17% of gross wages) 
for up to 4 years.
Add: 15-30% 
Subs: 30-45% 
Dead: 40%
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In some cases only additionality and deadweight were measured. In these cases, 
substitution is imputed as the residual on the assumption that displacement, which 
is not systematically measured in any of these studies, is zero.
Although the various policies studied vary considerably in terms of their target group, 
level of subsidy and administrative characteristics, some general observations can be 
made. Where any attempt has been made to evaluate displacement, it has generally 
been considered to be low. Deadweight is generally high, whilst additionality is 
rarely above 30%. These findings are broadly consistent with those reported in Casey 
and Bruche (1985) and Schwanse (1982) from earlier evaluations of wage subsidies 
implemented in the 1970s in the US and Europe.
Deadweight
Although it is of least interest economically, deadweight always comes first. There is 
always some hiring of even the most disadvantaged group. Provided administrative 
costs are not too high, firms will always have an incentive to claim subsidies for 
actions that they would have taken anyway, even if there are insufficient incentives 
for firms to change their hiring behaviour. Furthermore, whilst it may be possible to 
design and target programmes so as to reduce deadweight, it is probably impossible 
to eliminate it by imposing administrative checks, since the counterfactual is unobserved.
Deadweight is high everywhere, but particularly so in policies for which relatively 
short-term unemployed people are eligible. Those policies targeted exclusively on 
the long, or very-long, term unemployed had significantly lower deadweight, around 
40-50%, rather than the 70% plus typical of programmes for which shorter-term 
unemployed people were eligible. This is unsurprising, since, in most countries, the 
long-term unemployed suffer from negative duration dependence, so that their 
chances of obtaining a job may be sharply diminished. The corollary of this must be 
less hiring by firms of the long-term unemployed, and hence fewer firms able to 
make windfall gains if these hires become eligible for subsidy.
There may also be an effect from the size of the subsidy. Larger subsidies are likely 
to be required to induce firms to change their behaviour rather than merely to incur 
the administrative burden of claiming subsidies for their existing behaviour. Hence 
the proportion of deadweight should decrease as the size of the subsidy increases
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(although the absolute cost of deadweight may rise). Some evidence of this is provided 
by Atkinson and Meager (1994). They asked whether employers would have made 
use ofWorkstart subsidies if they had been reduced to £1,500 or £750 instead of the 
actual level of £2,340 (spread across one year). Jobs identified as deadweight were 
three times more likely to survive than those identified as additionality with a £1,500 
subsidy, and ten times more likely at £750. At £1,500, additionality would fall from 
18% to 8%, whilst at £750 it would fall to 3%.
Substitution
If deadweight ‘comes first’, then it may be most useful to consider substitution and 
additionality relative to the non-deadweight component. In general, substitution comprised 
approximately one-half to two-thirds of the non-deadweight effect. The two exceptions 
are the Young Workers Scheme (Bushell, 1986) and the Small Firms Employment Subsidy 
(Department of Employment, 1978). However, both of these were targeted by the choice 
of eligible firms rather than eligible workers, reducing the scope for substitution.
All hires by firms eligible for the Small Firms Employment Subsidy attracted the 
subsidy, regardless of who was hired, provided that they were in addition to the 
baseline level of employment at the firm. Hence substitution was zero by definition. 
There was no untargeted group of workers who could be substituted against. In the 
Young Workers Scheme, eligibility was restricted to workers under 18 and hence 
there could have been substitution of older workers. However, the low pay 
requirements of the scheme may have ensured that many of the jobs offered were 
unattractive to older workers anyway, reducing the scope for substitution.
It seems likely therefore that under any policy which is targeted at the long-term 
unemployed, there will be a substantial element of substitution (at firm level). At 
the partial equilibrium level this is generally seen as wasteful, since it apparently 
leads merely to a churning of the unemployment pool. In some cases, this churning 
was seen as an explicit policy objective, on equity grounds. For example, Atkinson 
and Meager (1994, p. 3) state of the Workstart pilots that ‘it is only a secondary aim 
of the programme to encourage employers to create such [additional] vacancies’. 
However, in general equilibrium, this churning effect may affect aggregate 
unemployment. In line with the last two effects identified in Caimfors and Lang 
(1995) above, substitution may increase the competition faced by the short-term
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unemployed, but reduce the utility cost of becoming long-term unemployed. If the 
former outweighs the latter, wage pressure, and hence aggregate unemployment, 
will fall, even if all the non-deadweight effect is substitution.
Displacement
Displacement is measured poorly, if at all, within these studies. It is intrinsically 
problematic, since it affects firms that do not make use of the subsidy and which, 
therefore, are not interviewed in the evaluations. Atkinson and Meager (1994) and 
Breen and Halpin (1989) both make an attempt to assess displacement by asking 
participating firms what competitive advantage they have gained from the subsidy. 
Atkinson and Meager found that around one-third of private sector participants in 
Workstart claimed to have increased business volume as a result of the subsidy, but 
that only one-fifth of these thought that Workstart had made them much more 
competitive. This group constituted just under 6% of all those who had filled 
Workstart vacancies, leading Atkinson and Meager to conclude that displacement 
might have a relatively high incidence, but a low intensity.
Breen and Halpin adopted a similar approach, asking whether firms in receipt of 
Employment Incentive Scheme (EIS) subsidies had been able to use them to lower 
prices or gain a competitive advantage on their Irish competitors. They found that 
only 4% of hirings involved possible displacement.
A number of attempts have been made to assess displacement more directly, but 
only for job creation schemes. Forslund and Kreuger (1994) attempt to assess the 
displacement effect of Swedish relief work programmes on employment in the 
construction and health and welfare industries, the major areas of relief work. They 
regress total industry employment (excluding relief work jobs) by county and year 
against the number of relief workers, the wage and measures of aggregate demand. 
They find substantial displacement, up to 69%, in the construction industry, but 
unstable results for health and welfare. These findings mirror an earlier study, using 
just time series data, by Gramlich and Ysander (1981).
However, it seems likely that what is being measured here is fiscal displacement. 
Johnson and Tomola (1977) find nearly 100% fiscal displacement, in the long-run, 
for grants to US state and local governments for Public Service Employment. If
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construction projects have long lead times then local authority demand for 
construction labour is likely to be relatively inelastic. The arrival of central government 
grants for relief work will therefore lead to high levels of displacement of local 
government funds away from construction work into other areas of expenditure or 
lower local taxation. If expanded provision is easier to manage in health and welfare, 
we would expect a lower degree of fiscal displacement. But these results are unlikely 
to tell us much about the behaviour of private companies in receipt of subsidies.
Furthermore, the same general equilibrium arguments apply as for substitution. Even 
if workers are displaced out of one industry, they will increase the competition for 
jobs faced by other unemployed workers, and hence potentially reduce wage pressure.
Subsidy take-up
For a wage subsidy scheme to succeed requires not only that a sufficient proportion 
of hires represent additional employment, but also that the absolute numbers of 
participants is large enough to make a significant impact on aggregate unemployment. 
Unlike government schemes, transition-based policies require the involvement of 
private companies. They cannot simply be expanded by administrative action.
Take-up rates vary considerably between different programmes. In general, we would 
expect take-up to be higher the greater the level of subsidy. Atkinson and Meager 
(1994) find an approximately linear relationship between firms’ expected likelihood 
of using wage subsidies and varying proposed alternative levels of subsidy, among 
employers in receipt of Workstart subsidies.
Other factors, though, also appear to be relevant. The wage subsidy element of the 
German Federal Employment Programme for Regions with Special Employment 
Problems was considerably under-subscribed even though subsidies of up to 90% of 
wages were available (Schmid and Peters, 1982). In contrast, the US New Jobs Tax 
Credit (NJTC), which paid only 50% of wages at most, was claimed for 3.6 million 
hires out of a potential universe of approximately 3.8 million eligible hires (O’Neill, 
1982).
In part, this simply reflects a trade-off between targeting, and hence deadweight, 
and take-up. NJTC was available for any hires in excess of 102% of baseline
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employment, whilst the German subsidy was only available for the unskilled or 
long-term unemployed. It is easy to increase take-up by having more deadweight. 
However, the failure of the German scheme also appears to reflect the interaction of 
high German firing costs with the greater risks involved in hiring the long-term 
unemployed (Schmid and Peters, 1982). A similar concern about the difficulties of 
dismissing subsidised workers if they proved unsuitable was expressed by Australian 
employers in an examination of falling take-up rates of Jobstart under the Working 
Nation programme (DEETYA, 1996a). Take-up is likely to reflect not only the level 
of the subsidy and the degree of disadvantage of the target group, but also the extent 
to which firms are required to enter into long-term commitments and the degree of 
risk aversion of those who actually make the hiring decisions.
Take-up also varies systematically with firm characteristics. Atkinson and Meager 
(1994), Breen and Halpin (1989) and Byrne and Buchanan (1994) all consider the 
types of firms that make use of wage subsidies. Although the subsidies operated in 
different countries, with different target groups and levels of subsidy, and were 
examined at different stages of the business cycle, their findings are remarkably 
similar. Subsidies are overwhelmingly taken up by small firms and predominantly by 
firms in the retail, wholesale, hotel and catering industries (Standard Industrial 
Classification 1980, class 6).
Firms with fewer than 10 employees accounted for 65% ofWorkstart employers, 62% of 
Jobstart employers and 76% of EIS employers. Moreover, most of the remaining hires 
were by slightly larger, but still small, firms. Only 17% ofWorkstart employers and just 
8.8% of EIS employers had over 25 staff, 14% of Jobstart employers had 30 or more. In 
contrast, across the UK economy as a whole, only 28.2% of employment is in firms of 10 
or fewer employees, with 56.3% in firms of 50 or more employees (DTI, 1994).
Clearly small, and especially very small, firms are disproportionately likely to make 
use of subsidies, although this may not be so true in the United States (Katz, 1996) 
where small firms seem to be more averse to engaging with the government 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, Byrne and Buchanan (1994) found that the level of 
deadweight increased monotonically with firm size. The subsidy made no difference 
to the hiring decision for only 57% of firms with fewer than 5 employees, compared 
with 86% for those with more than 30 employees.
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This size effect may reflect the incentives faced by individual managers responsible 
for hiring. In small firms both the impact of hiring a potentially less productive 
worker and the benefit of receiving a subsidy will be considered at the same level. 
However, in large firms, the gains from subsidies may be received centrally and 
hence may not be properly considered by managers at lower levels who make the 
hiring decisions and bear the costs of taking on less productive employees. Arwady 
(1988) found that Borg-Wamer Protective Services, a large company that decided 
centrally to maximise its use of wage subsidies, had to include subsidy payments 
against managers’ income targets before they would hire subsidised workers.
The distribution across industries is less notable but still fairly consistent between 
the three studies. Figure 1.3 shows the industry distributions for Jobstart and 
Workstart, compared with the distributions of all employees in employment in 
Australia and the UK. Data for the EIS shows a similar picture. In particular the 
retail, wholesale, hotel and catering industries always come out as the largest users 
of subsidies, and subsidised workers are disproportionately likely to be hired into 
these industries compared with their share of overall employment in the three 
countries. This probably reflects low pay in these industries, which makes a fixed 
level of subsidy worth relatively more. In Australia, manufacturing firms are also 
disproportionately likely to make use of Jobstart, although this is not found in the 
UK nor Ireland. The low take-up of subsidies in ‘other services’ probably reflects 
restrictions on their use in the public sector.
Implications
Overall, it is clear that, whilst deadweight is often large, wage subsidies do induce 
changes in firms’ hiring behaviour. Even if fiscal constraints are binding, it may be 
that the savings from reduced benefits and increased taxation sufficiently outweigh 
the costs of subsidies that the level of deadweight is sustainable. However, if the 
programme is targeted on the long-term unemployed, then a substantial proportion 
of the non-deadweight effect appears to be substitution. The implications of this 
depend on our theoretical framework. Within a labour demand setup, it is only 
additionality that matters and the results of many of these studies are disappointing 
for advocates ofwage subsidies. However, if wage pressure effects are also taken into 
account, then substitution may have macroeconomic effects. In particular if the 
increased competition for jobs faced by the short-term unemployed outweighs the
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Figure 1.3: Industry distribution o f participants
Jobstart (AUS) and Workstart (UK)
Participants by Industry
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Source: Atkinson and Meager (1994), Byrne and Buchanan (1994), Department o f Employment Gazette November 1994, 
Labour Statistics Australia, 1993.
gain in utility to the long-term  unemployed, then wage pressure will fall, reducing 
aggregate unemployment. In  the limiting case, as in Layard (1996), where wage 
pressure is solely a function o f the level o f short-term  unemployment, substitution 
and additionality will be equivalent in general equilibrium.
Impact studies
W hilst studies o f deadweight, displacement and substitution focus on employer 
behaviour, impact studies look at the employee. For wage subsidies, we can obtain 
some information about the employee’s subsequent status from the employer surveys 
considered above, for as long as the worker remains with the original job. Beyond 
this, and also if  we w ant information on job search assistance programmes, we need 
data on individual unemployed workers.
This inevitably raises methodological problems. In  surveys o f employer behaviour, 
we assume that the employer can make a reasonable estimate o f their own likely 
counterfactual behaviour. However, employees are very unlikely to be able to assess 
their counterfactual chances o f obtaining and keeping a job in the absence o f a 
programme, and hence we m ust use the behaviour o f  other unemployed workers to 
measure the counterfactual. This can lead to severe problems o f selection bias. I f
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programmes are voluntary, then it maybe that the most motivated of the unemployed 
opt to go on them, biasing any comparison against non-participants towards a 
favourable programme effect. Where selection for programmes is made 
administratively, there maybe a tendency to ‘cream skim’ in order to boost the apparent 
success of the programme, or alternatively to target programmes on those most in 
need, so that biases may go either way. OECD (1991), Heckman (1992), Jensen and 
Madsen (1993), Burdess (1995) and Heckman and Smith (1995,1996) all discuss the 
difficulties inherent in evaluation of the impact effects of active labour market policies.
Selection bias can be tackled by the use of random assignment into treatment and 
control groups. Since any differences in observed or unobserved characteristics of 
the two groups will be purely random and uncorrelated with programme participation, 
the difference in the mean outcomes of the two groups will be an unbiased estimator 
of the programme effect. A large number of randomised experiments have been 
carried out in the social sciences over the last 25 years (Burdess, 1995), predominantly 
in the US (see Bjorklund and Regner, 1996, for a comparison of US and European 
experiences of random assignment). These are particularly useful in evaluating job 
search assistance policies, where we are also able to draw on experiments from the 
UK and Sweden. There are fewer random experiments for wage subsidies, and many 
of the impact assessments make no attempt to calculate the counterfactual, focusing 
solely on participants.
In the absence of random assignment, quasi-experimental methods can be used which 
attempt to control statistically for selection bias (Heckman and Smith, 1995; 1996). 
However, these have mainly been used in evaluations of training programmes and 
only rarely been applied to wage subsidies or job search assistance. Riddell (1991) 
argues that non-experimental methods produce estimates that are highly sensitive 
both to the comparison group and to the statistical method employed, and that even 
if specification tests could be developed to discriminate between different approaches, 
experimental methods will generally produce more precise impact estimates. However, 
more recent work suggests that the combination of better data and specification 
tests, such as those in Heckman and Hotz (1989), can produce non-experimental 
findings that are comparable to those from experimental studies (Hotz, 1992; 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998).
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Job search assistance
One of the few areas of general agreement within the debate about active labour 
market policy is that measures to enhance job search assistance are effective (US 
Department of Labour, 1995; Fay, 1996). These results are based almost exclusively 
on impact assessments, although there have been a small number of supporting 
macroeconomic studies. Interestingly, although the issue is equally relevant, or 
irrelevant, there has been virtually no discussion of substitution within the job search 
assistance evaluations (Lehmann, 1993, appears to be unique in attempting to measure 
the substitution effect).
Delander (1978, cited in Bjorklund, 1993) examines the only random experiment in 
Swedish labour market policy evaluation. Intensified employment services were 
offered to a random sample of workers who had been unemployed for at least 3 
months in the town of Eskilstuna.The treatment group used the employment agency’s 
services for an average of 7.5 hours during the experiment, which ran from 10 March 
1975 to 6 June 1975. The control group had access to the normal services, using the 
agency for an average of 1.5 hours. By the end of the experimental period, 48% of 
experimentals had obtained a job, compared with only 34% of controls. They also 
spent less time in unemployment over the 9 months following the start of the 
experiment, and had higher monthly average earnings when in work. These results 
were all statistically significant. Bjorklund (1993) andjohannesson (1995) cite results 
from a number of subsequent, but non-experimental, studies in Sweden, most of 
which support these positive results for intensified employment services.
Meyer (1995) assesses the results of five randomised experiments in the US, promoting 
enhanced job search among Unemployment Insurance (UI) claimants. The 
experiments involved different mixes of services, principally increased referrals and 
formal job search training, and tighter requirements on claimants to report their job 
search activities. One experiment, in Washington DC, included a treatment group 
for which existing reporting requirements were relaxed, so that no report of job 
search activity was required, and UI payments were continued until the claimant 
indicated that they were no longer eligible.
Four of the five experiments showed modest declines in UI receipt, about one-half 
week less over the benefit year (6 months in one case), from programmes providing
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more intensive services and requirements. Three of these four results were at or near 
statistical significance. The fifth experiment, which involved caseworking together 
with higher quality services, showed a significant and much larger reduction in UI, 
3.9 weeks over the benefit spell. However, methodologically, this was the weakest of 
the experiments. The relaxed conditions offered to one treatment group in 
Washington DC led to a significant increase in UI claiming, of just over 3 weeks in 
the benefit year. But since there was no reduction in earnings for this group, the 
effect may have been due to later notification of job finding rather than lower job 
search intensity.
Friedlander and Burtless (1995) look at the long-term effects of four ‘welfare-to- 
work’programmes in the US, primarily for single mothers, using random assignment. 
This updates earlier, similar, findings from Gueron and Pauly (1991). Job search 
assistance was the predominant service provided. They found that whilst earnings 
gains lasted for up to three to four years, the programmes did not lead to greater job 
security. Instead they appeared to hasten the initial transition into work without 
affecting subsequent job duration or job finding. All of these programmes included 
other measures, such as compulsory unpaid work experience, as well as job search 
assistance. Whilst these were relatively rarely used, they may still have had a threat 
effect. However, Brock, Butler and Long (1993) looked at separate job search 
assistance/compulsory work experience and job search assistance only treatment 
groups in one of the experiments. They found no significant additional employment 
effect for combined job search assistance and workfare over job search assistance alone.
Findings from more recent US experiments have continued to show positive impacts 
from job search assistance, and in particular from programmes that emphasise a 
‘work first* approach. Of six California GAIN programmes examined by Riccio etal 
(1994), the results for Riverside county stand out: over a three year period, the 
treatment group s earnings exceeded those of the control group by 49%, and welfare 
payments were reduced by 15%, the largest effects found in large-scale state welfare- 
to-work experiments. Riverside placed an unusually large emphasis on job search 
and rapid job entry, whereas the other five GAIN programmes had a greater emphasis 
on basic education, with more modest results. The Riverside model was subsequently 
adopted by Los Angeles which had previously placed considerable emphasis on 
education in its GAIN programme (Riccio et aly 1994; Freedman, Mitchell and
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Navarro, 1998). Early findings from Los Angeles again suggest large earnings impacts: 
a 46.3% increase after 6-9 months.
However, the Riverside experiment also suggests that there are limits to the 
effectiveness of increasing the intensity of job search support. In addition to the 
control group, two treatment groups were randomly assigned between a ‘regular’ 
and an ‘enhanced’ group. Case managers were also randomly assigned between the 
groups, to prevent possible biases from the quality of staff (Doolittle and Riccio, 
1992). Staff working with the ‘regular’ group had an average caseload of 97, against 
an average of 53 for case managers working with the ‘enhanced’ group. Although 
both groups obtained large earnings gains and reductions in AFDC receipt relative 
to the controls, there was no additional impact for the enhanced group (Riccio et al, 
1994).
Virtually the only use of random assignment in UK labour market evaluations was 
the Restart experiment. Restart involved interviews with the unemployed every six 
months. During these interviews, an Employment Service adviser assessed the 
claimant’s recent unemployment history and offered advice on benefits, search 
behaviour, training courses, and in some instances initiated direct contact with 
employers. Interviews lasted around 15-25 minutes and attendance was compulsory, 
with benefit sanctions for those not attending. In addition, there was a threat effect, 
with sanctions imposed on those deemed not to be actively seeking work (Dolton 
and O’Neill 1995a). A randomly assigned control group, drawn from the inflow into 
Restart in March-July 1989, were not sent the letter asking them to attend. White 
and Lakey (1992) found that controls were significantly less likely to leave 
unemployment in the following year, and that, of those that did leave the register, 
controls on average left significantly later. Taking these two effects together, they 
estimated that, on average, controls took 55 days more before first leaving 
unemployment.
However, since Restart acted as a gateway to other government programmes, many 
of these exits from unemployment would have been transitions onto programmes 
rather than into employment. Dolton and O’Neill (1995a) examine the effects of 
Restart on transitions into employment, and also into ‘stable’jobs, which they define 
as full-time jobs lasting at least 3 months. They find that whilst Restart increased
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the transition probability into ‘any job’, there was no significant difference between 
Restart and control groups in transitions to ‘stable jobs’. However, Restart did not 
appear to reduce reservation wages (Dolton and O’Neill, 1995b), nor did it reduce 
the duration of the ‘out of unemployment’ state (Dolton and O’Neill, 1996), so that 
the gains, whilst modest, were genuine and not offset by other factors. In line with 
Friedlander and Burtless, Restart appeared to speed up the initial transition, without 
affecting subsequent employment prospects.
Overall, the experimental literature suggests that job search assistance can have 
positive effects, reducing the time participants spend unemployed before transiting 
into employment. These effects were generally modest, but so were the interventions. 
Programmes involving enhanced services, greater search requirements, or both, all 
seemed potentially effective. However, whilst the experimental approach accounts 
for deadweight, possible substitution effects are ignored. Nor are any effects that 
might operate through wage pressure considered. Hence we cannot directly translate 
the positive results of these studies into assessments of aggregate unemployment 
effects.
W age subsidies
Although much of the evaluation literature for wage subsidies has concentrated on 
deadweight and substitution, there have been a number of studies that have looked 
instead or as well at the effects of subsidy eligibility on unemployed workers’ exit 
probabilities. In addition, there is some, limited, evidence on the duration of 
employment in subsidised jobs. This is particularly relevant to the likely effects of 
wage subsidies on the inflow into unemployment. In a simple neo-classical model of 
the labour market, a temporary wage subsidy could only lead to a temporary increase 
in the firm’s labour demand. Once the subsidy expired, the worker would be laid off. 
However, if there are fixed costs to hiring, such as training or lower initial productivity, 
then a temporary subsidy may lead to a permanent increase in the firm’s employment 
(Layard, 1979). In this case the effects of policy on inflow are ambiguous.
There have been fewer experimental studies of wage subsidies than of job search 
assistance, perhaps because of the greater cost of wage subsidy programmes. The 
most dramatic result comes from Burtless (1985), who finds that wage subsidies in 
the form of vouchers reduced the probability of finding work for the treatment
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group. Burtless considers the evidence from an experiment in Dayton, Ohio, in 1980- 
81, which involved two treatment groups, given vouchers for direct cash payments 
and tax credits respectively, and a randomly-assigned control group. Participants 
were recipients of either Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 
primarily single mothers, or general assistance, primarily young one or two-person 
families without children. Whilst the programme was not especially successful at 
finding jobs for any of the participants, the striking result is that the control group 
were significantly more successful than either of the treatment groups, suggesting 
that the vouchers were harmful. Whilst 20.6% of controls found a job within the 
eight weeks of the programme, only 12.8% of the treatment groups (which were 
virtually identical to one another) did.
Burtless suggests that employers may have used the vouchers to screen out public 
assistance recipients, so that they had a stigmatising effect. This would be consistent 
with O’Neill (1982) who found that take-up rates of US wage subsidies fell sharply 
when they were targeted on narrow socioeconomic groups. Unfortunately, the Dayton 
experiment was cancelled before a planned employer survey was undertaken, so that 
this explanation remains speculative.
How relevant the negative finding is to other programmes is difficult to assess. 
Haveman and Hollister (1991) note that all the control group were referred to the 
Employment Service, who may have made special efforts on behalf of those denied 
the voucher. Hostility to welfare recipients may be more severe in the US than other 
countries. Furthermore, the Dayton subsidy was targeted according to a characteristic, 
receipt of AFDC or general assistance, which was unobservable to employers. The 
description of the subsidy programme on the vouchers may have drawn particular 
attention to the limitations of voucher-holders (Haveman and Hollister, 1991). In 
contrast, subsidies targeted according to the duration of unemployment maybe less 
likely to play a stigmatising role if employers already have this information. There is 
clearly a risk, however, that providing subsidies for particular groups of unemployed 
workers will simply serve to reinforce negative perceptions among employers. Against 
this, Atkinson and Meager (1994) found that among employers in the UK who actually 
hired subsidised workers, attitudes towards the long-term unemployed improved.
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If the Dayton result was due to stigma attached to welfare benefits, we might expect 
a different effect for Unemployment Insurance claimants, if UI is less stigmatising. 
Evidence from the Illinois Unemployment Insurance experiment (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman, 1987) presents a mixed picture. Employers were eligible for a $500 
subsidy, if they hired a UI recipient within 11 weeks of their initial claim, and 
employed them for at least 4 months. The level of subsidy was considerably below 
that offered in most wage subsidy programmes, but unusually the Illinois experiment 
was specifically targeted on the short-term unemployed. The eligible group did 
record small reductions in the length of their first unemployment spell compared to 
the control group, about two-thirds of one week, and had about a 3% greater 
probability of leaving unemployment within 11 weeks. But these results were not 
sustained over the whole benefit year. Taking total weeks of claiming over the benefit 
year, there was no significant reduction, except for white women.
However, Dubin and Rivers (1993) question these findings. Participants in the 
experiment had to agree to take part after random assignment, and findings are 
averaged across both participants and non-participants to eliminate effects from 
selection bias in participation. However, this also serves to dilute the programme 
effect. Dubin and Rivers contrast this with biomedical experiments, where the use 
of placebos allows random assignment to take place after permission has been 
obtained. In the Illinois experiment, only 68% of the treatment group actually agreed 
to take part. Dubin and Rivers estimate the effect of participation, controlling for 
selection bias in the participation decision by making use of the assumption that, in 
the absence of selection bias, non-participants in the treatment group would have 
the same outcomes as the control group. They obtain somewhat larger, and statistically 
significant, effects, with a reduction of just over 1 week in the initial benefit spell 
and of $102 in benefit payments over the benefit year.
One final source of experimental information on wage subsidies are the re­
employment bonus experiments carried out in a number of US states (Meyer, 1995). 
Here, the employee rather than the firm was eligible for a bonus, if they exited 
unemployment within a certain period. Most of the experiments produced modest, 
but significant, reductions in unemployment duration of about half to one week over 
the benefit year. Coasean deals should make these equivalent to subsidies paid to 
employers. However the findings that wages are unaffected by subsidy entitlement,
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whether the subsidy is paid to the firm or the worker (Woodbury and Spiegelman, 
1987), suggests that subsidies are probably captured by the recipient.
Felli and Ichino (1988) use a quasi-control group to study the effects of an employment 
subsidy offered by the Agenzia del Lavoro of Trento, Italy in 1985-86. The subsidy 
was targeted at workers in receipt of unemployment benefit from the Cassa 
Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (CIGS), a group with very low exit rates due to 
the generous terms of the CIGS. Subsidies were offered in 1985 to those with more 
than 3 years duration, whilst in 1986 the subsidy was available to those with over 6 
months duration, but increased in value with duration up to 3 years. Workers eligible 
for the CIGS in 1983-84 make up the quasi-control group. Clearly labour market 
conditions would have changed between the two periods, so Felli and Ichino control 
for aggregate effects using monthly dummies. These can be identified separately to 
subsidy eligibility, since their sample of CIGS recipients had varying durations and 
hence varying eligibility in time series.
They find that eligibility for the subsidy had a positive and highly significant effect 
on the probability of re-employment. The average probability of exit increases from 
0.0132 to 0.0278 per month because of the subsidy, equivalent to an expected 
reduction of time in the CIGS of 21 months (compared with an average time in the 
CIGS of 43 months). This is a substantial effect, but since the CIGS covers only a 
fraction of the unemployed in Italy, the scope for substitution is considerable, so that 
the aggregate effect may be much less.
Duration o f  subsidised employment
If we are interested in the duration of subsidised employment, as well as the probability 
of obtaining it, then we must return to the survey data. None of the experiments 
tracks employees for long enough to estimate duration effects. A number of surveys 
of employers contain information on the proportion of subsidised hires still with the 
firm at some subsequent date, including some after the expiry of the subsidy. In 
addition surveys of employees give some data on subsequent employment. Unfortunately, 
however, in the absence of a control group, the counterfactual is less clear cut. Hence 
we cannot easily assess the net impact of the policy on subsidised workers’ subsequent 
prospects. We can, however, address the question of whether temporary subsidies 
inevitably lead only to temporary employment for the subsidy duration.
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Breen and Halpin (1989) find that 85% of employees hired under the Employment 
Incentive Scheme (EIS) were still with the firm at the end of the 24 week subsidy 
period. However, firms were only able to claim EIS subsidies for employees 
continuously employed for the full period, so we might expect a high survival rate. 
Participating firms were also surveyed approximately 8 months after the subsidy 
had expired, by which point 54% of EIS hires were still with the firm. In a further 
11% of cases, the job was still in existence, although the specific EIS employee was 
no longer with the firm. Employees taken on as deadweight or substitution might 
be expected to survive, since the post would have been viable even in the absence of 
the subsidy. More interesting is the fate of additionality positions. Breen and Halpin 
find that slightly over half of the additional posts survived for at least 8 months after 
the subsidy had expired. Similarly, the Department of Employment (1978) found 
that employers expected 66% of additional jobs created by the Small Firms 
Employment Subsidy to survive subsidy expiry. This might imply the existence of 
fixed costs in the hiring process, although it is clearly also possible that these firms 
simply experienced an unanticipated positive demand shock. Unfortunately, Breen 
and Halpin provide no reference group to compare their survival rates against.
Arwady (1988) does provide a comparison between subsidised hires and normal 
hires for equivalent jobs. He studies the operation of the US Targeted Jobs Tax 
Credit (TJTC) in one firm, Borg-Wamer Protective Services, the largest user of the 
TJTC. Arwady finds that subsidised workers remained with the company for around 
20% longer than equivalent unsubsidised employees. Subsidy-eligible workers differ 
systematically from their unsubsidised colleagues. They are more disadvantaged and 
so may be less likely to quit to obtain better jobs. However, they may also have worse 
labour market characteristics that increase the risk of being fired. Moreover, Arwady’s 
study is of a single firm in a high turnover industry, and so may not be representative.
A survey of Workstart employees (RSGB, 1996) found that 40% were still with 
their Workstart employers 3 months after the 12 month subsidy had expired, with a 
further 15% employed elsewhere. Most of the remainder had returned to 
unemployment. No counterfactual is provided, although Sweeney (1996) shows that 
among all UK unemployment benefit claimants who exit into employment, 51.8% 
returned to unemployment within 12 months, 40.1% within 6 months. Nor is there 
evidence that layoffs from Workstart are concentrated at the expiry point. Among
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employees who remained with the firm until subsidy expiry, 77% were still with the 
same employer three months later and only 13% unemployed. The primary cause of 
returns to unemployment appears to be poor matches, which fail to last for the 
duration of the subsidy, rather than subsidy expiry. Post-programme monitoring of 
Jobstart participants suggests that those who do gain sustain those gains: 59.1% of 
participants whose subsidies expired between April and June 1994 were in 
unsubsidised employment 3 months later (DEETYA, 1996b). After 12 months, the 
proportion was essentially unchanged at 58.8%, although the study does not say 
whether these were the same people.
Pay and productivity
Atkinson and Meager’s (1994) employer survey provides us with information on 
two other variables of interest: pay and productivity. They found that 81% ofWorkstart 
employers paid their subsidised workers the same rate as existing employees in similar 
jobs. This is consistent with Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) who find no difference 
in earnings between subsidy-eligible workers and randomly-assigned controls. 
Atkinson and Meager also found that most employers were satisfied with their 
Workstart employee’s skills and productivity. Overall, they found that 80% of recruits 
met employers’ standards and expectations, with only 8% deemed unsuitable. No 
extra help was needed, in addition to that which would have been offered to a 
normal recruit, for 62% of Workstart employees, whilst 23% needed some extra 
help. Only 13% needed considerable help at a significant cost to the business. 
Productivity showed a similar pattern, with 64% ofWorkstart employees as productive 
or more productive than ordinary recruits. A further 12% were initially less productive, 
but subsequently caught up, with only 11% less productive throughout.
Long-term effects
Layard (1997) argues that a central feature of wage subsidies is their long-term 
effect on participants. By returning the long-term unemployed to the world of work, 
even on a temporary basis, they would re-acquire work habits and skills, and obtain 
a recent reference, which would increase their long-term employability: ‘the main 
justification for the proposal is not that it employs people on a subsidised basis but 
that, by doing so, it restores them to the universe of employable people’ (Layard, 
1997, p. 336).
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The survey ofWorkstart employees (RSGB, 1996) provides some support for this 
view. Around 60-65% of participants felt that Workstart had been helpfid in building 
confidence, improving existing skills, learning new skills and getting an up-to-date 
work reference.
Studies of supported work give a long-term perspective on the possible effects of 
wage subsidies. The National Supported Work Demonstration (Hollister etal, 1984) 
provided 12 to 18 months of subsidised employment, in a highly structured 
environment. Because of the substantial element of training and support involved, 
this is not directly comparable to a wage subsidy, but the notion of subsidised 
employment with on-the-job training to re-integrate participants into the labour 
market was central to the programme. Positive results were obtained only for women 
on AFDC. However, for this group the effects were both substantial and very long- 
lasting. Participants had higher earnings than a randomly-assigned control group 
for at least 8 years after the end of the programme (Couch, 1992). The Homemaker- 
Home Health Aide Demonstrations were similar in approach, including 12 months 
of subsidised employment, but with a far less intensive training and support element 
(Bell and Orr, 1994). They too produced positive effects for earnings and benefit 
receipt for at least 5 years following participation (US Department of Labor, 1995).
Implications
The impact assessments paint a generally positive picture of the role of wage subsidies, 
with the striking exception of Burtless (1985). For the unemployed, eligibility for a 
wage subsidy generally increases the probability of exiting unemployment into work, 
but there is a risk of stigma attaching to subsidised workers, especially when targeting 
is on narrow socioeconomic grounds. Once in a subsidised job, workers generally 
receive the same wage as regular employees and most are equally productive, at least 
after an initial period. There is little evidence that workers are systematically laid off 
once the subsidy expires, even for jobs that would not have been created without the 
subsidy. This suggests that subsidies may overcome fixed costs of hiring or training. 
Survival in subsidised positions compares favourably with that for general hirings 
from unemployment. Finally, there may be long-term beneficial effects arising from 
re-integration into the labour market. However, by focusing on participants, these 
studies ignore possible detrimental effects on non-participants as well as any general 
equilibrium factors.
57
Active Labour Market Policy: A Survey
1.4 Macroeconomic Evidence
Whilst the macroeconomic literature is less comprehensive than its microeconomic 
counterpart, there have been a number of evaluations published, particularly in recent 
years, using varying methodologies. The most straightforward approach to evaluating 
the success of active labour market policy would seem to be cross-country 
macroeconomic studies, to evaluate whether the total extent of ALMP spending or 
participation reduces the aggregate unemployment rate. A number of such studies 
have been undertaken, but there remain formidable difficulties in identifying programme 
effects. Hence a number of alternative methodologies have also been applied.
If we are concerned about possible wage pressure effects in general equilibrium, 
then we should study the significance of ALMP variables in wage equations. Such 
studies have mainly been undertaken for the Nordic countries, with somewhat mixed 
results. Alternatively, we can attempt to evaluate the effect of policy on the outflow 
rates from unemployment of both the target group and the non-target group to 
obtain aggregate flow effects. If we assume that inflow is essentially constant, then 
we can use these estimates to calculate aggregate unemployment changes. This 
approach has generally given favourable results. Finally, at least one study has used 
a natural experiment framework to bypass identification problems, again giving 
favourable results.
Cross-country studies
Comparable cross-national data on active labour market policy effort is difficult to 
obtain. Policies vary between countries in their design and implementation as well 
as their level. Simple expenditure measures may ignore important differences in the 
effectiveness of programmes, or in the balance between incentives and requirements 
in national systems. In addition, policies may interact with other features of the 
labour market in ways which are difficult to measure. Nonetheless, several studies 
have attempted to include active labour market policy variables in cross-country 
unemployment regressions, generally using OECD measures of expenditure on policy.
Jackman etal (1990) estimate the effects of active labour market policy on national 
Beveridge curves in 14 OECD countries between 1970 and 1989. They use a two- 
stage process to control for world shocks to unemployment and vacancies, firstly
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regressing all countries’ unemployment and vacancy rates on 19 year dummies, and 
then using the residuals from these regressions as reflecting country-specific factors. 
The residual of the unemployment rate is then regressed against the residual of the 
vacancy rate, country-specific time trends and policy variables. Controlling for benefit 
duration, the replacement ratio and an index of corporatism, they find that active 
labour market policy has a significant and negative effect on unemployment. Hence, 
ALMP shifts the Beveridge curve inwards, reducing unemployment for any given 
level of vacancies.
They use two measures of policy. Firstly, a general policy stance variable, the level of 
active labour market expenditure per unemployed person in 1985. This reflects cross­
country differences. The second consists of two dummies for the introduction of 
new labour market policies. The first switches from zero to one when a new policy 
is introduced, the second when a second policy is introduced. These reflect within- 
country changes. In general it is the second policy change that has the larger and 
more significant effect, although these are somewhat crude measures of policy. For 
the Nordic states and the UK, Jackman etal construct time series data for expenditure 
on ALMP, which has a negative and significant effect on unemployment for four of 
the five countries (Norway is the exception).
Layard et al (1991) estimate a cross-country regression for 20 OECD countries, 
using the average unemployment rate for 1983-88 as their dependent variable. They 
obtain the following relation:
Unemployment rate (%) = 0.24 (0.1)
+ 0.92 (2.9) benefit duration (years)
+ 0.17 (7.1) replacement ratio (%)
-  0.13 (2.3) ALMP expenditure
+ 2.45 (2.4) coverage of collective bargaining (1-3)
-  1.42 (2.0) union co-ordination (1-3)
-  4.28 (2.9) employer co-ordination (1-3)
-  0.35 (2.8) change in inflation (% points)
Where the t-statistics are in brackets. The ALMP measure is 1987 expenditure on 
active labour market programmes per unemployed person as a proportion of GDP
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per capita. Even if we assume that all of the ALMP expenditure is used on scheme- 
based policies, this estimate implies that an additional one person placed onto a 
scheme reduces open unemployment by 1.5 persons, and hence increases employment 
by 0.5 persons (Calmfors, 1994, footnote 18).
Zetterberg (1995) obtains a similar effect of increased ALMP expenditure on a 
country’s aggregate unemployment rate. He pools time-series and cross-section data 
for 19 OECD countries between 1985 and 1991. Controlling for benefit duration, 
the replacement ratio, the change in inflation and various measures of corporatism, 
he also finds a negative and significant co-efficient for ALMP. Active policy in this 
case is measured by the proportion of total labour market expenditure that goes on 
active policies. The implications of his finding for open unemployment and regular 
employment are similar to those of Layard et al (Calmfors, 1994).
In a related study, Heylen (1993) examines the effects of labour market policy on the 
wage responsiveness to unemployment, using cross-national data for 17 OECD 
countries. He constructs an index of real wage flexibility on the basis of a number of 
existing studies, and then estimates the effects on this of various supply side variables. 
Active policy stance is measured by the 1986 expenditure on active labour market 
policy, excluding direct job creation, per unemployed person. He finds positive and 
statistically significant effects on wage flexibility for overall expenditure, and also 
separate measures for expenditure on public employment services and training, but 
not employment subsidies.
However, these studies all face a common problem of potential simultaneity bias. 
The assumption that the variation in ALMP expenditure is purely exogenous is 
implausible. Instead, we would expect active labour market expenditure to be related 
to unemployment through a policy reaction function as well as through the labour 
market (OECD, 1993). In the short-term, ifbudgets are fixed, higher unemployment 
will automatically mean lower expenditure per unemployed person. In the long-run, 
the effect could go either way. Higher unemployment increases the costs of a high 
standard of provision, but at the same time increases the urgency of provision. The 
political economy of active labour market policy is discussed by Saint-Paul (1995), 
King (1995) and Janoski (1996). Grubb (1994) and OECD (1993) find that, typically, 
active programme expenditures rise less than proportionately with unemployment,
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so that the long-run bias would be in the same direction as the short-run. Layard et 
al average unemployment rates over 6 years (although their ALMP expenditure 
measure is only for one year), which should eliminate spurious correlation from the 
short-term policy function, but still leaves the ambiguous effects from the long­
term.
OECD (1993) re-run the Layard etal regression using ALMP expenditure/(wage x 
labour force) as their policy measure, and fail to find any significant effect. This 
eliminates the potential bias in Layard et al> but introduces a potential opposing 
bias. Unless the budget for active labour market policy is completely fixed, even in 
the long-term, then a rise in unemployment is likely to bring about a rise in total 
expenditure, even if expenditure per unemployed person falls. Hence the policy 
reaction function in this case will bias the co-efficient on ALMP in the other direction.
Furthermore, these results may not be stable over time. Forslund and Kreuger (1994) 
run similar regressions to those of Layard et al for 1983-88 and for 1993. They use 
two measures of active policy stance, the fraction of GDP spent on active programmes, 
and the share of active expenditure in total labour market expenditure. These are likely 
to be biased in opposite directions by the policy reaction function. However their key 
interest is in the behaviour of the co-efficients over time. The co-efficients on both 
ALMP measures are negative for the first period, although only the second is significant. 
However, for 1993, both measures are positive, again with only the second significant.
The comparison between a six-year average and a single year may not be a reasonable 
one. In any one year, cyclical effects may dominate the structural components of 
unemployment that these equations seek to determine. Jackman et al (1996) run 
pooled regressions of averages over 1983-88 and 1989-94 for 20 countries. They use 
the same ALMP measure as Layard et aly but instrument it using 1987 active 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP per capita, divided by the average unemployment 
rate from 1977-79. Active labour market policy now has no significant effect on 
total unemployment, but a significant negative effect on long-term unemployment. 
However, even this latter effect disappears if Sweden is excluded from the sample. 
This highlights a general difficulty of these regressions: because they have so few 
degrees of freedom it is impossible to control for all the differences in labour market 
institutions that might be relevant. Where, as with Sweden and ALMP, one or a
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few countries are significant outliers, the co-efficient may proxy for any uncontrolled- 
for features of those labour markets, capturing effects beyond ALMP itself.
Overall, the results of cross-country studies are somewhat mixed. Although most of 
the studies find a significant effect of active labour market policy in reducing 
unemployment, there are serious problems. The data itself is poor and in particular 
concentrating on expenditure ignores issues of design and implementation of policy 
that may be equally important. With few degrees of freedom, it is impossible to 
control for all potentially relevant factors. Furthermore, there are potential biases 
arising from the endogeneity of policy. Finally, co-efficients may not be stable over 
time.
Wage equations
Concern about the possible wage pressure effects of active labour market policy has 
led to a number of studies of the impact of ALMP on wages, mainly in the Nordic 
states. The OECD (1993) run a cross-country wage equation, allowing for country- 
specific effects of active labour market policy, over the period 1985-90. For most 
countries, the co-efficient on ALMP expenditure is negative, often significandy, 
implying a wage moderating effect. ALMP appeared to increase wage pressure 
significantly only in Ireland and Spain. However, the number of observations on 
each country is small.
Studies of wage pressure effects in single countries, predominantly Sweden, have 
been able to make use of longer time series, and also to eliminate difficulties in 
comparing ALMP stances across countries. Calmfors and Forslund (1990, 1991) 
find that an increase in the accommodative stance — the number of people on 
programmes as a proportion of open unemployment plus programme participation 
-  increases wage pressure in Sweden. Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) estimate wage 
equations for the four Nordic states, again finding positive and significant co-efficients 
for the accommodative stance of ALMP in Sweden, and also in Denmark and 
Finland. In Norway, however, the effect of policy is to reduce wage pressure. Finland 
was also studied by Eriksson, Suvanto and Vartia (1990), but they could find no 
effect of labour market programmes on wage pressure, pointing out that Finland has 
made only limited use of such policies.
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These studies are subject to a number of criticisms. As with the cross-country studies, 
they suffer a potential bias from the policy reaction function. High wage pressure 
will lead to higher unemployment, and this in turn may lead to a higher 
accommodative stance if policy is counter-cyclical, as it appears to be in Sweden 
(Calmfors, 1994). In addition, these estimates generally assume a union bargaining 
model, which seems most appropriate given the extremely high level of union 
membership in these countries. However, no attempt is made to control for union 
bargaining strength, due to the lack of any suitable measure. Since, in Sweden at 
least, active labour market policy was substantially the invention of the trade unions 
and has always been promoted by them, a greater accommodative stance might be 
proxying for higher union power. Furthermore, the variation in the ALMP variable 
in Sweden arises principally from a small number of observations, mainly in the 
1970s (Edin, Holmlund and Ostros, 1994). Newell and Symons (1987) find no 
effect of policy on Swedish wage pressure in a regression including a dummy variable 
for the 1972-1976 period, which they identify as the peak of union militancy.
The lack of variability in the time series data has led to two attempts to exploit 
cross-sectional variation in the policy stance. Edin, Holmlund and Ostros (1994) 
use pooled cross-section and time-series data from the Swedish engineering industry 
between 1972 and 1987. The policy stance is measured by the level of programme 
activity in the worker’s regional labour market. They find that policy has a negative 
effect on wage pressure, significantly so in most of their specifications.
Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) also make use of regional variation, although their 
study uses regional unemployment (including ALMP participants), rather than wages, 
as its dependent variable and hence is a reduced form. Their policy variables are the 
accommodation ratios for direct job creation (relief work) and training programmes, 
the major types of Swedish ALMP. In an attempt to tackle the problem of 
simultaneity bias, they use two sets of instruments. The first consist of political 
variables, the share of seats in the region held by parties of the left, and the share of 
seats held by parties of government. The assumption here is that left-wing parties 
will tend to favour ALMP, and also that parties in power nationally will tend to 
channel resources to regions where they are strong. The second approach is to use 
the national jobless and accommodation ratios, on the assumption that regional 
accommodation ratios are determined in a two-stage process. The first stage,
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determined at national level, is exogenous to the region. Calmfors and Skedinger 
find that direct job creation increases the total jobless rate (including ALMP 
participants), crowding out regular employment, but that co-efficients for training 
programmes are unstable.
As with the cross-national studies, the wage equation literature presents a mixed picture. 
Time series data, at least for Sweden, suggests that active labour market policy may 
increase wage pressure, but there are considerable difficulties with these studies. Attempts 
to use cross-sectional data to overcome these problems present a more favourable picture 
of Swedish labour market policy, at least for training if not relief work. Nonetheless, the 
problems of identification and simultaneity remain considerable.
Outflow rates
If we assume that the inflow into unemployment is largely independent of the effects 
of active labour market policy, then we can evaluate the effects of policy by looking 
at outflow rates or at the Beveridge curve. Where policies are targeted, we can assess 
substitution and displacement effects in general equilibrium, by examining the outflow 
rates not only of the targeted group, but also of the non-targeted group.
The basic idea is straightforward (Bellmann and Jackman, 1996). We assume that 
there is an aggregate matching function:
(1.11) x = x(cu,v)
Where x is the total number of hires per period, and hence the total outflow from 
unemployment, u is unemployment, v  vacancies, and c is the average employability 
of the unemployed. We assume that the matching function is increasing in both its 
parameters. Hence the per period outflow rate from unemployment, a, is given by:
(1.12) a -  — -  x{cu,v)lu
u
If we further assume that the matching function is constant returns to scale (see for 
example Coles and Smith, 1996, for evidence of constant returns to scale), then we 
can write the aggregate outflow rate as:
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(1.13) a = cv^l,— ^
And if we take a log-linear approximation of (1.13), we have that:
(1.14) log* = logc+8 Xlog^“ j  = (!“ 8 1)
Finally, if we assume that the impact of the policy stance, ALMP, on employability 
takes the form:
(1.15) c = c(l + aALMP)
and relax the restrictions on the co-efficients in (1.14), then, provided aALMP is 
small, we obtain a general estimatable equation of the form:
(1.16) log a = \ogc +y1\ogv + y 2\ogu+y:i\ogALMP + £
An early attempt at this approach is the study of the UK Community Programme 
(CP) by Haskel and Jackman (1988). The CP was a job creation scheme, targeted on 
the long-term unemployed over 18, and offering temporary, and usually part-time, 
work on projects of community benefit. The scheme was voluntary, and the rules 
meant that it mainly appealed to younger workers. Haskel and Jackman consider 
only the outflows for those with unemployment durations between 1 and 2 years, 
because they assume a given equilibrium stock of short-term unemployed, 
independently of the programme. Since CP funding was only eligible for projects 
that would not otherwise have happened, spillovers are likely to have been small. 
However, because this assumption remains untested, their estimates may only capture 
the partial effect for this duration. Haskel and Jackman find a statistically significant 
and positive effect of the number of CP vacancies on the outflow rate of men aged 
18-24, but no effect on men aged 25-55. There is a negative effect for men over 55, 
suggesting a possible substitution effect, with the older age groups losing out to CP 
workers, but no substitution of the intermediate age group. The net effect on outflows 
however is small relative to the number of CP places, suggesting that the CP may have 
taken on young men who otherwise would have found work of their own accord.
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Lehmann (1993) goes a step further, using SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Estimators) to evaluate the effects of Restart on outflow rates across all durations of 
unemployment. This allows an aggregate assessment of the unemployment effect of 
Restart, by measuring the effect not just on participants, but also on non-participants. 
Lehmann uses the proportion of the eligible population who actually received a 
Restart interview as his measure of policy stance. Simultaneity bias from the policy 
reaction function should not be a problem for Restart, since from its introduction 
(apart from an initial pilot phase), the scheme was intended to be universal, so that 
Lehmanns measure should tend towards unity, with deviations due to initial delays 
in implementation and idiosyncratic factors.
However, there are at least two possible sources of bias remaining which Lehmann 
does not consider. Firstly, unemployed workers who exit before going to their Restart 
interview will not, of course, participate, and therefore a high outflow rate at the 
relevant durations will be correlated with a lower Restart participation rate. This 
implies a possible source of downward bias in Lehmanns estimates. Secondly, if 
outflow rates are high at shorter durations, then the numbers of people becoming 
eligible for Restart will fall. If administrative capacity is quasi-fixed, then eligible 
unemployed are likely to be seen sooner, reducing the probability that they will have 
exited in the meantime, and increasing the participation rate. This might impose an 
upward bias.
Lehmann estimates that Restart had a positive and significant effect on the outflow 
rate of the unemployed with durations of 9-12 months and 12 months or more. The 
effect on the 6-9 month group, who would receive their first Restart interview, is 
also positive, but not significant. For the 0-3 month group there is a significant 
negative effect, suggesting that part of the Restart effect was substitution of the 
shortest-term unemployed. However, the net effect implies a substantial reduction 
in unemployment, and Lehmann estimates that Restart was responsible for 35% of 
the reduction in unemployment between 1984 and 1990. However, Restart may in 
part be proxying for a tightening of benefit conditions that came into effect around 
the time that Restart was being introduced (Dicks and Hatch, 1989).
Boeri and Burda (1996) also obtain positive effects for active labour market policy 
on aggregate outflows using a pooled time-series and cross-section data set for the
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Czech Republic. They consider the effects of direct job creation (‘publicly useful 
jobs’) and wage subsidies (‘socially purposeful jobs’) on aggregate outflow rates. They 
find small, but significantly positive, effects of policy. They are able to instrument 
for policy stance, in part using the allocation rule from the Slovak Republic, which 
had the same labour market policies, but a different means of allocating resources 
across districts, prior to the separation of the two states. Co-efficients on an 
expenditure-based policy measure were robust to instrumentation, but co-efficients 
on ALMP placement measures were substantially larger using instruments.
Natural experiments
Natural experiment evaluations use one-off changes in the policy environment to 
bypass problems arising from the endogeneity of the policy variable. The argument 
is that the change in the environment provides a source of exogenous variation in 
the policy variable. Katz (1996) examines the effect of restrictions in the eligibility 
rules for the US Targeted Jobs Tax Credit as a natural experiment. On 1 January 
1989, eligibility was restricted to disadvantaged youth aged 18-22, excluding those 
aged 23-24 who had previously been eligible.
By comparing the difference in employment rate of disadvantaged 23-24 year olds 
before and after the change with that for non-disadvantaged youth of the same age, 
Katz obtains a differences-in-differences estimator of the effect of TJTC eligibility. 
However, this does not take account of other, non-TJTC related, factors that might 
affect disadvantaged youth over the period differently from non-disadvantaged youth. 
Katz therefore also takes the differences-in-differences estimate for disadvantaged 
versus non-disadvantaged youth using 18-22 year olds (always eligible for TJTC), 
and 25-29 year olds (never eligible for TJTC). This allows him to control for non- 
TJTC, but disadvantage, related factors in a differences-in-differences-in-differences 
(DDD) estimator. Finally, the DDD estimator is adjusted to take account of 
differences in the composition of the treatment and control groups.
Katz’s final estimate is that withdrawal of TJTC eligibility reduced the employment 
rate of disadvantaged 23-24 year olds by 3.4 percentage points, suggesting that 
between 40 and 52% of subsidies for this group represented additional jobs.
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Assessing th e  macroeconomic evidence
A range of different methodologies have been applied in an attempt to assess the 
aggregate effects of active labour market policies. Cross-country evaluations and 
matching functions have generally produced positive results, whilst wage equations 
have more often been negative. The widely varying results from microeconomic 
evidence of the impact of different policies suggests that it may be optimistic to 
expect too much from cross-national studies using highly aggregated measures of 
national policy stance such as expenditure variables. Instead, single country studies 
would seem more likely to be fruitful, especially if we wish to shed some light on 
particular types of active labour market policy. All these approaches face the same 
basic problem, however: endogeneity of the policy variable. If the policy stance 
responds to unemployment, and hence indirectly to the real wage and outflow rates, 
then macroeconomic evaluations will suffer from simultaneity bias.
A lack of suitable instruments has restricted attempts to tackle this problem, although 
Jackman etal (1996), Calmfors and Skedinger (1995) and Boeri and Burda (1996) 
are exceptions. Lehmann (1993) argues that the implementation of Restart on a 
universal basis eliminates policy endogeneity, although the unemployment rate may 
nonetheless influence participation through administrative rather than policy 
considerations. Katz (1996) also relies on a one-off change in programme rules to 
provide a source of exogenous variation in the policy variable, finding, like Lehmann, 
a positive result. The problem of simultaneity remains a serious concern with the 
macroeconomic evaluations, and there is clearly scope for further attempts to identify 
suitable instruments or natural experiments.
1.5 Conclusion
Active labour market policies have been a frequently used, but rarely sustained, weapon 
in the armoury of governments faced with mass unemployment. Alongside the shifts 
of policy a substantial body of literature has developed, but little consensus. We have 
argued that there are three broad strands to the existing theory of active labour 
market policy, which correspond to the main evaluation methodologies within the 
empirical literature. Each contains genuine insights, but none completes the picture.
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The first, and oldest, approach emphasises the effect of wage subsidies on labour 
demand. At a theoretical level, the effect of policy is to shift out the labour demand 
schedule by reducing the marginal cost of hiring to the firm. Empirically, surveys of 
firms have sought to establish the level of additional job creation, net of deadweight, 
substitution and displacement. Deadweight in particular is generally found to be 
high, but far from total. Depending on the design of the scheme, net job creation 
accounts for between 10-30% of the total number of subsidised jobs. Hence, it is 
argued, wage subsidies will only be cost effective, at least in fiscal terms, if the subsidy 
is no more than 30% of the total fiscal cost of someone remaining unemployed for 
the expected duration of the created post.
The second strand focuses on the outflow rates, or search effectiveness, of the 
unemployed. Programmes of job search assistance, work experience or training, in 
the classroom or on-the-job, might improve the ability of workers to find suitable 
jobs, increasing their outflow rate from unemployment. Offsetting this, search 
intensity may fall whilst workers are in programmes, although this is not a problem 
for transition-based policies that directly increase the outflow. Empirically, random 
assignment or quasi-experimental techniques can be used to evaluate the net effect 
of policies, controlling for possible selection biases.
Job search assistance appears to enhance the outflow rate of unemployed workers, 
without leading them to take lower paying or shorter-term jobs. The effect is generally 
modest and appears to be one-off, hastening the initial transition into work, but not 
having long-term effects. However, the interventions needed are also modest. The 
effect of eligibility for wage subsidies has been less studied and the picture is more 
mixed. Some eligible workers appear to gain a substantially higher probability of 
leaving unemployment, but there is a risk that subsidies stigmatise workers, especially 
where they are targeted on narrow socioeconomic groups. In this case, workers may 
actually be worse off with subsidies. Where subsidised workers are employed, there 
is little evidence that jobs automatically break up when the subsidy expires, and pay and 
productivity levels are comparable to regular employees, at least after an initial period.
The assumptions underlying both these approaches, however, have been challenged 
by the third strand within the literature. Calmfors, in particular, argues that if the 
effect of policy is to reduce the utility cost to the unemployed, then that will raise
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wage pressure. Hence, even if there are positive effects from increased labour demand 
and greater employability, they may be offset in general equilibrium. Conversely, if 
policies lower wage pressure, they may give an extra boost to reductions in aggregate 
unemployment. Attempts to assess these theoretical insights require macroeconomic 
studies. Unfortunately, these have suffered from considerable problems both of data 
and in identifying programme effects, leaving a somewhat mixed picture.
Most advocates of active labour market policy have preferred one of the first two 
approaches to modelling policy, and most models in these traditions have yielded 
positive predictions for the effects of active labour market policy. Undoubtedly these 
effects are important. Korpi (1995), for example, argues that Swedish ALMP prevents 
the decline in employability with unemployment duration seen in most other OECD 
countries. But by setting wages exogenously, or using ad hoc formulations that ensure 
the independence of wages from policy, these approaches simply rule out the most 
powerful objection of their critics by definitional fiat.
Instead, we believe that the Calmfors critique must be faced head on, if a credible 
case for active labour market policy is to be made. It is relevant to too many leading 
theories of wage setting to be ignored. However, not all the contributions to the 
wage pressure literature imply that policy is ineffective, or at best ambiguous. Baily 
and Tobin’s seminal paper argues that policy will work precisely by reducing wage 
pressure, and this case has also been argued recently, but informally, by Jackman
(1994) and Layard (1996).
Furthermore, even the most sophisticated model in this strand, Calmfors and Lang
(1995), considers only scheme-based policies. Disappointment with these policies 
has led to a shift in emphasis towards transition-based approaches in many countries. 
We need a formal theory of these transition-based policies that responds to the 
Calmfors critique and fully incorporates wage pressure effects. Chapter 2 attempts 
to address this, and argues that transition-based policies targeted at the long-term 
unemployed, or those most likely to become long-term unemployed, will reduce 
wage pressure, and hence unemployment at given labour demand.
Moreover, we should not lose the insights of the labour demand and outflow 
approaches. Calmfors and Lang (1995) move some of the way towards this. They
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allow that policy may have beneficial effects in maintaining the unemployed within 
the effective labour force, and that this in turn may reduce the cost to employers of 
opening vacancies, so that they open more. However, for wage subsidies, the subsidy 
itself is intended to boost labour demand directly, and this too needs to be modelled. 
Chapter 3 extends our analysis to include the demand side effects of wage subsidies 
targeted at the long-term unemployed, as well as explicitly modelling job search 
assistance.
The wage pressure literature has emphasised the importance of targeting ALMPs, 
and we consider only targeted policies in Chapters 2 and 3. Almost all policies in the 
1980s and 1990s have been targeted, normally using duration of unemployment as 
the main criterion for eligibility, although some untargeted policies were enacted in 
the 1970s. The experience of Working Nation in Australia, however, suggests that 
exclusive targeting of policies onto the long-term unemployed may be counter­
productive. A large scale shift in resources from the short-term unemployed to the 
long-term unemployed under Working Nation led to a substantial increase in the 
inflow into long-term unemployment, which in turn overwhelmed the programmes 
targeted on the long-term unemployed (DEETYA, 1996a). Recent work drawing 
on the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of job creation and job destruction has 
simulated the effects of untargeted active labour market policies for the UK economy 
(Mortensen, 1996; Millard and Mortensen, 1997). In Chapter 4 we extend this 
approach to consider whether targeting the long-term unemployed is always desirable. 
We are able to show that, because of diminishing returns, some resources, although 
always less than half the total, should be used for the short-term unemployed.
Empirically, we believe that two areas of research are likely to prove particularly 
fruitful in assessing the effectiveness of transition-based active labour market policies. 
More macroeconomic evidence is needed to assess the impact of policy on 
unemployment, notwithstanding the considerable difficulties involved. We suspect 
that the lack of degrees of freedom and the difficulties in comparing widely different 
policy design and implementation will seriously hamper cross-country studies, even 
if the problem of simultaneity can be addressed. Hence we suspect that single­
country, and ideally single-policy, studies will prove more practical. Some attempts 
have been made to tackle the problems of identification at this level. Natural 
experiments may provide important new data in the future.
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Secondly, virtually all the existing theory, and much of the evidence, is static. Long­
term effects, especially of wage subsidies, have received little attention, despite the 
claims of subsidy advocates that they at least as important as the immediate effects 
(Layard, 1996). The focus of policy initiatives is gradually shifting towards the 
fashionable, if somewhat ill-defined, notion of‘employability’. Yet our knowledge of 
what happens to participants in wage subsidy programmes, once the subsidies expire, 
is minimal. In Chapter 5, we make an attempt to examine this issue, using data on 
Australian youth who participated in wage subsidies in the mid-1980s. We show 
that there is only weak evidence of subsidised jobs ending with subsidy expiry, and 
that instead the effect of subsidies appears to be to extend very short duration jobs. 
Furthermore, we find a substantial and strongly significant positive impact on the 
probability of being employed between 1 and 2 years after subsidy expiry.
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2. Can Active Labour Market Policy Work?
Persistent high unemployment in Europe has led to renewed interest in Active 
Labour Market Policy. However, most existing theory suggests that its effects 
are ambiguous at best. We argue that job search assistance and wage subsidies 
are more appropriately modelled as a transition rather than the state-based 
approach of existing theory. This eliminates the ambiguity. We present two 
main models, one in which negative duration dependence in unemployment 
arises from state dependence, the other where it is due to heterogeneity. In 
both cases policy is unambiguously effective provided it is targeted on those 
who are, or are most likely to become, long-term unemployed
2.1 Introduction
The persistence of high unemployment in much of western Europe has led to renewed 
interest in active labour market policies (ALMPs). Yet, although there is a wealth of 
micro level studies (see Chapter 1) there have been few attempts to model ALMPs 
explicitly in a general equilibrium context. This is despite the fact that success of the 
programmes at micro level is neither sufficient nor necessary for ALMP to reduce 
aggregate unemployment: successful programme effects may simply substitute one 
group of unemployed for another, or be offset by increased wage pressure (Calmfors 
and Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). Conversely even apparently useless 
schemes may be effective by reducing wage pressure among workers keen to avoid 
ending up on them (Jackman, 1994).
Compounding the difficulties in interpreting the micro-level studies, most of the 
attempts at macroeconomic modelling have concluded that the effect of policy is 
ambiguous (Holmlund and Linden, 1993; Aarnio, 1993; Jackman, 1994; Calmfors 
and Lang, 1995). Typically, increased competition for jobs among the unemployed 
and improvements in the matching process are offset by reduced welfare loss for the 
unemployed and possible reduced search whilst on programmes, leaving the overall 
effect uncertain. At a time when governments are being urged to allocate increased 
resources to active labour market policy, the message is far from clear.
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However, we argue that the ambiguity in existing models arises out of a view of 
active labour market policy that is not universally applicable. An understandable 
tendency to model policy along Swedish lines has led to an emphasis on scheme- 
based ALMP, where policy is seen as the creation of an explicit state into which 
unemployed workers are placed (Snower, 1994, and Layard, 1997, are exceptions). 
Exit rates both during and after scheme-participation, together with in-scheme 
conditions, offer a host of policy parameters and consequent scope for ambiguity.
By modelling policy as a transition, rather than a state, we are able to obtain simple 
and unambiguous effects. Provided policy is targeted on those who are, or who are 
most likely to become, long-term unemployed, ALMP leads to a fall in equilibrium 
unemployment. We believe that this approach is particularly suited to modelling job 
search assistance and wage subsidies. For the moment, however, we model policy in 
a stylised manner, taking the effect of policy to be an increase in the outflow rate of 
the target group relative to untargeted unemployed workers. We assume that the 
target group are at some disadvantage within the pool of unemployed, and that the 
effect of policy is to narrow that disadvantage1. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
well-designed policies are capable of achieving at least this, and the question that 
we are interested in is what the aggregate effects of such policies are in general equilibrium. 
In the next chapter, we model both job search assistance and wage subsidies explicitly.
We look exclusively at targeted policies, in particular those targeted at the long­
term unemployed, or those at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. We return 
to the question of whether targeting is optimal in Chapter 4. One of the main 
justifications for the targeting of many active labour market policies onto the long­
term unemployed has been the widespread observations of falling outflow rates as 
unemployment durations rise (Layard et al, 1991). We present two sets of models, 
one in which negative duration dependence among the unemployed is a consequence 
of state dependence, and one where it is due to heterogeneity among the unemployed.
Section 2 below sets out the assumptions we make in modelling policy as a transition 
rather than a state, and considers the supporting evidence. Sections 3 and 4 consider 
the state dependence case with efficiency wages and union bargaining respectively. 
Section 5 sets out three variants of the model under the alternative assumption of 
heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Active Labour Market Policy as a Transition
The OECD (1993) categorises active labour market policies into five types: temporary 
job creation; training; job search assistance; wage subsidies for regular employment; 
and assistance for those starting their own enterprises. Of these only the first is 
unambiguously a separate state within the labour force. Trainees are arguably out of 
the labour force altogether, whilst the availability of job search assistance, wage or 
self-employment subsidies do not constitute a separate state into which the 
unemployed are placed, but rather act to increase transition probabilities into regular 
(or self) employment. Wage formation in self-employment is not adequately captured 
within our model, but such programmes are inevitably on a limited scale since self- 
employment is of interest to only a small sub-group of the unemployed (US 
Department of Labour, 1995). By capturing the effects of job search assistance and 
wage subsidies we consider that our transitions approach is at least as relevant as the 
predominant state-based models.
We model policy in the simplest possible way, as an increase in the relative outflow 
rate of those on whom the policy is targeted. It is easy to see within the models that 
this implies an increase in their absolute outflow rate as well, but overall outflow 
rates are of course endogenous. Implicit in this is the idea of a matching function 
with the potential for productivity gains (Pissarides, 1990), and we will make extensive 
use of this framework in Chapters 3 and 4. However, for the moment we do not 
explicitly model search. As Calmfors and Lang (1995) show, the introduction of 
search does not affect the wage-setting schedule, which is our primary focus 
here.
We take it for granted that well-designed programmes are capable of increasing the 
outflow rates of those who participate in them, at least relative to other unemployed 
workers. Furthermore we assume that not all of this effect is simply‘queue jumping’ 
at the expense of other members of the target group (although it may be at the 
expense of other unemployed workers not in the target group), so that the relative 
outflow rate for the target group as a whole rises. Alternatively, we could assume 
that the programme covers the whole of the target group so that the possibility of 
queue jumping within the target group does not arise.
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Job search assistance is straightforward to model in this way. Such programmes do 
not carry the risk of reduced search for their duration, which is anyway typically 
very short. Nor do they generally involve enhanced benefit payments beyond some 
possible token element to cover expenses. Hence their sole effect is through increasing 
outflow rates of the target group. One of the few areas of agreement among the 
micro studies is that job search assistance programmes generally succeed in increasing 
outflow rates among participants (Fay, 1996).
Modelling wage subsidies as a transition involves a greater degree of simplification, 
but we believe that it captures a central feature of wage subsidy programmes, namely 
that they provide a direct entry into regular employment. Moreover, by ignoring the 
possible effects of subsidies on labour demand, we are taking an overtly pessimistic 
view of what wage subsidies can achieve.
The impact of wage subsidies is generally disaggregated into four effects:
i) Deadweight where the vacancy would anyway have been filled by someone 
eligible for the subsidy so that the hiring decision is unaffected.
ii) Substitution', where the vacancy would otherwise have been filled by another 
unemployed person from outside the target group.
iii) Displacement where firms receiving the subsidy are able to win orders at the 
expense of competitors, leading to a drop in labour demand in rival firms.
iv) Additionality: Net expansion of labour demand.
We consider only the case where deadweight is less than total so that the subsidy 
has at least some effect. Although measures of deadweight are often high (OECD, 
1993; Fay, 1996), they are always less than 100%. Provided that the programme has 
a reasonable degree of coverage and that the target group have a low initial outflow 
rate this condition is certain to be met.
Although difficult to measure, displacement effects are generally found to be quite 
small (Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Breen and Halpin, 1989), in part because subsidies 
are relatively low and most firms take on only one or two subsidised workers. We 
deal with endogenous job destruction in detail in Chapter 4. For simplicity, we will
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assume here that displacement occurs through natural wastage rather than 
redundancies, so that the job separation rates are unaffected. Hence we can treat 
displacement as another form of substitution: the hiring of a subsidised worker at 
the expense of an unsubsidised one, where now the unsubsidised worker would have 
been employed at a rival firm.
This leaves additionality. All the micro studies identify this as the measure of success. 
Implicit in this view is the assumption that the policy acts by increasing labour 
demand at given wages, a view that can be traced back to Kaldor (1936) and Pigou 
(1933). However, the studies suggest that the contribution of additionality, (measured 
at firm level, ie in partial equilibrium), is relatively modest, at most about one- 
quarter of the total. Even this may be an over-estimate, since studies are typically 
based on surveys of employers who may have an incentive to disguise substitution.
Instead, we shall assume that there is no effect on labour demand, turning the 
conventional criterion of programme success on its head. Net of deadweight, we 
shall treat wage subsidies as having a pure substitution effect. It is easy to see that 
this is precisely equivalent to an increase in the relative outflow rate of those eligible 
for the subsidy, at given labour demand. Formally, therefore, we are providing an 
analysis only of the substitution effects of wage subsidies and not also of their labour 
demand effects. The neglect of the macroeconomic implications of these substitution 
effects in most past studies provides sufficient justification for this approach. We 
will return to the labour demand effects in Chapters 3 and 4.
One further issue remains, however: whether expiry of temporary subsidies will lead 
to higher separation rates for subsidised workers. We have seen, in Chapter 1, that 
what little empirical evidence there is does not support this view. For the moment, 
therefore, we simply note that given that we are assuming that there is no effect on 
labour demand, then there is also no reason to suppose that the job would be 
terminated as a consequence of expiry of the subsidy. We go on to model endogenous 
job destruction in Chapter 4 and to consider the evidence in Chapter 5.
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2.3 State Dependence
Two competing explanations for negative duration dependence exist. State 
dependence argues that unemployment itself leads to reduced subsequent outflow 
rates, whilst heterogeneity assumes that people differ in their outflow probabilities, 
so that low exit rate types are disproportionately represented among the long-term 
unemployed. Of course the two are not mutually exclusive, and moreover there are 
considerable empirical difficulties in distinguishing between them (Heckman, 1991). 
We do not wish to come down on one side or the other of this dispute, but will 
demonstrate instead that policy is effective whichever is the dominant cause of 
negative duration dependence.
We consider state dependence first, treating heterogeneity in Section 5 below. We 
model state dependence as a one-off fall in the relative outflow rate, after one period 
of unemployment. Unlike Calmfors and Lang (1995) who model duration dependence 
through a zero outflow state, this allows policy to be targeted on those who have 
already suffered duration dependence. Policy is then modelled as a reduction in the 
extent of state dependence, equivalent to an increase in the relative outflow rate of 
the long-term unemployed.
The model
We assume that wage determination follows the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) efficiency 
wage model. This ensures that we capture the possible effect of ALMPs in increasing 
wage pressure through reducing the utility loss involved in unemployment (see for 
example Calmfors and Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 1995). In Section 4 
below, we show that union bargaining over wages leads to identical conclusions.
Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we assume that workers in employment are paid 
a real wage, w, and have linear utility functions. They can choose either to work, in which 
case they must expend effort, e, or not work (shirk), in which case they are detected with 
probability, q, and fired. In addition, there is an exogenous probability of separation, s.
We model the structure of unemployment in the simplest possible way that will 
allow for targeting, having only two states: short-term and long-term. This captures 
a widespread feature of subsidies, whereby eligibility is determined by a simple
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duration threshold. For example, in the UK’s New Deal for 18-24s, young people 
become eligible for a subsidy after 8 months of unemployment (including 2 months 
on the New Deal Gateway). In the New Deal for 25+ long-term unemployed, the 
threshold is 2 years. We think that this is, therefore, the most appropriate approach, 
but clearly more complex structures might yield fewer unambiguous results, requiring 
more simulations of the kind used in Chapter 4.
After separation, a worker becomes short-term unemployed. If they fail to find a job 
within one period, they become long-term unemployed in the next period, and remain 
so until they exit. Exit rates from long-term unemployment are lower than from 
short-term unemployment by a factor, 0</3<l, either because the long-term 
unemployed search less effectively or because employers discriminate against them. 
Hence, the exit rate from long-term unemployment is pa. Unemployed workers 
receive per period utility, b, including the value of leisure time as well as unemployment 
benefits.
Let WE be the expected present discounted value of working, WN be the expected 
present discounted value of not working (shirking), and U be the expected present 
discounted value of short-term unemployment. We assume a stationary equilibrium, 
so that a worker choosing to work this period will make the same choice next period, 
and similarly for a shirker. Once unemployed, workers are indistinguishable, except 
by their unemployment duration, so that firms cannot tell whether an individual 
previously worked or shirked. It follows that:
(2 .1) rWE = w -e  + s(UST-W E)
(2.2) rWN = w+(s+9XUST-fVN)
Workers will choose to work only if WE > WN. Since shirkers produce zero output, 
it is always optimal for firms to set a wage such that workers choose to work, which 
implies from (2.1) and (2.2) that:
(2.3) w>rUST+(r + s + q}ejq
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Since there is no incentive for the firm to pay above the wage required to ensure that 
workers work rather than shirk, we assume that (2.3) holds with equality. Let W be 
the expected present discounted value of employment, given that firms pay the no­
shirking wage, allowing us to rewrite (2.1) as:
(2.4) W = w e+sUgr 
r + s
Following Manning (1993), we allow that workers may exit from unemployment at 
the beginning of each period, and hence, following separation, workers have 
probability a of being immediately re-employed. This avoids the problem of 
unemployment being bounded below by the normal assumption that at least one 
period of unemployment follows separation. None of our results depend upon this 
assumption, but it does simplify the algebra somewhat. The Bellman equations for 
short- and long-term unemployment respectively are:
(2.5) Usr = aW +\-?-{b+ULT) 
1 + r
(2.5) ULT=/3afV+±-&-(i+UlT) 1 + r
Where ULT is the expected present discounted value of long-term unemployment.
Solving (2.3)-(2.6) yields:
(2.7) w — b + e + — (r+ j) + 
9 .
air +P)
1 -a
Following Manning (1991) we define unemployment as the end ofperiod stock, 
allowing for the fact that a proportion of those flowing into unemployment in any 
period also flow out during that period, and are thus not captured in empirical stock 
measurements. Let tts,uL be short- and long-term unemployment respectively. We 
normalise the labour force to unity, so that these are also the short- and long-term 
unemployment rates. Employment then equals 1 - u , where u is total unemployment.
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Following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we assume a stationary equilibrium. This is 
also the approach taken in the union bargaining and search models which we adopt 
below (Manning, 1991; Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), and in 
most of the existing theoretical literature on active labour market policies (eg Aarnio, 
1993; Piggott and Chapman, 1995; Holmlund and Linden, 1993; Calmfors and 
Lang, 1995; Mortensen, 1996; Millard and Mortensen, 1997). However, it implies 
that the effects arising in our models are the effects on equilibrium unemployment, 
and may not hold in disequilibrium.
In stationary equilibrium flows into and out of each state must balance:
(2.8) us = (l-a )s(l-u )
(2.9) us(l -f3a) = pauL
The end of period stock of short-term unemployment equals the per period inflow, 
less the proportion of the inflow who flow out during that period. Similarly, the 
remaining short-term unemployed, less those of them who flow out in the next 
period, make up next periods net inflow into long-term unemployment, which must 
equal the outflow from the existing stock. Solving gives:
(2.10) a -
1 + pu /  s{l-u)
whilst substituting (2.10) into (2.7) yields the wage-setting schedule:
(2.11) w — b + e + — 
9
r + r  +
which can easily be seen to be upward-sloping in wage-employment space. The 
model is closed by the labour demand schedule:
(2.12) iv = F '{\-u )
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where F(.) is the aggregate production function, with F '(.) > 0,F"(.) < 0, and which 
we assume to be independent of policy.
Policy
We model policy as an increase in the relative outflow rate of the long-term 
unemployed, /?. We can obtain the effect of policy by equating (2.11) and (2.12) 
and differentiating. However, it will be easier to identify the offsetting effects by 
using (2.7) instead and substituting for a later. Furthermore, since we are assuming 
that the labour demand curve is unaffected by policy, we can focus exclusively on the 
marginal effect on the wage setting curve. Hence, from (2.7), we have:
du I V - 1 da a( 1 -  a) ---- h—----- -dp ehtt=0 /  8u_ dp (r+/3)_
where:
(2.14) —  = ■ - “M 1- " )  - ^ - * > <0
dP  [l + -  «)] P
(2.15) o
From (2.13), we can see that there are two off-setting effects represented by the
terms in the second bracket:
i) A competition effect, whereby increasing j3 reduces a since the short-term 
unemployed face greater competition for jobs. This increases the utility cost 
of unemployment, reducing wage pressure and lowering unemployment at 
given wages.
ii) A utility effect, whereby increasing reduces the utility costs of long-term 
unemployment, pushing wage pressure up and increasing unemployment at 
any given wage level.
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However, it is immediately obvious from (2.14) that the competition effect will 
dom iiate for any r>0. Because the utility gain to the long-term unemployed is 
discounted more heavily than the cost to the short-term unemployed from greater 
competition in the job market, the threat of unemployment becomes more severe.
It follows that programmes targeted at the inflow into unemployment would have 
no effect, since as the length of a period tends to zero, /3—>1 and r->0, so that the 
effectiveness of policy will tend to zero.
CitiIt is also worth noting from (2.16) that —  <0 does not require that p< 1 and hence 
negative duration dependence is not a prerequisite for policy effectiveness, although 
it will increase the effectiveness of policy, since the lower is p, the higher is the 
proportion of u who are long-term unemployed.
Short-term unemployment
We have modelled wage subsidies as an incentive for employers to substitute long­
term unemployed for short-term unemployed workers when hiring. Hence we would 
expect, even where policy is effective in reducing overall unemployment, that short­
term unemployment will rise. Indeed, this is precisely the mechanism by which we 
can reduce unemployment without also reducing the disutility of unemployment, 
which would increase wage pressure.
Given that there is a fixed inflow rate, any policy that reduces unemployment will 
automatically increase the inflow into short-term unemployment, simply because 
(1 — u) is now greater. Of more interest, though, is the effect of policy on the outflow 
rate from short-term unemployment, a. It is easy to show from (2.10) that:
Hence a lower wage is needed to prevent shirking, which allows employment to 
rise.
Formally, we can solve out to give:
—r(l -  u)u
<0
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(2.17) da _ —a u 
d(5 r(l -  u)
1-
{(r + 0)-F "(  1 -  u)Pqu21se)
<0
So that the outflow rate from short-term unemployment always falls, but the higher 
the discount rate, r, the less the increase in short-term unemployment.
2.4 Union Bargaining
Union bargaining models of wage formation have been popular in the literature on 
active labour market policy (eg Calmfors and Forslund, 1991; Calmfors and Lang, 
1995). Such models share with the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, and more widely with 
the concept of a non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), the 
presumption that unemployment acts as a discipline on wage setters, and hence 
counters upward wage pressure. Hence it is unsurprising that our results, which 
depend on the interaction of policy with the appropriately discounted utility of 
unemployment, carry over from the efficiency wage case.
Following conventional practise, we assume that the wage is set so as to maximise 
the Nash bargain:
(2.18) wu -  argm axF /n^
where Vit is the utility of the union at time t, II^  the firm’s operating profit, and % 
the relative bargaining strength of the union. Following Manning (1993), we assume 
a union utility function of the form:
(2.19)Vi/= N ^ - [ / m )
where is the level of firm employment; y/ the union’s preference for employment
relative to wages; Wu the present discounted value of employment at the firm and 
USTt the present discounted value of short-term unemployment.
If, as above, we assume that exits from unemployment occur at the beginning of 
each period, we can write the value functions as:
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[viw ^ + s j / ^  + ( l-s it)Wit+l]
(2.21) Um  = a,W, +1 + r
(2.22) Ut „ =patV, + \ ^ [ < K )  + UL7,^}
(2.23) W, = - l—[v(w,)+slUsn^+ (l-s ,)lV M] 
1 + r L
where ULTt> Wt are the present discounted values of long-term unemployment and
the real value of unemployment benefits; su the probability of separation from the 
firm; and wn st the wage and separation rate in outside employment.
If we assume that the wage is set for one period only, and that employment is set 
unilaterally by the firm, we can write the first order condition for the maximisation
and sNw, are the elasticities of employment and profits with respect to the 
wage. It is convenient to assume that jj. is constant across time and independent of 
unemployment, at given wages. This would be the case, for example, with a Cobb- 
Douglas production function and constant union preferences, y/ , and power, x  > 
(Manning, 1993).
If we solve equations (2.20) -  (2.24) for a stationary solution, and impose the 
equilibrium conditions wi = w = w, andri = J = s , we obtain:
outside employment respectively; v(.)  is the utility function of union members; bt is
of (2.18) as:
(2.24) wu =M(Wu -U sn) where: //
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Differentiating (2.25) with respect to u and (5, holding the wage constant, yields:
(2.26) —  
60 dw=  0 /  du
da a( 1 -  a)
( r +P)
exactly as in the efficiency wage case. Since a is affected only by the flow equilibrium, 
and not by wage setting, we can see that the effect of policy is the same in the union 
bargaining case as in the efficiency wage model.
2.5 Heterogeneity
Existing models of active labour market policy under duration dependence have 
tended to assume state dependence as the cause (Calmfors and Lang, 1995; Layard, 
1997). However, the empirical difficulties inherent in distinguishing state dependence 
from unobserved heterogeneity suggest that we should also consider the effects of 
policy under heterogeneity.
Furthermore, modelling heterogeneity allows us to examine another question of 
some policy interest. Suppose that we can distinguish, to some extent at least, those 
at risk of becoming long-term unemployed at the point where they enter 
unemployment. Australia’s Working Nation programme, for example, included an 
early intervention strategy, which identified high risk workers using an automated 
screening system, supplemented by employment service staff assessments (DEETYA, 
1996a). Should we target policy on such ‘at risk’ individuals immediately, or is it 
necessary to wait, in order to reap the benefits of discounting, as above?
Extending our model to examine heterogeneity, we find that the basic conclusion is 
the same as for the state dependence case. Policy is effective, provided that it is 
targeted at the less able. Furthermore, under heterogeneity, it is no longer necessary 
for policy to target the long-term unemployed directly. A policy of targeting those 
‘at risk’, provided that they can be identified, can reduce aggregate unemployment. 
Given heterogeneity, the less able make up an increasing proportion of the 
unemployed as duration increases, so that targeting the less able, even in the inflow, 
implicitly targets the long-term unemployed.
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We look first at the simplest case, where ‘at risk’workers can be identified and policy 
is targeted on the inflow into unemployment. Below we extend this, first to the case 
where workers’ type can still be identified, but policy is targeted on the long-term 
unemployed. This might be because type is not immediately revealed to the 
employment service, but can only be determined after a period of unemployment, or 
because policies are costly, and government prefers to intervene only after conventional 
job search has failed. Finally, we consider the case where type is not revealed, so that 
policy cannot be targeted explicitly on those with poor prospects. However, we 
assume that policy is targeted on the long-term unemployed, since deadweight would 
be very high if the short-term unemployed were also included and no distinction 
could be made between those with naturally high and low exit rates.
For simplicity, we revert to Shapiro-Stiglitzwage-setting, but the results from Section 
3 above suggest that equivalent results would be found in the union bargaining case. 
We assume that there are two types of labour, with the least employable having an 
outflow rate /times that of the most employable, where 0</<l. This enables us to 
model policy as an increase in /. We label workers with a high outflow rate ‘good’, 
and those with a low outflow rate ‘bad’, and assume that workers are good with 
probability tt, and bad with probability 1-7T.
We also assume that employability is drawn randomly on entry into unemployment 
and is unemployment-spell-specific. Since we are interested in whether government 
should target ‘at risk’ individuals in the inflow, we are primarily interested in the case 
where type is observable. But if type were worker-specific, rather than unemployment- 
spell-specific, and observable, then there would be no differences in outflow rates, 
contradicting our initial assumption. Since there are always queues of workers in the 
Shapiro-Stiglitz framework, observably high type workers must be more desirable 
in order to have a higher exit rate. But then competition amongst firms would bid 
up the wage of high type workers, above the no-shirking wage for low type workers, 
until firms were indifferent between the two, in which case outflow rates would be 
equalised. Even if unobserved, worker-specific types lead to the perverse implication 
that those most likely to get hired are also those most likely to shirk. We prefer 
therefore to define type for the unemployment spell, so that it might refer to some 
stochastic element in the worker’s search motivation or effectiveness.
87
Can Active Labour Market Policy Work?
Targeting the  inflow
Define a as the exit rate of good workers, so that ya is the exit rate of bad workers. 
Let UG be the expected present discounted value of unemployment for good types, 
and UB be the expected present discounted value of unemployment for bad types. 
Note that since we are assuming no state dependence, these will be independent of 
duration. Equations (2.1) to (2.4) continue to define the no shirking criterion, where 
UST is now given by:
(2.27) Ugj. = 7tUc + (1 -  n)UB
whilst the remaining value functions are given by:
(2.28) UG = a W + j~ [ b  + U0]
(2.29) UB=ra W + ^ - [ b  + UB\ 
and hence:
(2.30) w = b + e + — 
9
(r + f) + 5(l+r) 7t + y ( l -  7t)X 
(1 -  a)n + (l -  ya)(l -  k)X
where X = f  r + a N 
r + y,a
Let uG,uB be the unemployment rate of good and bad types respectively, with the 
labour force normalised to unity. The stock of unemployed at duration i equals the 
inflow times the survival rate at duration i. We again define unemployment as the 
end of period stock, giving:
(2.31) uG =
88
Can Active Labour Market Policy Work?
which gives:
(2.33) a = yn+ Q -n) 
y[l + u/s(l-u)]
Policy
We treat yas the policy variable. This implicitly assumes that policy covers all the 
bad type workers, and also that the effects of policy persist throughout the 
unemployment spell, or alternatively that bad type workers continue to be eligible 
for policy intervention at subsequent durations. Since most active labour market 
policy is targeted on those at longer durations, the assumption that policy available 
to the short-term unemployed would also be made available to the longer-term 
unemployed seems reasonable.
As before the model is closed by the aggregate labour demand function, (2.12), but 
it is again more illuminating to look at the shift in the wage-setting schedule. 
Differentiating (2.30) with respect to yand u, holding the wage constant, gives:
(2.34) du -V
fcB~ 'da 2(1-x)
dy dw= 0 / du dy y ( l -n )  + 7r/A2
where:
(2.35)—  = -a{ 1 -  7t)
dy y 2[l + a/r(l-«)] y[y;r+(l-/r)]
<0
(2.36)— = —a <0
&U j ( l -« )2[l + «/j(l-w)]
Hence, from (2.34) we can again see that there are competing competition and 
utility effects, as in the state dependence model. From (2.35) it is clear that if r=0 
the effects will exactly cancel out. Furthermore, —  < 0 so that the utility effect is 
decreasing in r, whilst the competition effect is independent of r. Hence for any r>0 
the competition effect will dominate, and policy will again be effective.
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We also note that as y —> 1,A —> 1jy  and hence the competition and utility effects 
will again exactly cancel, regardless of r. Thus if there is no heterogeneity, policy 
targeted on the inflow into unemployment will be ineffective.
Finally, we can solve out the entire system to give:
( 2  3 7 ) —  —__________-K 1  ~ YM 1  ~fl'M1  - u)211  + M]___________ < 0
t y  y 2(r + ya)^\7t + y( 1 -  n)A2 ] -  F"( 1 -  u)qs{ 1 -  u f  + r)J
where: £ = [(1- a)7t + (l -  ya)( 1 -  ;r)/l][l + «/r(l -  w)]
Heterogeneity and policy for the  long-term unemployed
So far we have modelled policy under heterogeneity as targeting the inflow into 
unemployment, on the assumption that type is observable. The effectiveness of policy 
in this case contrasts with Calmfors and Lang’s (1995, p. 601) conclusion that 
‘targeting the long-term unemployed is crucial for the success of ALMP’. However, 
in practice, policies are often targeted on the long-term unemployed in order to 
reduce deadweight, or because of difficulties in identifying those at risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed. This is particularly true of relatively expensive programmes 
such as wage subsidies. We look first at the case where type is still observed, but 
policy is targeted only on the long-term unemployed. Below, we consider the case 
where type is not observed.
Suppose that high exit rate workers have exit rate a at all durations. Low exit rate 
workers have initial exit rate ya. After one period of unemployment, however they 
are subject to policy and obtain exit rate PQya , where /JQ is the policy variable, which 
we assume to be unity in the absence of intervention.
The wage equation now becomes:
(2.38) w = b + e + -  
9
(r + s) + a
f 1 + r) + y  (1 -  n){r + f i0 )1 '
n{ 1 -  a) + (1 -  7t\ 1 -  ya)/1
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where: A =r r + a  ^r + fi0ya
and flow equilibrium gives:
(2.39) a = (1 -7t) + f3Qrn
r[(l - * )  + PQn + Pou/s{\ -  u)]
Solving as before yields:
(2.40) du
%
cB ya{ 1 -  ya){\ -  n)
dfiQ y(l-;r)(r + /?0) + ;r(l + r ) / i 2
where:
(2.4i) —  = 
P<\0--x) + PQyn]
so that we can again see that the competition effect dominates, provided r>0 and 
ie provided the bad type continue to have lower exit rates even allowing for 
the effects of policy.
Unobserved type
Suppose instead that policy is targeted onto all the long-term unemployed, because 
type is unobserved. It is unclear a priori whether we should expect the effect of 
policy to be greater or less for high exit rate workers than for low exit rate workers. 
Let be the effect of policy on bad types, so that their initial exit rate is ya, and 
thereafter their exit rate is p xya. Let 6 be the effectiveness of policy for the good 
types relative to the bad types, so that good types have initial exit rate a , and exit 
rate 0/3 after one period of unemployment. The policy variable is now .
The system is now determined by:
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(2.42) w = b + e + — 
9
(r + s) +a
f n{r + epx) + y( 1 -  n tr  + PX) ^
where: /I = ^ r + 9f$x£i^ and:
(2.43) a =
r+fii/a 
[(l-;r)+y;r]
y[l + Pxu/s(l-u)] 
so that the policy effect is now:
(2.44) du
S/5,
r 1 / ^ 1
^  2f[0;r(l -2 ) + y ( l - x X l -  ya)l2 ]
div=0 / A . 7t{r + 0fix) + y(l -  n)(r + fix )12
(2.45)
so that, once again, the competition and utility effects cancel out if r=0, and the 
competition effect dominates for any r>0, provided 6 is not too large. In particular, 
policy will always be effective if 0 > y , so that, even allowing for policy, the good 
type have a higher exit rate, and 0 < 1, so that the bad type gain at least as much 
from policy as the good type.
The optimal timing of interventions
From (2.16), (2.37), (2.40) and (2.44) we can see that, under each of our sets of 
assumptions, policy is increasingly effective as r increases. Both greater discounting 
and a lower probability of remaining unemployed long enough to enter the 
programme reduce the wage-increasing utility effect as the target duration increases. 
This suggests that maximum policy effectiveness can be achieved by targeting the 
very long-term unemployed. Against this, however, we need to consider the likely 
increased difficulty of improving outflow rates at longer durations. To the extent 
that demoralisation and adaptation to a life on benefits set in (see for example, Warr 
and Jackson, 1987; Winefield andTiggeman, 1989), the costs of achieving a given
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improvement in outflow rates will rise with duration. Without more detailed empirical 
estimates of these offsetting effects, we cannot say more than that policy should 
only be targeted onto the inflow into unemployment when heterogeneity is important, 
and we can identify those at risk of becoming long-term unemployed.
2.6 Conclusion
Existing models of active labour market policy have tended to treat ALMP as a 
state into which the unemployed are placed, and which may or may not lead to an 
exit into employment. This is particularly true of the few general equilibrium models 
that take into account the possible effects on wage-setting. This literature has tended 
to have somewhat pessimistic conclusions as to the effectiveness of active labour 
market policy, whilst most of the models are both complex and produce frequently 
ambiguous results.
We argue that this state-based approach is relevant only to policies of direct job 
creation and training. Alternative active labour market policies, in particular job 
search assistance and subsidies to regular employment, do not constitute a separate 
state within the labour force. Instead, they act to increase the probability of making 
the transition from unemployment to employment. By modelling policy as a transition, 
rather than a state, we can better capture the effects of these types of ALMP. 
Moreover, we have shown that this approach allows us to generate unambiguous 
results within a relatively simple framework, even ignoring any potential benefits 
from increased labour demand.
We have presented a number of closely-related models of active labour market policy 
in a macroeconomic framework. These take the possibility of programme effectiveness 
at micro-level (for the participants) for granted, instead asking what the general 
equilibrium effects of such policies would be. Our results suggest that policies that 
involve directly improving an unemployed person’s chances of obtaining a regular 
job, rather than sending them onto a scheme, are unambiguously effective provided 
that they are targeted on those who are, or are likely to become, long-term unemployed.
Our models start from the widely observed phenomenon of negative duration 
dependence, and we treat policy under the alternative assumptions of state dependence
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and worker heterogeneity. Our main conclusion, that policy can be unambiguously 
effective holds regardless of which of these is the dominant cause of negative duration 
dependence. With state dependence, we find that policy must be targeted on the 
long-term unemployed to work, in line with Calmfors and Lang (1995). However, 
where there is heterogeneity among the unemployed, this result need not hold. 
Provided that those with low outflow rates can be identified, policies targeted on 
less employable workers in the inflow will reduce aggregate unemployment. Especially 
where policies are relatively cheap to implement, there may be a strong case for 
employment services seeking to identify those at risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed, and intervening early.
1. Strictly, we only require that the target group is disadvantaged in the case of heterogeneity. With 
state dependence, policy would still be effective under positive duration dependence, although 
less so than with negative duration dependence. However, the widely-observed decline of outflow 
rates with duration suggests that positive duration dependence is of little policy interest.
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3. Targeted Wage Subsidies and Job Search 
Assistance
We build on the models in Chapter 2, introducing labour demand effects into 
the model to develop explicit models of targeted wage subsidies and job search 
assistance. Modellingjob search intensity as an endogenous choke highlights 
the importance of interactions between job search assistance and 'actively 
seeking work’ requirements in the unemployment benefit system. I f  policy 
simply cuts the cost of search, the short-term unemployed will search less, 
anticipating lower future costs, whilst the long-term unemployed will take 
part of the reduced cost as extra consumption. However, where the benefit 
system mandates search intensity, these effects can be avoided, leading to 
reduced unemployment. We go on to model wage subsidies, under the 
assumption that falling outflow rates with unemployment duration arise from 
genuine state dependence. One firm’s hiring decision is then an externality 
for other firms. Hiring a short-term unemployed worker reduces the average 
quality of the remaining unemployed poolfaced by otherfirms with vacancies.
A  subsidy targeted at the hiring oflong-term unemployed workers can overcome 
this externality, reducing unemployment.
3.1 Introduction
Job search assistance and wage subsidies, in particular programmes targeted at the 
long-term unemployed, are the predominant forms of‘transition-based’ active labour 
market policy. Whereas there is general agreement that measures to enhance job 
search assistance are effective (Fay, 1996), wage subsidies have always attracted 
opposition on the grounds that they have very high levels of deadweight and 
substitution: those who are helped by the scheme either didn’t need help or were 
only helped at the expense of someone else. Perhaps because there is less public 
money at stake, evaluation of job search assistance programmes has not become 
bogged down in the discussion of substitution and displacement effects, even though 
such issues are potentially just as relevant, or irrelevant.
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In the previous chapter, we argued that the scepticism arising from substitution 
effects was a consequence of partial equilibrium analysis. If we consider substitution 
in the context of equilibrium wage-setting models, the positive effects of policy on 
the long-term unemployed are discounted relative to any negative effects on the 
short-term unemployed. This implies that what is generally identified as an entirely 
negative substitution effect would instead reduce unemployment by reducing wage 
pressure.
Here we extend that approach into a fuller general equilibrium setting, looking in 
more depth at the behaviour of both individuals and firms. Search theory provides a 
natural framework in which we can account for labour demand as well as wage-setting. 
Using a general framework similar to Pissarides (1990), we develop explicit models of 
both job search assistance and wage subsidies, targeted towards the long-term unemployed.
Somewhat contrary to the received wisdom, we find that wage subsidies have an 
unambiguous negative effect on unemployment, whilst job search assistance can 
have ambiguous effects. If unemployed workers’ search intensity is fully endogenous, 
then short-term unemployed workers will respond to job search assistance targeted 
to the long-term unemployed by cutting their own search intensity. Although the 
search intensity of the long-term unemployed will generally increase, they too will 
take some of benefit of job search assistance as higher consumption. Overall the 
effect on unemployment is ambiguous.
However, if the search intensity of the long-term unemployed, or of all the 
unemployed, is constrained from below by requirements of the benefit system, then 
job search assistance will unambiguously lead to a reduction in unemployment.
Wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed also unambiguously reduce 
unemployment. Subsidies directly reduce the costs of hiring to any firm that hires 
the long-term unemployed, and hence increase labour demand. But they also reduce 
the costs faced by other firms. Because the long-term unemployed are now more 
employable’, the expected duration of vacancies falls and hence their expected cost, so 
that more firms are induced to open vacancies. Furthermore, more of the unemployed 
are ‘higher quality’ short-term unemployed, further reducing the cost of recruiting.
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In addition, the wage pressure effects discussed in the previous chapter continue to 
exert downward pressure on unemployment. However, it is no longer clear what the 
effect will be on short-term unemployment. Here, the substitution effects that are 
generally assumed to increase short-term unemployment bring about positive 
externalities and the effect on short-term unemployment is ambiguous. At best, in 
general equilibrium there maybe no substitution effects. Both short- and long-term 
unemployment can fall. At the least, the estimates of substitution derived from partial 
equilibrium analysis of wage subsidies are overstated.
Section 2 below examines the effects of job search assistance under varying 
assumptions about the benefit system, and consequent constraints on the search 
intensity of the unemployed. Section 3 looks at the effects of a subsidy to employers 
who hire the long-term unemployed. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Job Search Assistance
Job search is intimately linked with the unemployment benefit system. We shall 
assume, for simplicity, that all the unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefits, 
but also subject to the requirements of the benefit system. In particular that they 
may be bound by conditions about the amount of job search that they undertake: 
actively seeking work’ requirements. We shall further assume that, although these 
requirements may be binding on the unemployed, they are never sufficiently onerous 
to deter people from the benefit system altogether.
Whether the benefit system imposes binding job search requirements on the 
unemployed affects not only their behaviour, but also the policy instruments to which 
government has access. If the system binds, then government can act directly on the 
job search intensity of the affected group, but if there are no binding restrictions 
(and assuming that we do not impose any), then government can only act indirectly, 
altering the incentives to search.
We consider models in which there are two groups of unemployed workers, the short­
term unemployed and the long-term unemployed, and we consider only policies targeted 
on the long-term unemployed. We start with the most general case, where search intensity
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is fully endogenous, with no binding requirements from the benefit system. The policy 
instrument in this case is the cost of search for the long-term unemployed.
We then consider restrictions on the unemployed’s choice of search intensity. Firstly 
we suppose that the benefit system binds on both short- and long-term unemployed. 
Secondly we consider the case where there are no binding requirements on the 
short-term unemployed, but search intensity is binding for the long-term unemployed. 
This latter case might arise either endogenously, if the required level of job search 
falls between the optimum levels of the long- and short-term unemployed, or through 
choice of policy instrument if search intensity binds on the long-term unemployed 
precisely because of our policy. The remaining possibility, that search intensity is 
binding only for the short-term unemployed can also easily be considered within 
our framework, but seems of little policy relevance.
A model of job search assistance
We start from the concept of an aggregate matching function of the form:
(3.1) x = x(csus +cLuLtv)
where x is the total number of matches per period, v is the number of vacancies, 
c s and cL the (average) search effectiveness’ of the short- and long-term unemployed 
and ug and uL are short- and long-term unemployment. We normalise the labour 
force to unity, so that these are also unemployment rates. We might consider cs,cL 
as the number of ‘units of search’ provided by short- and long-term unemployed 
workers, so that csus +cLuL is the total number of‘units of search’ in the market, 
sometimes referred to as cu. We assume that the matching function is increasing in 
both its arguments and exhibits constant returns to scale. The CRS assumption is 
widely supported in the empirical data (see for example, Pissarides, 1986; Blanchard 
and Diamond, 1989; Coles and Smith, 1996).
The probability that a given vacancy is matched is given by:
(3.2) q = -x(csus +cLuL,v)
v
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so that if we define labour market tightness, 0 = v/(csus +cLuL), we can re-write
(3.2) to give:
(3.3) ? = * f i  l W o )
where q'{Q) < 0 and TJ, the absolute value of the elasticity of q, is between 0 and 1, 
from our constant returns to scale assumption.
Unemployed workers choose the intensity of their search, subject to a cost of searching. 
If an individual unemployed worker chooses search intensity c , the probability that 
they will get a job per period is given by:
i
(3.4) f   ------------- x(csus + cLuL,v)
CSUS CLUL
The cost of search is given by /c(r') for the short-term unemployed and fijc{c') for 
the long-term unemployed, where k:(0) = 0;*:' > 0;/c" > 0. If the long-term 
unemployed suffer from negative duration dependence we will have fj, > 1. Duration 
dependence might arise because employers discriminate against the long-term 
unemployed, so that fewer of their applications are acceptable, or because they become 
discouraged or lose contact with the labour market, and search less effectively. In 
addition, unemployed workers receive per period real benefits, b.
If Wf USJt and ULT are the expected present discounted values of employment, short- 
and long-term unemployment respectively, then we have:
(3.5) rU‘ST = * -« r(4 )+ /(4 ) [ 0 "  - t ^ ]  + [ l - / ( 4 ) J / L . - U ‘„]
(3.6) rU‘LT = i - MK(clL) + f‘(c‘LllV i - U lLT]
Where c*s, cL are the level of search intensity chosen by the worker when short- and 
long-term unemployed respectively. Unemployed workers will set their search 
intensity so as to maximise the expected present discounted value of unemployment. 
We assume that workers set their search intensity for that period only, so that W is 
independent of c . Maximising (3.5) and (3.6) gives:
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(3.7) *r'(4) + f ^ i r - ^ ]  = 0Ctc
We then seek a symmetrical solution such that c's = cs andcL - c L. However, from
(3.4) we can obtain:
4>‘ dp
dc\
Furthermore, if we define the probabilities of exiting unemployment for the short- 
and long-term unemployed as:
ps =-----   x(csus +cLuL,v) = csdq{6)
csus +cLuL
and pL = -----^ ----- x{csus + cLuL ,v) = cL0q(9)
CS U S ~>rCL U L
we can write:
£
cs~cs
=&_ 
ct\
=h - = p ± =g^ d)
CS  CL
and hence:
(3.9) k '{cs ) + O 0 {Ul t -W ] = 0
(3.10) h k '(cl ) + 6 0 p LT-W ] = 0
We could solve (3.9) and (3.10) from the value functions to give expressions for the 
optimal levels of search intensity. However, it will prove simpler to solve a similar 
problem for wages first, and then substitute.
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Vacancies, jobs and wages
Our basic unit of analysis is the job. Jobs are filled and productive or empty and 
vacant. Productive jobs produce per period output with real value y' and pay real 
wages w. It seems safe to ignore taxes completely when considering job search 
assistance, since the cost of such programmes is generally very small.
Vacant jobs incur a per period cost y  We assume that employers are indifferent 
between short- and long-term unemployed, but this assumption is not restrictive 
since we could alternatively define fl such that the probability that a long-term 
unemployed worker will be acceptable to an employer is factored into their greater 
cost of searching. We also assume that if more than one applicant arrives at a vacancy 
then employers choose randomly from the pool of applicants.
Hence, the value functions for vacant and filled jobs will be given by:
(3.11) rV = - y +9(0)U -V )
(3.12) rj = y '- w - s { J - V )
where Vis the expected present discounted value of a vacant job; J  is the expected 
present discounted value of a filled job; and s is the exogenous separation rate. We 
assume that there is free entry in vacancies, so that the value of vacancies, V} will be 
driven to zero in equilibrium, giving:
(3.13) j  = J L -  
and hence:
(3.14) y' -zu -(r  + s)—y— -  0
We assume that wages are set to maximise the Nash bargain: 
(3.15 ){pr, - U ia y { j i -V)'~’
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Where the i superscript denotes the particular match, and J3 is a measure of the 
workers relative bargaining power. The value function for W is given by:
(3.16) rW‘ =w‘ +s{Usr -W ‘)
So that maximising (3.15) with respect to the wage gives:
(3.17) H"
However if we substitute the value functions for Wl and J l we obtain:
w' =rUtST+p(y’-rU ‘ST)
From which it follows that there will be a single wage in symmetric equilibrium 
where U‘ST = . Hence we can drop the i superscript. Solving the value functions,
(3.5), (3.6) and (3.16) together with (3.17) and (3.13) gives the wage equation:
(3.18)
zj = b \ K^s ^  + Cl6q^  + ^  ~ Cs6^ 6^  ]
1 1 + r+(cL-c s) 0 0 )  J
+
p )
( \  
r
l l - p ) K0 ) )
r +s +
0 q ( 0 ) ( rcs + c L )
1 + r+(cL - c s)Q(0)
The wage equals the instantaneous value of the worker’s outside option, 
unemployment, (suitably weighted by the probabilities of being short- and long­
term unemployed), plus the worker’s share of the surplus value of the filled job over 
the firm’s and worker’s combined outside options (where the firm’s outside option is 
zero from the free entry condition).
Search intensity
We can use the Nash condition (3.17) and the free-entry condition (3.13), together 
with the value functions to give:
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W D
f l l  + r)
(1 ~P)
f   ^
/
\ 0 ) j
and hence we can obtain the optimum search intensity, given the wage-setting 
behaviour, from (3.9) and (3.10):
(3.19) * '( 0  +
60)
1 + r + (cL-c s)fy(d)
k(cs)-/Jk(cl )~ P0 - +  T)
f  \
r
\0)j
=  0
(3.20) ftK'(cL) + e^e)
\ + r+{cL-c s) 6 0 )
k(cs) - /jk(cl ) - /?(l + r)
(1 -P )
f \
y
\ 0 ) j
=o
which are simply the conditions that the marginal cost of search equals its marginal 
benefit for the short- and long-term unemployed respectively.
Flow equilibrium
Finally, to close the model, we assume a steady state, so that flows into and out of 
each state must be equal. It is convenient to assume that we measure unemployment 
within the period after inflows, but before outflows (see discussion of this in Chapter 
4). If u=us +uL is the overall unemployment rate, we have:
(3.21) s(l-u ) = us
(3.22) us[ 1 -  cs0g(0)] = cL0q(0)uL
Since short-term unemployment lasts only for one period, the existing stock must 
always have flowed out by the following period. Hence, the stock of short-term 
unemployed, measured before this period’s outflow, is simply the inflow into 
unemployment. Similarly the inflow into long-term unemployment is made up of 
all those who were short-term unemployed at the end of the last period, less those 
who flow back into employment from short-term unemployment. Since we assume 
that the stocks are constant in equilibrium, this net inflow must equal the outflow 
from the pre-existing stock of long-term unemployed. Combining (3.21) and (3.22) 
gives:
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(3.23) ^
cLOq{d)+s[i + (cL -  cs)<%(<9)]
The model has five unknowns, u, 0, cL and w determined by the five equations
(3.14), (3.18), (3.19), (3.20) and (3.23). However, we can simplify somewhat by 
substituting w out between (3.14) and (3.18) to give:
, _ b + f *fc)[r + ci P 0 )]+ -  csQq{Q)\ 1
(3.24)
1 + r+(cL-c s)dq(d)
( \  
rcs  + C L
<l + r + (cL-c s)0q(6))_
=  0
Policy
Policy comprises a reduction in the cost of job search for the long-term unemployed, 
which we model through a reduction in fl. Whilst this might involve the provision 
of some resources, such as at Job Clubs, it will more generally imply a reduction in 
the effort required per application, either following simple job search training or 
through more intensive referrals of vacancies.
If we define:
X1 ={rcs +cL) + Y T p (r+ I)[1 + r + (ci  ~ cs ) W ) ]  > o
we can differentiate (3.24), (3.19) and (3.20) and solve to give:
(3.2S) 2 t ^  = ^ ) [ l -c seg{e)y{cL)
(3.26) 2, A  = ^ L yXl_ , )M ,(c J + M ( ^ ± i ) }
dfi *:"(<*)[ 1-/? J
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d c L  K ( Cl )  \  / / 1 V 1 x , t  \  . / 77 <% ( 0 ) ( / ?  +  r  +  J ) l  K { CL )  ,(3.27) A, —*- = ----r-r<  ?(0)(1 -  i)iuc\cL) +----   \ ----------- r^ i
</// 1-J0 J /^ " ( c j
Hence, 6 and c are both increasing in fl, whilst the effect on cL is ambiguous. Thus 
a reduction in the cost of searching for the long-term unemployed, ie a reduction in 
fl, will lead to 9 and cs both falling. A fall in fl has an effect similar to an increase in 
unemployment benefit for the long-term unemployed. The costs of unemployment 
fall, which tends to push up wages, but there are no first-order effects on search 
intensity because we were initially at the optimum. Firms react to the increased 
wages by reducing the number of vacancies that they offer and hence 9 falls. For the 
short-term unemployed, a fall in 9 reduces the returns to searching, and hence the 
incentive to search. In addition, the lower future cost of search reduces the incentive 
for current search. The short-term unemployed search less; cs falls. The effect on cL 
however is ambiguous. Both the marginal cost and the marginal return of searching 
fall, and hence search may increase or decrease depending on which effect dominates. 
Note, however, that if the absolute value of the elasticity of with respect to c is 
greater than or equal to unity, as for example with quadratic search costs, then cL rises.
Unemployment
Finally, to obtain the effect on unemployment, we can differentiate (3.23) to give:
(3.28)
du _ -s (l-u )
dp cL0q(0) + s[ 1 + (cL -  cs)0q(9)]
\ q0 ) ^ A .  , &L + .^ X 1 “ 7) dQ
du dfi 9q{6) du
Which is clearly ambiguous in general. The effect is similar to the point made by 
Jackman (1994) and Calmfors and Lang (1995) that if active labour market policies 
reduce the cost of unemployment to the unemployed, then that may offset the 
beneficial effects from increased incentives. Unlike policies which directly impact 
on outflow probabilities, reducing the cost of search allows the long-term unemployed 
to take at least some of the gains from policy in the form of increased utility in 
unemployment, for which there is no offsetting loss to the short-term unemployed.
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Constrained search intensity
Ambiguity arises in the model in part because the short-term unemployed anticipate 
reduced search costs in the future, and hence reduce current search. Suppose, however, 
that job search intensity is mandated by the benefit system, for example through 
requirements to be ‘actively seeking work’ (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991 for 
a general discussion of these issues).
We consider first the case where the benefit system imposes binding minimum search 
levels on all unemployed workers, which is equivalent to both c and cL being 
determined exogenously from the perspective of workers. Note that this not only 
changes the determining equations, but also the choice of policy instrument. If the 
policy-maker can directly influence search intensity, then the level of search becomes 
a potential policy instrument. Moreover, if search requirements are binding, then 
altering the costs of search, at the margin at least, will have no effect. Workers are 
already searching more than they would choose to. Hence search intensity is the 
only relevant policy instrument. This does assume however, that a mandated increase 
in search activity corresponds to an increase in search effectiveness. With a one­
dimensional search strategy this follows automatically, but in the presence of differing 
search strategies, a mandated increase in intensity may lead to substitution between 
different search techniques, with potentially negative effects on search effectiveness 
(Thomas, 1996; 1997; 1998).
With binding requirements for all the unemployed, the endogenous search intensity 
choice equations (3.19) and (3.20) no longer hold. Instead, 6 is determined by (3.24), 
given which u can be obtained from (3.23) and w from (3.14). If we define the 
marginal benefit of search as:
£= l  + r  + (c£ - c s ) (k 0 )
1(1 + r)
( l - £ )
~K(cs)
and differentiate (3.24) with respect to cL we obtain:
(3.29) Tj)(rcs +cL\v K \c I) - ^ ^ = Q 0 f c - c sO 0)\pK X cL)-£ }
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Where the left hand term is positive, and reduces to Ax if search intensity is optimal, 
from (3.20). Similarly, if we were at the optimum level of search intensity, then the 
right-hand side would equal zero, (from the envelope theorem). However, if we 
assume that c is bounded below by restrictions in the benefit system, then it must be 
that the marginal cost of search exceeds the marginal (private) benefit, and hence 
the right-hand side is positive. By further increasing the search requirement, we are 
reducing the utility of unemployment, in much the same way as a reduction in benefits 
for the long-term unemployed. This lowers wage pressure, causing firms to open 
more vacancies, so that 0 rises. Hence, if we let:
Unemployment unambiguously falls. There is a direct effect, because increased search 
by workers is a positive externality for firms, who respond by opening more vacancies. 
In addition, there is an indirect effect, since increased search requirements act like a 
reduction in benefits for the long-term unemployed, reducing wage pressure.
Partially endogenous search
Many labour market programmes are targeted solely on the long-term unemployed. 
The short-term unemployed have high exit rates, and correspondingly high levels of 
deadweight in any programmes targeted on them. Furthermore, it is often argued 
on equity grounds that policy should be targeted at the most disadvantaged. It is 
therefore worth considering the effects of policy targeted directly on the search 
intensity of the long-term unemployed, but where the search intensity of the short­
term unemployed is endogenous. Suppose that elements of the benefit system, such 
as compulsory attendance at Job Clubs or job search assistance courses, are binding 
on the long-term unemployed but are not applied to the short-term unemployed. 
Alternatively, a fixed ‘actively seeking work’ requirement maybe binding only on the
^ 2  = K  -  ^ X 1-  i i r cs +cl)[v k '{cl) -  fl
we have:
(3.30) dcL dcs=a cLX2[cL0q{e) + s[\ + {cL -*j)%(0)]}
{ ^ 2  +cl<0 ) Q -  V)[VK '{cL) ~ fl}
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long-term unemployed if their costs of search are higher, so that their optimal level 
of search is lower than that for the short-term unemployed.
As above, the long-term unemployed’s search intensity optimisation, (3.20) no longer 
holds, but now we reinstate the equivalent for the short-term unemployed, (3.19). 
The policy variable is again q.. Equations (3.14), (3.19), (3.23) and (3.24) determine 
the four unknowns, q, wy u and 6. Furthermore, the system is recursive, (3.19) and
(3.24) determine c and 6. Unemployment then follows from (3.23) and wages from
(3.14). As before, from (3.24), we obtain:
dcL
and hence, from (3.19), we can then obtain:
dcL K (CS) [ 1-/3 J
Because the long-term unemployed are now forced to search harder than they would 
choose, the costs of long-term unemployment rise. This tends to depress the wage, 
leading firms to open more vacancies. The increase in 0, and the greater costs involved 
in becoming long-term unemployed, increase the returns to search for the short­
term unemployed, and hence the short-term unemployed are also induced to search 
harder. In contrast to the initial model, where c0 fell, we now find that both c„ and cT« d L
rise. It is immediately obvious that unemployment must fall, since all the relevant 
variables are moving in the right direction.
du _ ~j(1-k)[1-c,^(0)]
& l cLX j lcLer](0) + s[\+(cL - c :i
(3.31) ?(*X1 '?) + A-»(Cs)[1_ c^ 0)] X 
W -7)g+-^ X^+r+j)'
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3.3 Wage Subsidies for the  Long-term Unemployed
Whilst job search assistance programmes are widely perceived as successful (OECD, 
1993; Fay, 1996), they generally deliver only modest increases in outflow rates for 
participants. The persistence of high and long-term unemployment in many OECD 
countries during the 1980s and 1990s has led to a search for policies that offer a 
bigger impact. Disappointment with government training schemes has led to a 
growing interest in wage subsidies. In Australia, the Job start programme, introduced 
in 1985, accounted for 80% of placements of the long-term and very long-term 
unemployed by 1993 (Byrne and Buchanan, 1994), whilst in the UK, wage subsidies 
are central to the New Deal.
However, wage subsidy schemes have always attracted opposition on the grounds 
that they have very high levels of deadweight and substitution: those who were 
helped by the scheme either didn’t need help or were only helped at the expense of 
someone else. Casey and Bruche (1985), for example, claim that the net employment 
effect is generally only about 10%. But this scepticism is based on a partial equilibrium 
analysis. The possibility that, in general equilibrium, targeting could reduce 
equilibrium wage pressure goes back to Baily and Tobin (1977). However, the claim 
that wage subsidies targeted on the long-term unemployed will not provoke 
inflationary pressures has been subject to litde theoretical analysis since then. Snower 
(1994), for example, merely invokes it as an axiom.
In contrast, Calmfors and others have warned that active labour market policies 
could increase wage pressure (eg Calmfors and Forslund, 1990; 1991; Calmfors and 
Nymoen, 1990; Calmfors and Skedinger, 1995). Calmfors and Lang (1995) provides 
a comprehensive analysis of Swedish-style programme-based active labour market 
policy that formalises this notion.
However, Calmfors and Lang’s analysis assumes that active labour market policies 
take the form of specific programmes into which the unemployed are placed, such 
as relief work or training schemes. Wage subsidies, like job search assistance, act 
differently. Their purpose is to increase the probability of transitions directly from 
unemployment into regular employment.
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As with our models of job search assistance above, search theory provides a natural 
framework to model wage subsidies in general equilibrium. We abstract from search 
intensity, assuming that all workers search equally effectively, but introduce a degree 
of duration dependence arising from loss of human capital. It is well-known that the 
outflow rates from unemployment fall substantially with unemployment duration in 
most OECD countries (Layard etal, 1991). Various reasons have been suggested for 
this and there is a substantial literature on the extent to which this arises from agent 
heterogeneity or from true duration dependence (see Heckman, 1991). We saw in 
the previous chapter that the implications for policy are rather similar whichever of 
these is the case. For the UK at least, there is reasonable evidence that duration 
dependence is a genuine phenomenon (Arulampalam and Stewart, 1995; Jackman 
and Layard, 1991; Atkinson et aly 1984),
A number of reasons have been suggested for duration dependence including skill 
attrition, employer discrimination and worker demoralisation. The last of these is 
connected to our models of reduced search intensity above. Here we assume that 
duration dependence arises from skill attrition, but the model could equally be 
interpreted as one of employer discrimination, with employers requiring the subsidy 
to overcome their disutility of hiring the long-term unemployed. Employers certainly 
perceive the long-term unemployed as less able (Meager and Metcalf, 1987; 
DEETYA, 1996a), regardless of whether this is well-founded.
Subsidies and skill attrition
Suppose the government offers a subsidy to employers hiring long-term unemployed 
workers. We assume that there would be some provisions within the scheme to prevent 
subsidy-farming’: firms which were laying off other workers would be ineligible. However, 
we do not impose any other restrictions on eligibility. Firms would not be required to 
show that vacancies would not otherwise have been created, nor would there be any 
restriction on their using the subsidy to replace workers who quit voluntarily.
For simplicity, we drop our previous assumptions about search intensity, assuming 
simply that all workers search costlessly at some uniform fixed intensity. Instead, we 
assume that long-term unemployment leads to an attrition of the skills of the long­
term unemployed, and hence that firms must pay a cost for initial training when 
hiring the long-term unemployed. If this cost is too high it will be optimal for a firm
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to reject the worker and continue searching either for a short-term unemployed 
worker, or a lower cost long-term unemployed worker. However, once training is 
provided, the worker becomes fully productive. Provided the worker is properly re­
integrated into regular employment, there are no permanently damaging effects 
from long-term unemployment. This is consistent with the evidence from wage 
subsidy schemes that, beyond an initial period, the productivity of scheme participants 
and regular employees are the same (Arwady, 1988; Atkinson and Meager, 1994).
We further assume that the initial training cost is stochastic and match-specific. It is 
likely that individuals’various skills will decline in varying ways, which will affect their 
suitability differently for different potential jobs. Hence different individuals will need 
different patterns and extents of retraining for different jobs. Stochastic costs ensure that 
all unemployed workers have a positive probability of leaving unemployment, but that 
the probability is lower for the long-term than the short-term unemployed.
The basic idea is very similar to Pissarides’ (1990) stochastic job matching model. 
Whereas Pissarides has a stochastic productivity that affects the worker for as long 
as they are in a given job, we assume that the stochastic element is an initial cost 
only, along the lines of Diamond’s (1982) ‘coconut’ model. This has the advantage 
that it is the experience of employment, specifically here initial training, that restores 
productivity, whereas in Pissarides (1990) a low productivity worker can only regain 
productivity after a period of unemployment.
Separations
We assume that the separation rate, s, is fixed and exogenous. Within our model, 
this is entirely consistent. Once the initial training cost is paid, the worker is fully 
productive and hence the match always has positive value. Thus there is never any 
incentive for the firm to separate with the worker and we can assume that the rate 
of separation of subsidised workers is the same as unsubsidised workers.
In practise, however, there are two sources of concern about the interaction of subsidies 
and inflows. Firstly, that subsidised jobs will only be viable for as long as the subsidy 
is paid, and secondly that subsidies will create an incentive for firms to fire existing 
workers, so as to be able to take on subsidised workers in their place. There is little 
empirical evidence on either. Such data as there is suggests that separations when
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subsidies expire are relatively rare. For example, RSGB (1996) found that 77% of 
Workstart participants who remained with the firm until the end of the subsidy 
period were still with the same employer three months later, whilst only 13% were 
unemployed. Where separations occurred it was earlier, because the employee was 
unsatisfactory. Overall, 55% of participants were employed three months after the 
end of the 12 month subsidy period. This compares favourably with the general 
experience of unemployed workers who exit into employment, 51.8% of whom return 
to unemployment within 12 months (Sweeney, 1996). We present further evidence 
supportive of our assumptions in Chapter 5.
We assume that the second effect is ruled out by the rules of the subsidy scheme, so 
that firms cannot simultaneously fire existing workers and hire subsidised 
replacements. Such rules generally apply to actual programmes, although no doubt 
some employers are able to evade them. There will also be an offsetting effect, since 
many jobs taken by the unemployed are for very short durations. Forty per cent 
return to unemployment within 6 months (Sweeney, 1996), and these jobs may be 
extended up to the duration of the subsidy (see Chapter 5). A  priori it is not clear 
that subsidies will have a significant effect on inflows, so for the moment we assume 
that they are fixed. In the next chapter, we relax this assumption, introducing fully 
endogenous job destruction. Although our unambiguous algebraic results no longer hold, 
simulations suggest that our basic findings remain valid for reasonable parameter values.
A model of wage subsidies
As in our models of job search assistance, we start from the notion of an aggregate 
matching function, but now assume that all workers search costlessly and with equal 
intensity. By setting cs = cL = 1, equation (3.1) reduces simply to x = x{u,v) , where 
x is now the total number of contacts between firms and workers per period. Since 
there are differential costs across workers, not all contacts will now necessarily lead 
to matches. We further assume that contacts are random and that any vacancy is 
contacted by no more than one worker per period.
We now have 6 = vfu , so that the probability that any given vacancy is contacted by 
an unemployed worker is q{6) = x(u,v)/v . Since we are assuming that all workers 
search equally effectively, for the worker the probability of contacting a vacancy is 
independent of their unemployment duration, and is just 9q(6) = x(u, v )ju .
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Vacancies
Let a  be the proportion of short-term unemployed amongst the pool of people searching. 
Short-term unemployed workers are ‘job-ready’ -  they have not yet suffered from any 
loss of human capital. Hence if a vacant job is contacted by a short-term unemployed 
worker, it can be filled with no additional cost1. Since, as we show below, there will be a 
single wage greater than the benefit level, both the firm’s and the worker’s acceptance 
decisions are trivial in this case and such matches will never be rejected.
However, if the vacancy is contacted by a long-term unemployed worker, the firm 
must pay an additional initial training cost, a, if it hires the worker. We assume that 
wages are set by Nash bargaining and subject to continuous renegotiation, or 
alternatively that only renegotiation proof contracts are agreed to. Hence the firm 
cannot pass on the cost to the worker. This is consistent with the empirical evidence 
that subsidised workers receive the same wages as regular workers, (Atkinson and 
Meager, 1994; Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987). The long-term unemployed vary 
in how well matched they would be with any particular vacancy, and hence what 
costs would have to be incurred to make them fully productive. We assume, therefore, 
that ex ante the training cost a  is unknown and drawn randomly from some underlying, 
known, distribution G(a). Ex post, once contact has been made, a  is revealed and the 
firm can decide whether to accept or reject the worker with full information.
We assume that G(a:) is continuous and at least once differentiable, and has finite 
range within the positive quadrant. Provided the lower support of G(a)<% the long­
term unemployed will always have a positive outflow rate. Since the firm must pay 
at least yif it rejects the worker, it will always accept any worker whose training cost 
is less than y  We also suppose that the upper support of G(a) is sufficiently above y 
to ensure that rejection is optimal in some cases. Since the short-term unemployed 
are never rejected, this will generate negative duration dependence.
A subsidy y/ is payable when firms hire the long-term unemployed, financed by a 
proportional wage tax. Suppose the firm adopts a reservation training cost, a ,  hires 
all long-term unemployed workers with costs below a ,  and rejects all those with 
training cost above a  . We show below that this is optimal, given that wages must be 
renegotiation proof. It follows that firms will hire a long-term unemployed worker, 
given that contact has been made, with probability G(a).
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Let Fbe the expected present discounted value of a vacant job and J be the expected 
present discounted value of a filled job. We have:
(3.32) TV = - y  + o 0 \ ]  -  F] +(1 -  o ) 0 ) G ( a ,  ) [ / -  V + y, -  E {a \a  < a , )]
Where ris the interest rate, E  is the expectations operator, and the expectation term 
is the ex ante expected training cost of hiring a long-term unemployed worker, given 
that this cost is low enough that they are not rejected.
There is free entry of vacancies, and hence firms open vacancies until the marginal 
value of a vacancy is driven to zero, giving V=0.
Hiring
Once contact has been made between a vacancy and a worker, both parties must 
decide whether to accept or reject the match. We will show below that all jobs offer 
the same wage, which is always at least as great as unemployment benefit. Hence 
the worker’s decision is trivial: workers always accept jobs if offered.
The firm’s hiring decision is slightly more complex. The return to rejecting the 
worker is simply the value of a vacancy, V, which equals zero. If the firm is contacted 
by a short-term unemployed worker, then the return to hiring them is simply /, the 
value of a filled job. Since this is always positive, the decision is again trivial in this 
case. Firms always accept short-term unemployed workers. However, if the firm is 
contacted by a long-term unemployed worker, with a realised training cost of a ‘, 
then the firm will only accept them provided the return is greater than zero:
J - a 1 +y / >  0
Provided the wage is renegotiation proof,/will be independent of the training cost, 
a '. Hence there will exist a unique reservation training cost, cf, such that:
J - a r + y/ = 0
so that the firm will reject all workers with realisations of a  greater than a ,  and 
accept all others. Hence, we can write:
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(3.33) J  = a r -y /
Substituting (3.33) and the free entry condition V=0 into (3.32) gives the firms 
vacancy opening, or job creation, condition:
(3.34) = a[ar -  y/]+(1 - a)G{ar\ a r - E{a\a < a r)]
Filled jobs and wages
Filled jobs produce per period real output y' and pay real after tax wages of w and 
a proportional wage tax z . Hence, the value functions for filled jobs,/, and for the 
worker of being employed, W, are the same as above, (3.12) and (3.16), except that 
now we must take account of taxation. Since we define w as the after-tax wage, the 
value function for J  is now:
(3.35) rj = y' - i 4 \  + z ) - s j
Whilst that for IVis unchanged:
rW = w + s(UST-W )
Wages are determined by Nash bargaining and must be renegotiation-proof, which 
implies that neither the sunk costs of training nor the benefits of subsidies form part
of the wage bargain. Maximising the Nash bargain (W ’ -  USTf  [ j 1 - V f  P now 
gives:
(3.36) W‘ -U ST=  --- ^ -----   f
”  ( l - m + r y
Taxes lead to the worker obtaining a lower share of the surplus to be bargained over. 
With a proportional wage tax, the higher the worker’s share, and hence the wage, 
the greater is the loss to both parties through taxation. Maximising the available 
surplus therefore requires a lower worker’s share the higher the tax rate.
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By the same logic as in our job search assistance model, we can show that there will 
be a single wage, and hence we can drop the i superscripts. The probability that an 
unemployed worker will contact a vacancy is 9q{0) . Since the short-term unemployed 
are always accepted, this is also their probability of being hired, whilst for the long­
term unemployed the probability of being hired is given by G(ar )0q{6) . Hence, the 
value functions for unemployment are given by:
(3.37) rU „= b + eq{0lW -U „ ]+ [!-
(3.38) rULT =b+G{ar)fyO XW -U LT]
Where b is the per period real level of benefits. Substituting from (3.33) and solving 
for the wage equation gives:
(3.39) w -  b + («r -  V) r+s +
% (g)[r + G (a r )]
1 -0q(0) + r + G(ar)0q(0)
If we further assume that benefits are set to maintain a constant replacement ratio 
p  then we have:
(3.40) w = p
(1-/?)(!+ rX l-^ ) -  w)
r + s +
\-0q{0) + r + G(ar)dq(d)
Combining equations (3.33), (3.35) and (3.40) gives the reservation training cost 
schedule:
(3.41) ( l - y S ) ( l - p )
-{r+sXaT-y/) = 0
ia r~V) r + s +
%(0)[r + G(cO]
1 -  6q{6) + r + G{ar )6q{9)
Flow equilibrium
Our flow equilibrium conditions are essentially the same as (3.21) and (3.22) above, 
except that now outflow rates are given by 6q(9) and G{ar)6q{6) :
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s( l -u)=us
us[ 1 -  Oq{d)\ = G(ar )O(0)uL 
Giving:
c i a ,  *[i-m+G(cc,MQ)]
G(ctr)0y(0)+{l-0q(0)+G(ar)0q(0)]
Which is the Beveridge curve. Similarly, short-term unemployed searchers fail to 
find a job within one period with probability 1 -  6q{6) , and flow into the pool of 
long-term unemployed searchers. In equilibrium this inflow equals the outflow from 
the pool of long-term unemployed searchers, giving: <j[l -  = (1 -  cr)G(a r)6q(6)
and hence:
Finally, we impose a balanced budget requirement:
(3.44) -  u) = pwu + y/G(ar )0q{0)uL
j[ 1-<%(£)]
where, uT ——-—  ----------p-------------------------- -
G{a, )O 0)  + 4 l -  0 0 )  + G{ar )09{0)}
Total taxes must equal benefit payments to the unemployed plus subsidy payments 
to the per period flow out of long-term unemployment.
Policy
The model has six unknowns 6 ,ar,w,T,u and a  and is determined by the job 
creation condition, (3.34), the reservation training cost condition (3.41), the wage 
curve (3.40), the balanced budget constraint (3.44), the Beveridge curve (3.42) and 
the flow equilibrium condition (3.43). Moreover, the system is recursive. If we 
substitute a  from (3.43), then equations (3.34) and (3.41) are sufficient to determine
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labour market tightness, $ , and the reservation training cost a . We can then solve 
for u and <r from (3.42) and (3.43) and w and t from (3.44) and either (3.40) or, by 
substituting from (3.33), from (3.35).
The policy variable of interest is y/ , the level of subsidy offered to employers who 
hire the long-term unemployed. To obtain the effect of y/ on unemployment, wages 
and taxes we first need to differentiate (3.34) and (3.41) to obtain the effect on 6 
and a . Differentiating (3.41) is straightforward and yields:
(3.45)
y  t p(ar -  y/)(l + r)G'(ar )0g(d)[l -  <%{#)] 
{<Xr-v) (1 -  f i l l  -  p)[ 1 -  a ye)+ r + c (a r )^{e)]
p{ar -  y/)[r + G(ccr )](1 + r)q(0){ 1 -  if)
da
dy/
r-  +
-e 0 )+ r + G { a r)g^e)]
d0
dy/ (ar -  yf)
Where all the terms are positive. However differentiating (3.34), given (3.43), yields:
(3.46;
j q{e\l-li)(T  1 d6 nfn.
|  m  ^\-9q(6)+ G (ar)0 q (0 ) \d y /~ ^
where: ( = { a , - y / ) ~  G(ar \ a r -  E(a\a < a r)] = /  -  G(ar)[/ + ^  -  E(a\a < a , )] 
the difference between the ex ante expected value of contacting a short-term 
unemployed worker versus contacting a long-term unemployed worker. We shall 
assume that subsidies are not so large that f  becomes negative. The first and last 
terms of (3.46) are always positive, but the middle term is ambiguous: if T) is sufficiendy 
small it could be positive.
The term represents the (partial) marginal effect of an increase in labour market 
tightness on the ex ante expected cost of opening a vacancy. There are two offsetting 
components: an increase in 6 makes it less likely that you will contact a worker in 
any period, tending to increase the cost of vacancies. However, there is also a 
compositional effect, an increase in 6 means that more of the unemployed are short-
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term unemployed. If the short-term unemployed are less costly than the long-term 
unemployed, ie if £>0 , then the change in composition tends to reduce the cost of 
vacancies. If this effect dominates, then as the labour market tightens, the firm will 
open more vacancies, further tightening the market. This is similar to the thin market 
externality in Pissarides (1992). However, it is somewhat perverse in this case, and 
provided 77 is not too small we can rule it out. In general, we will assume therefore 
that this term is negative, so that as the labour market tightens it becomes more 
costly to fill vacancies, in line with the normal assumptions of search theory2.
Solving gives:
(3.47)
dar /
dy/ {ar -y/)
riy-<Z i - e q ( e ) + G { a r)e^e) +
Pia r -iyX 1 + r)^ (g)[r+G(a:.)]g(gX1-  n P  
{ \ - P t \ - P\ \ - e 0 ) + r + G ( a r) 9 0 t f
de
(3.48)
dw  (a. -  V)
0 0 ) oG '(«r)
f i g ,  -  ¥ X\+r)G'{ar)eg {ff{ \-e0 )]  
( l - /S )(l-/> )[l-a?(0)+'- + G(ar ) ] 2
where:
+
[i- + G{aT)}0 y \-r i)a > ct+(1-<t )G(ar)+ ^ >0
and: a  ~ f o r - v f t  + r)B 0 )
dctThus, 0  < — - < 1 . The subsidy serves to offset the training cost the firm must 
dy/
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incur if it hires the long-term unemployed. Hence, it is able to relax its hiring criterion, 
hiring long-term unemployed workers who previously would have been too expensive. 
However, as firms relax a ,  the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed rises 
which puts upward pressure on wages. This chokes off the increase in a ,  so that the 
increase is less than the full amount of the subsidy. We can show this directly by 
substituting (3.33) into (3.35) and differentiating to give:
dar . 1 dw , .(3.49) — -  = 1 -   -------  where: w = n\\. + r)
dy/ (r + s)dy/
a  rises by the amount of the subsidy, less the increase in the wage costs discounted 
over the expected duration of the job.
The effect on 6 is ambiguous. As we shall see below, u falls, which tends to make 6 
increase. However, the effect on vacancies is ambiguous. The cost of vacancies falls, 
so more vacancies are opened, which tends to increase v and hence 0 . However, 
vacancies are also more rapidly closed, since the long-term unemployed are less 
likely to be rejected, which tends to reduce v and hence 0 . Whilst a fall in 6 will 
cause the outflow rate of the short-term unemployed to drop, the outflow rate of 
the long-term unemployed can still rise provided the increase in a  is sufficient.
Unemployment
Our primary interest is in the effect on unemployment. From (3.42), (3.47) and 
(3.48), we obtain:
(3.50)
du s (  1 -  u)G \ar )y(0Xl “ 1)
iV  X fi(a r\G (a , )fy(0) + *[l -  0 0 )  + G(ar )%(<?)]} 
G(g rX
(«,- v O [ \-B q{e )  + G{ar )e>j{e)]
rap{a,  -  y /^ l+ r )%(#)[ 1 -  0q{6j\
( 1  -  /?)(! -  p p . -  + r + G(ar )O}(0j\2
+
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Which is negative. Hence unemployment unambiguously falls. There are two 
principal effects: the first term is the labour demand effect, the second a net wage 
pressure effect. The labour demand effect has three components:
i) The direct effect of the subsidy is to lower the cost of recruiting the long­
term unemployed and hence to make recruiting more attractive;
ii) Because it increases the probability that contact with a worker will lead to 
hiring, the subsidy also reduces the expected duration of any given vacancy, 
and hence lowers the cost of vacancies;
iii) Finally, there is a composition effect. Increased outflow rates among the 
long-term unemployed mean that more of the unemployed are short-term 
unemployed, who are more desirable, provided £>0 ;
The net wage pressure effect arises because an increase in the outflow rate of the 
long-term unemployed is discounted more heavily by wage setters than a fall in the 
outflow rate of the short-term unemployed. Hence, at constant disutility of 
unemployment the long-term outflow rate can be increased by more than the short­
term outflow rate falls. Thus, even if there were no labour demand effect, it would 
be possible to reduce unemployment by inducing employers to substitute hiring the 
long-term unemployed instead of the short-term unemployed, as in the previous 
chapter. Note that this term would be zero if r=0.
Substitution
Much of the discussion of wage subsidy programmes has focused on substitution 
effects (OECD, 1993), although some economists, notably Layard (1996), have sought 
to play them down. Substitution is where the firm fills a vacancy with a long-term 
unemployed (or other target group) worker, in response to the subsidy, but where 
they would otherwise have filled the vacancy anyway, but with a short-term 
unemployed or other non-target group worker. Substitution effects are generally 
measured through surveys of employers participating in wage subsidy schemes (eg 
Atkinson and Meager, 1994; Byrne and Buchanan, 1994) and are usually found to 
be quite high, about 60-70% of the non-deadweight effect (OECD, 1993).
However, much of the concern about substitution effects is misplaced. Substitution 
does not simply involve churning the unemployed pool with no net gain. In a matching
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framework, each firm’s hiring decision is an externality for other firms. When choosing 
to hire the short-term unemployed in preference to the long-term unemployed, 
firms do not take account of the effect of their decision on the pool of applicants 
faced by other firms, nor of the effect on the utility cost of unemployment, and 
hence there is too little hiring of the long-term unemployed. There are gains to 
inducing employers to hire the long-term unemployed in place of the short-term 
unemployed. Wage pressure is reduced, allowing lower equilibrium unemployment, 
and a larger pool of highly employable short-term unemployed are available to other 
firms. This reduces the costs of opening vacancies, so that more jobs are created. 
Employers observe these as improvements in the general economic climate, rather 
than the specific effects of the wage subsidy scheme. Nor are they specific to those 
employers who participate in the scheme. But many of these additional jobs will go 
to the short-term unemployed.
We can formalise this by considering the effect of policy on the short-term
unemployed. With a fixed inflow rate, we are principally interested in the outflow
rate from short-term unemployment3. But this is just 6q{9) , so that the effect of
policy will be q{6){ 1 -  rj)-j—, which is clearly ambiguous from (3.48).dy/
There are no restrictions within our model on firms’ ability to use wage subsidies for 
vacancies that they would have filled anyway. Nonetheless, at the aggregate level, 
both short- and long-term outflow rates can rise.
Wages and taxes
We have seen in equation (3.49) that the total wage bill zv( 1  + r) rises with increased 
labour demand. However, the separate effects on wages and taxes are more complex. 
If the costs of the subsidy — which includes deadweight payments to employers who 
would anyway have hired the long-term unemployed -  exceed the savings from 
reduced benefits payments then taxes will have to rise. Potentially this could lead to 
a fall in take-home pay for employees, so that the policy would be redistributive 
rather than improving the lot of both the employed and the unemployed.
Formally, we can solve for wage and tax effects by differentiating the balanced budget 
constraint (3.44) and substituting from (3.49) to obtain:
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(3.51)
dw {r + s)(!-*) 1 - da.
dy/
Where aL -  G(ar)6q(6) the outflow rate from long-term unemployment. There 
are four effects, two positive, one ambiguous, and one negative, leading to an 
ambiguous result. The first term is the effect of increased labour demand, which 
tends to increase wages. Secondly, lower benefit payments and higher tax revenues 
from reduced unemployment tend to reduce the tax burden and hence also increase 
wages. The third term is the effect of changes in the total outflow from long-term 
unemployment on the amount of subsidy that is paid. This effect is ambiguous. The 
outflow rate, aL increases, but the total outflow can fall if the inflow into long-term 
unemployment falls, ie if the short-term unemployment rate falls sufficiently. Finally 
a higher level of subsidy needs to be financed, tending to increase taxes, lowering 
wages, which is the last term.
The parallel effect on taxation is given directly from (3.49) as:
(3.52) dr _ (r + r) 
dy/ w
1 - da.
dy/
( 1  + r) dw 
w dy/
which is, unsurprisingly, also ambiguous.
3.4 Conclusion
The persistence of mass unemployment in many OECD countries throughout the 
1980s and 1990s has led to a renewed interest in active labour market policies, and 
in particular in policies aimed at directly increasing transitions into employment 
among the long-term unemployed. Search theory provides a framework in which 
the macroeconomic equilibrium effects of these policies can be considered. We 
consider two leading policy options, job search assistance and wage subsidies for the 
long-term unemployed.
Our findings are somewhat contrary to the received wisdom. Job search assistance is 
viewed favourably within the literature. Microeconomic impact assessments show
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that programmes of job search assistance can have large and sustained positive impacts 
for individuals (see for example, Riccio etal, 1994; Freedman, Mitchell and Navarro, 
1998). These studies also show that programmes can be cost effective from the 
government s perspective at the microeconomic level: reduced benefit claims and 
increased tax revenues exceed net programme costs. But we argue that the success of 
job search assistance is not a universal outcome in macroeconomic equilibrium. We 
find that wage subsidies, often viewed less favourably, would unambiguously reduce 
unemployment.
The effects of job search assistance policies depend critically on our assumptions 
about the interaction between the benefit system and unemployed workers’job search 
decisions. The choice of policy instrument is also dictated by this interaction. If we 
impose binding constraints on the amount of job search required of the unemployed, 
then we can act directly on search intensity. In the absence of such constraints, we 
can act only indirectly on the incentives to search.
Where search intensity is fully endogenous, reducing the cost of search for the long­
term unemployed has an ambiguous effect even on their search intensity, whilst 
search by the short-term unemployed falls. The effect on unemployment is 
consequently ambiguous. Cutting the costs of search for the long-term unemployed 
has a similar effect to increasing their benefit levels. The utility cost of unemployment 
falls, wage pressure rises and hence employers open fewer vacancies. This reduces 
the benefit of searching for the short-term unemployed since vacancies are a positive 
externality for them.
Where search intensity for the short-term unemployed is fixed, this effect is of 
course ruled out. Increasing search intensity requirements for the long-term 
unemployed, beyond their optimal private choice, leads to a reduction in 
unemployment. At least in the UK and the US, job search assistance programmes 
have made increasing use of mandatory job search requirements for participants in 
recent years. Finally, we consider the case where search by the short-term unemployed 
is endogenous, but search by the long-term unemployed is mandated by the benefit 
system. By requiring the long-term unemployed to search harder than they would 
otherwise choose, we increase the costs of long-term unemployment, reduce wage 
pressure and increase the incentive for firms to open vacancies. This in turn increases
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the incentive for the short-term unemployed to search and they consequently search 
more intensely. Unemployment falls unambiguously.
We also show that a policy of targeted wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed 
unambiguously reduces unemployment. Moreover, we show that the analysis of 
substitution effects that has dominated much of the debate about wage subsidies is 
flawed. There are positive externalities to persuading employers to favour the long­
term unemployed, and these externalities lead to an increase in the total number of 
jobs. Many of these new jobs will go to the very short-term unemployed people who 
are apparently the victims of substitution.
Wage subsidies have been tried before in many countries at various times. In many 
cases they have proved relatively ineffective because they have been introduced at 
times of high cyclical unemployment when firms may well have been hoarding labour 
anyway, and when active labour market policies in general appear to be at their least 
effective (Robinson, 1995). But in other cases they have undoubtedly been 
undermined by an excessive concern among policy-makers with substitution effects, 
arising from partial equilibrium analysis. We have shown that these concerns are at 
least overstated, and possibly wholly misplaced.
Our models do not provide a basis for a direct comparison of different possible 
policy interventions. To do that we would need to consider the implementation 
costs of each option, which are undoubtedly higher for wage subsidies than for job 
search assistance. We would also need to balance the welfare costs of imposing greater 
search on the unemployed against the costs imposed by unemployment, and the 
effects of distortionary taxation required to pay both for benefits and for subsidies. 
Nor should job search assistance and wage subsidies necessarily be seen as competing 
policy options: both seek to achieve the same outcome, a direct transition from 
unemployment into employment. A combination of job search assistance and wage 
subsidies, such as in the UK’s New Deal for 18-24s, may prove a more effective 
option than either individually.
However, our findings should at least serve to question the prevailing wisdom that 
job search assistance is more effective than wage subsidies. In particular, job search 
assistance programmes need to consider not only the incentives faced by the target
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group, but also by those outside the target group. To ensure their success, it may 
prove wise to ensure that the gains to the long-term unemployed are taken solely in 
the form of increased search efficiency and not in part as reduced search effort.
1. It is convenient to suppose the cost is zero, but substituting a fixed cost would not affect our 
results, provided it were not so high that firms would reject a short-term unemployed worker in 
favour of waiting for a long-term unemployed one.
2. This condition is sufficient to ensure that XJ> is non-negative. However, provided (3 is not very 
small, this condition is unlikely to bind.
3. Given the way we have set up the flow equilibrium, short-term unemployment is just equal to the 
per period inflow. In turn, this must rise, since employment rises and there is a fixed inflow rate. 
However, we need to take into account the full effect of the policy on the short-term unemployed, 
which arises primarily through their outflow rate.
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4. Should Policy AlwaysTarget the Long-term 
Unemployed?
Most recent work on active labour market policies has advocated targeting 
them exclusively on the long-term unemployed. However, in Australia, an 
ambitious policy, Working Nation, was undermined when a shift in emphasis 
towards the long-term unemployed led to a large increase in the inflow into 
long-term unemployment, following the withdrawal of services to the short­
term unemployed We use a modified version of the Mortensen-Pissarides job 
creation and job destruction model to examine the effects of wage subsidies on 
the UK economy. By allowing subsidies to be shifted between the short- and 
long-term unemployed we can consider the effects of targeting and map the 
optimum policy mix. Using simulationsfor the UK economy, we find that a 
subsidy programme could significantly reduce unemployment, provided the subsidies 
on offer were large enough. Whilst some targeting on the long-term unemployed is 
always desirable, this should not be to the complete eocclusion of the short-term 
unemployed As the size ofthe overall programme increases, so a substantial and 
increasingfraction should be allocated to the short-term unemployed
4.1 Introduction
Most recent work on active labour market policy (ALMP) has advocated targeting 
the long-term unemployed (Calmfors and Lang, 1995; Snower, 1997; Layard, 1996). 
The previous chapters have also focused on targeted wage subsidies, which we argued 
would unambiguously reduce unemployment. This argument has heavily influenced 
government policies in a number of countries. Active labour market policies in 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the UK 
have all focused, almost exclusively, on the long-term unemployed (NERA, 1995). 
Within the UK, the government’s New Deal for 18-24s is targeted on youths of 
more than 6  months duration, whilst the New Deal for 25+ is targeted at unemployed 
people of more than 2  years duration.
However, the question of whether the costs of targeting can outweigh the benefits 
has received little attention. In particular, the experience of Australia’s Working Nation
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programme suggests that an excessive shift of focus from shorter durations to the 
long-term unemployed maybe counter-productive, increasing the inflow into long­
term unemployment and overwhelming programme resources. In this chapter we 
examine the choice of targeting a wage subsidy between the short- and long-term 
unemployed. Wage subsidies are only one of a number of policies that come under 
the rubric of ALMP, but they are of particular interest in the UK, where they lie at 
the heart of the New Deal.
Furthermore, our framework allows an endogenous treatment both of the concerns 
ofwage-subsidy sceptics about deadweight, substitution and displacement (Calmfors, 
1994), and the claims of wage-subsidy advocates of positive ‘employability’ effects 
from targeting (Layard, 1996). Hence we are also able to address the competing 
claims about the efficacy of wage subsidiesy>er se. We find that, in simulations for the 
UK economy, a wage subsidy policy could lead to a significant reduction in equilibrium 
unemployment. However, the optimal policy is not to target the long-term unemployed 
exclusively As the size of the policy increases, so an increasing proportion of resources, 
though always less than half, should be reserved for the short-term unemployed.
The rest of this paper is as follows. We start by considering the arguments that have 
been made for targeting policies onto the long-term unemployed, and at the possible 
pitfalls illustrated by Working Nation. Section 3 develops the formal model, an 
extension of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) job creation and job destruction model. 
Algebraically, most of the results of interest are ambiguous, and so we use simulations, 
in Section 4, to analyse the model’s implications for unemployment, the structure of 
unemployment, wages and taxes. Section 5 looks at welfare issues, whilst Section 6  
concludes.
4.2 Targeting the  Long-term Unemployed
Four main arguments have been advocated for targeting active labour market policies 
onto the long-term unemployed: equity, deadweight, wage pressure and 
‘employability’. It is often argued that policies should be targeted onto the long­
term unemployed on equity grounds. The long-term unemployed are amongst the 
poorest and most disadvantaged members of society. But more than this, it is argued
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that long-term unemployment ‘corrodes the soul’, leading to a loss of self-esteem 
and motivation, poor physical and mental health and a raft of related problems that 
have come to be labelled social exclusion. ‘By wanting less, long-term unemployed 
people achieve less, and they become less’ (Warr, Jackson and Banks, 1988, p. 55). 
However, even if we accept this view, a desire to assist the long-term unemployed 
does not tell us the form that such help should take.
Deadweight
Deadweight, where participants would have been hired regardless of the policy 
intervention, is a perennial concern with active labour market policies, especially 
where the cost per participant is high. Government cannot identify which unemployed 
workers will exit unassisted, nor which firms would anyway have hired those workers. 
Even where, for example, wage subsidies are only payable for hirings in excess of 
some base level of employment, there will be deadweight, since some firms would 
have expanded anyway. Moreover, there is likely to be a trade-off between such 
conditions and the scope of any policy, since some firms would otherwise be able to 
use subsidies to avoid or mitigate contraction.
Targeting the long-term unemployed is seen as a way of minimising deadweight, 
because the long-term unemployed have low exit rates (Snower, 1997). The 
relationship between deadweight and duration is more complex than this, since the 
cost per participant is also likely to be higher if the long-term unemployed are 
harder to help. Nonetheless, the evidence does suggest that deadweight falls with 
duration. Empirical studies of wage subsidy programmes find that where the relatively 
short-term unemployed are eligible, deadweight is generally in the region of 70% 
(Breen and Halpin, 1989; Byrne and Buchanan, 1994), compared with 40-50% for 
policies targeted on the long-term unemployed (Atkinson and Meager, 1994). Levels 
of subsidy were broadly equivalent between these schemes, although such comparisons 
between different schemes in different labour markets are inevitably crude.
Wage pressure
The argument that wage pressure can be reduced by targeting help onto the long­
term unemployed goes back to Baily and Tobin (1977). Empirically, Nickell (1987) 
found that, for a given level of unemployment, wage pressure was higher the higher 
the proportion of long-term unemployed. Findings such as this have led some to
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argue that policies targeted on the long-term unemployed can reduce unemployment, 
without stimulating inflation ‘since the long-term unemployed exert little if any 
dampening influence on wage inflation’ (Snower, 1997, p. 169). However, the 
proportion of long-term unemployed is highly correlated with the change in 
unemployment, so that it is not clear which of these the effect is due to (Nickell, 
1987). If workers are forward-looking, then they should anticipate the risks of 
becoming long-term unemployed. However, if they discount the future, then reducing 
duration dependence, by targeting the long-term unemployed, can reduce wage 
pressure. Gains to the long-term unemployed are discounted more heavily than 
losses to the short-term unemployed, because wage-setters will always become short­
term unemployed first (see Chapter 2).
Employability
The long-term unemployed may become less attractive to employers because their 
skills atrophy, they lose the habit of working, or simply because employers discriminate 
against them. In a matching framework, where firms and workers come together 
randomly, each firm’s hiring decision is an externality for other firms. If we can 
induce some firms to hire the long-term unemployed in preference to the short­
term unemployed, then the average quality of the unemployed pool faced by other 
firms increases. Hence their costs of filling vacancies will fall, and they will respond 
by opening more vacancies (see Chapter 3).
Working Nation
Much of the above argument informed the design of the Australian Working Nation 
programme, one of the most ambitious active labour market policies adopted in 
recent years (Commonwealth of Australia, 1994; Chapman, 1994). Working Nation 
offered a guaranteed work placement to all those unemployed for 18 months or 
longer. It was implemented in May 1994 and scrapped two years later, following the 
electoral defeat of the Labor government. Wage subsidies, delivered through the 
pre-existing Jobstart programme, were a major element of the policy, although various 
other options were used to meet the guarantee. Many of the features of Working 
Nation are replicated in the UK’s ‘New Deal’, especially for the youth programme. If 
New Deal is to succeed, understanding the weaknesses of Working Nation is an 
essential starting point.
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Table 4 .1:Australian Labour Market Programme Participants by duration
Year
<12
Duration of unemployment (months) 
12-18 18-36 36+
1992-93 37.9% 25.6% 28.5% 8.0%
1993-94 35.5% 21.7% 29.3% 13.5%
1994-95 31.8% 18.1% 29.1% 21.0%
1995-96 38.4% 12.5% 25.5% 23.6%
Source:Working Nation Evaluation Report, DEETYA, 1996
WorkingNation involved a substantial reallocation of resources from the short-term 
unemployed to the long-term unemployed. Table 4.1 shows the proportion of labour 
market programme placements by duration of unemployment from 1992 to 1996, a 
period when aggregate unemployment was falling. The effect is clearest in the 1 2 - 
18 month and 36+ month categories. The very long-term unemployed tripled their 
share of programme placements, from 8 % to 24%, as Working Nation targeted the 
existing stock of long-term unemployed, as well as the new inflow into the target 
group. The share of resources going to the 12-18 month group halved over the same 
period, as services were withdrawn from them. The under 1 2  month category saw a 
more modest fall, until the final year. The increase in 1995-96, however, is probably 
due to people flowing off programmes, under the guarantee, back into unemployment, 
and being classified as ‘at risk’ and hence eligible for continuing assistance.
WorkingNation is often described as having failed, although it maybe more accurate 
to say that it failed to live up to its substantial expectations. It did not run for long 
enough to allow a thorough evaluation, but long-term unemployment did fall more 
rapidly than in Australia’s previous boom (DEETYA, 1996a). However, one 
unforeseen consequence of Working Nation was a large increase in the inflow into 
long-term unemployment (here 18 months or longer), despite falling overall levels 
of unemployment. This was the major reason why the actual decline in long-term 
unemployment of 2 0 % was less than half the forecast level of 47% (DEETYA, 1996a). 
These higher inflows appear to have been a direct consequence of the withdrawal of 
services to the short-term unemployed, especially the 12-18 month duration group.
We did not seek explicitly to model Working Nation, which was a complex policy 
relying on a variety of programmes as well as wage subsidies (see Piggott and
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Chapman, 1995, for an attempt at modelling the full programme). Instead, we sought 
to examine the question it raised, as to whether it is always optimal to target active 
labour market programmes onto the long-term unemployed, in a somewhat simpler 
framework. We develop a modified version of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model 
of job creation and job destruction to simulate the effects of wage subsidies, targeted 
between the long- and short-term unemployed.
An added advantage of this approach is that it allow a fully endogenous treatment of 
the issues raised both by critics and supporters of wage subsidies. Deadweight, 
substitution and displacement are all incorporated, as are loss of skills by the long­
term unemployed and discounting by wage setters. Hence we can obtain estimates 
of their relative importance, without having to rely on ad hoc claims.
Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen (1996) look at untargeted policies in 
the same general framework. Millard and Mortensen find that a small hiring subsidy 
would increase equilibrium unemployment in a model with redundancy payments, 
but reduce unemployment in a model with zero redundancy payments. Mortensen 
looks at three types of subsidy: a recruitment subsidy offsetting the costs of vacancies; 
a hiring subsidy offsetting the costs of initial training; and a cut in payroll taxes. He 
finds that all three would reduce unemployment, even with redundancy payments, 
but for somewhat larger levels of intervention than those considered by Millard and 
Mortensen. However, redundancy payments reduce baseline unemployment in this 
model, whilst they increase it in Millard and Mortensen’s.
Each paper provides results only for a single, and different, level of subsidy, so that is 
impossible to determine how far their varying results arise from differences in 
parameters and how far from differences in the way wages are modelled. Typically, 
the effects of firing costs on unemployment are highly sensitive to the assumptions 
made about wage-setting (see for example, Bertola, 1990). We prefer to ignore 
redundancy payments, which, in the UK, workers are only entitled to after two years 
continuous employment. Nonetheless, our results are potentially consistent with 
both papers. We find that at low levels of subsidy, unemployment may increase as in 
Millard and Mortensen (1997), whilst at higher levels of subsidy it falls, as in 
Mortensen (1996).
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4.3 The Model
Each firm has one job, which can be in one of two states, vacant and searching, or 
filled and productive. Productive jobs produce a single unit of differentiated output 
per period, which has price y>+£, where p  is a common element for all products, and 
eis an idiosyncratic element, subject to random shocks. Shocks occur according to a 
Poisson process with arrival rate A, leading to a new value of £ drawn from a fixed 
known distribution F(x), which has finite upper support, and no mass points.
We assume that jobs are created using the best available technology, so that their 
price is initially equal top+£u. Jobs can be created and destroyed costlessly, but there 
is a cost to filling vacancies. Hence, jobs will not automatically be destroyed when 
they are hit by a shock. However, below some critical value, £d, it will be optimal for 
both firms and workers to separate, and the job will be destroyed. In addition, there 
is exogenous turnover of 8 per period. Hence, the total separation rate equals A/^£ )^+8.
Vacant jobs and unemployed workers contact one another according to an aggregate 
matching function, x = x{u,v) , where x is the total number of contacts per period, 
and u and v are unemployment and vacancies respectively. We normalise the labour 
force to unity, so that these are also the unemployment and vacancy rates. We define 
6 = v/u as the labour market tightness and assume that the matching function exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Hence, we can define the per period probabilities of making 
contact for vacancies and unemployed workers respectively as:
(4.1) q(0) = x(u,v)/v = x(^, 1)
(4.2) 6q(&) = x{uyv)/u = #(1,6)
After separation, workers enter short-term unemployment. If they do not find a 
job within one period, they become long-term unemployed. We assume, for 
simplicity, that all unemployed workers search with the same intensity, and hence 
have the same probability of contacting a vacancy, and also that vacancies are 
contacted by at most one worker per period. There is a per period cost, y, of 
holding open a vacancy.
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Short-term unemployed workers require some initial training, at a fixed cost k. The 
long-term unemployed may suffer from a loss of skills and require additional training. 
We assume that firms which hire the long-term unemployed incur a cost a, which is 
stochastic and match-specific. We assume that a  is drawn from some fixed known 
distribution G(x) in the positive quadrant, and that a  is realised when contact is 
made between a vacancy and a long-term unemployed worker. Hence firms can 
decide whether to hire the long-term unemployed with full information. G(x) has 
mean greater than or equal to k, and no mass points. We suppose that firms adopt a 
reservation training cost for the long-term unemployed, Cf, and hire any long-term 
unemployed worker making contact with a vacancy whose realised training cost is 
less than this. We show below that this is optimal. Provided the lower support of 
G{x) is less than or equal to the long-term unemployed will always have a 
positive outflow rate.
The government pays a hiring subsidy y/s for the short-term unemployed, and y/ L 
for the long-term unemployed. We assume that the subsidy is paid as a lump-sum at 
the point of hiring. Furthermore, we assume that wages are subject to continuous 
renegotiation, or equivalently that only renegotiation-proof contracts are agreed to. 
Hence, both the subsidy and the training cost are sunk for the purposes of the wage 
bargain. Mortensen (1996) argues that this is the appropriate assumption for the 
UK. Furthermore, the empirical evidence suggests that wages are independent of 
subsidies, whether subsidies are paid to the employer (Atkinson and Meager, 1994) 
or the worker (Woodbury and Speigelman, 1987), implying that subsidies are captured 
by the recipient.
For simplicity, we ignore taxes for the moment, supposing that the subsidy is funded 
by non-distortionary taxation. This may be an appropriate model for the current 
UK situation, where wage subsidies, at least for a 5 year period, are to be financed by 
a ‘windfall’ tax retrospectively levied on privatised utility companies. However, more 
generally, we need to include any fiscal consequences of the policy, and we extend 
the model to include taxation in the technical appendix, examining the implications 
towards the end of Section 4.
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Hiring and job creation
If V is the expected present discounted value of a vacancy, and J(e) the expected 
present discounted value of a filled job with idiosyncratic element £, then we can 
write the value function for vacancies as:
r V = - y  + crq{d\j(su ) - V  + yrs -k \  +
(4 .3) , , x1
(1 -  cr)q{0)G(ar )[j(su ) - V  +y/L-  E(a\a < ar)\
Where <T is the proportion of the pool of searching workers who are short-term 
unemployed, and hence impose only the fixed training cost k.
We assume that there is free entry for vacancies, so that V=0. Once contact has been 
made between an unemployed worker and a vacancy, both sides must decide whether 
to accept the match. We shall see below that the wage offered by vacant jobs is the 
highest available in the market, and hence the worker’s decision is trivial. Workers 
always accept job offers. We can represent the firm’s choices as:
Hire Don't hire
Short-term unemployed 1+ V= 0
Long-term unemployed ai£+ V= 0
Where a  is the realised training cost. Hence the short-term unemployed are always 
hired provided J{su }> k -y /s and never hired otherwise. We shall assume that this 
condition always holds, ie that the subsidies for the long-term unemployed are not 
so great as to drive out all hiring of the short-term unemployed.
The long-term unemployed will be hired provided J (su) > a - y / L. We shall see 
below that J(eJ is independent of a , and hence there will exist a unique reservation 
value of the training cost, a ,  given by:
(4.4) a r = J(su) + i//L
such that firms will optimally hire any long-term unemployed worker with a realised 
training cost less than CCr who contacts a vacancy.
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If we substitute the free-entry condition, V=0, and equation (4.4) into (4.3), we 
obtain the job creation condition:
(4-5) = <Aa r -  k  + V s  ~  ¥ l \ + (1 ■- r -  E {a \a  -  a r )]
The ex ante expected cost of filling a vacancy is equal to the firm’s expected return 
from a filled job.
Job destruction
Let W(e) be the expected present discounted value to a worker of employment in a 
job with idiosyncratic component e, and UgT the expected present discounted value 
of short-term unemployment. We can then define the total match surplus, S(e) as:
(4.6) S(s) = J(e)+ W (s)-U ST
We assume that the wage, zo(e), is determined by Nash bargaining so that the surplus 
is split in fixed proportions, with /? being the worker’s share. Furthermore, we 
assume that the wage must be renegotiation proof, and hence that sunk costs or 
benefits cannot form part of the wage bargain. Thus the wage is independent of 
both the subsidy and the training costs.
(4.7) W {e)-UST = pS(e)
(4.8) / ( £) = (1-/? )% )
Since there is no cost of job destruction, filled jobs will be destroyed for any shock x 
such that/(#)<0 , and hence S{sd) = 0 . For a given realisation of £, we can write the 
value functions as:
(4.9) rJ{e) = p + e - t i i£ )+ ^ ly (x )d F (x)-J(e)\-SJ{£)
(4.1 0 ) rW(e) = «(e) + a[J ‘'W(x)dF(x)+ F(ed -  W(s)]+4 ^  -  »V )]
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(4.11) rUn = b + e^e \w {e, ) - u ^ [ \ - e q{0)\uLT- u ST]
(4.12) rULT= b + G {a r)e^ e \W (e , ) - U LT]
Hence, if we substitute (4.9) and (4.10) into (4.6), we obtain:
(4.13) (r + 5 + A)S(s) = p + £ + X f u S(x)dF{x)-rUSTJsj
whilst from (4.7), (4.11) and (4.12), we have:
*  1 -  6q(ff) + r + G (ar )%(<?)
Finally, if we note that:
S’(s)= 1
T + S + X
and that integration by parts implies:
\ ‘'S(x)dF{x) = JV (*)[l-F (*)}fe
We have that:
(4.15)
(r+S+X)S(a) = f  + e - i + — f [ l  -  F {x)\k  -  . ^ j r + G^ a M E-)
r + <J + 2 J« . 1 n 1  -dq{p) + r + G{ar)Oq(e)
Given also that S(sd) = 0 , we have:
(4.16) S(s) = S(s)-S(ed)= £
r + 8 + A,
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and hence:
(4.17)
p + s  =b+___ m d i r  + G(ar%£, - Ej)________ ^ _ ! ‘- U F(x)]dx
f  d (r+S + X j(}.-e0)+r+G {ar)0q(e)] r + S + X W  "
Which is the job destruction condition. The reservation level of productivity equals 
the opportunity cost of working to the employee less the option value of retaining 
the existing match. At the job destruction margin, the value of the match equals the 
value of the worker’s and firm’s outside options (the firm’s outside option, V=0). 
Note also that because, from equation (4.15), S(e) is monotonically increasing in £, 
there will be a unique reservation productivity,
Furthermore, given that the wage is renegotiation proof, equation (4.9) implies that 
J{z) will be independent of the realised value of Of when a long-term unemployed 
worker is hired, and hence that there will be a unique reservation training cost, a.  
From (4.4), (4.8) and (4.16) we have the reservation training cost condition:
r + d + A
Since the firm’s outside option is zero, it is prepared to pay up to its share of the 
expected surplus value of a filled job to secure a match.
Flow equilibrium
To close the model, we need to determine <7, the proportion o f‘low cost’ searchers 
among the total pool of searching workers, and u, the unemployment rate. We assume 
a stationary equilibrium, in which the unemployment rate is constant over time, 
since we are interested in the effect of policy on the NAIRU.
Short-term unemployed searchers fail to find a job within one period with probability 
1  -  $q{0), and flow into the pool of long-term unemployed searchers. In equilibrium, 
this inflow must equal the outflow from the pool of long-term unemployed searchers. 
Hence:
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Giving:
(4.20) o  — G ( c O W
1 -Oq{9)+G{ar) 6 0 )
Unemployment
We could use a similar flow equilibrium condition to determine the overall unemployment 
rate, u, given that total inflows into unemployment must equal total outflows from 
unemployment. However, there are two different ways in which we could do this, 
measuring unemployment either before or after outflows have occurred. In models where 
the inflow is constant, this choice is essentially arbitrary, since the sign of du is unaffected, 
but this is no longer true when the inflow is endogenous. Measuring u after inflows but 
before outflows is equivalent to assuming that all the unemployed have a duration of at 
least one period, so that unemployment is bounded below at the per period inflow. In 
many countries the inflow is large compared to the stock, and this is a serious restriction. 
Moreover, it implies that short-term unemployment is independent of the outflow rate 
from short-term unemployment, so that by construction policies that target the 
outflow can never reduce short-term unemployment. However, if instead we measure 
u after both inflows and outflows, then we count none of the people who flow in and 
out in the same period, and this is not entirely satisfactory either.
Theoretically, the choice between measuring u before or after outflows is essentially 
arbitrary. However, we have to calibrate our model using actual unemployment 
statistics. In practise these statistics include some fraction of those who flow out 
during the period. Hence, for the purposes of simulating our model, we prefer to 
adopt an approach which finesses the choice of when to measure u so as to capture 
this feature of the unemployment statistics. Since equations (4.5), (4.17), (4.18) and
(4.20) are recursive, the basic parameters, 0, ej, a  and dare unaffected by u, and our 
method also encompasses both of the conventional options. The effect is simply to 
provide a more realistic estimate of the magnitude of policy effects, but our basic 
findings do not depend on this formulation.
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Formally, we can derive the unemployment equation from the normal flow equilibrium 
approach (see technical appendix). However, it will prove more intuitive to adopt an 
alternative, but algebraically equivalent, method. We start from the definition that 
the unemployment stock = inflow x average duration. Since we have normalised the 
labour force to unity, the unemployment stock equals the unemployment rate, u, 
whilst the inflow equals [AF(f d) + <?](1 -  u) . Given that we are in stationary 
equilibrium, the average duration is equal to the expected duration for a worker who 
has just been made unemployed.
Consider a worker who flows both in and out in the same period. We define a 
parameter, 0  < n  < 1 , as their average duration, and similarly as the average 
incremental duration of an existing unemployed worker who flows out this period.
For example, if workers flowed out uniformly across the period, fj. would equal 
one-half. Workers do not start a new job until the beginning of the next period, but 
we might suppose that they cease searching, and hence no longer count as 
unemployed, once they have been offered the job (in fact, we can eliminate this 
entirely: see technical appendix).
Hence the average duration equals:
m * + G (a , )m [ i  -  m ) ± [ i  -  = l ~H r (+^ l H0)•=1
Giving:
( 1  2 D ,  + +
<%ar)tye)+[AF(st )+sli-eti6)+M<K«rW.e)]
It follows also that:
u [1 + 0 / -  ) + S f t a ,  ) m
Us G(ar)%(0 )+ [A F(^)+ 4 l - ^ )  + /UG(a,)%(e)]
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(4.23) uL =
[l-% (g)][lF(g j)+ 4 l -G (q r)%(g)]
G{ar)a^e)+[XF{£ j)+Sl l -0^e)+M (KarM S)]
Wages
Finally, we can use (4.8), (4.9) and (4.17) to derive the wage:
(4.24) w(s) = /?(/> + s) + ( 1 -p ) b +
PO0)[r + G{ar)]{eu- e d)
(r + 8 + X)[l -  0 0 )  + r + G(ar )0^0)]
The wage is equal to the worker s fallback position plus P times the surplus over the 
fallback value of a filled job with idiosyncratic component e. The average wage will 
be given by:
Where n(e) is the number of workers employed in jobs with idiosyncratic component 
£, and N  = l - u , total employment. The distribution of employment over 
productivity is determined by the laws of motion:
(4.26) h(x) = XF'(x)N -  (S + X)n(x) s d < x< eu
(4.27)i{i;,) = [XF(e1) + S } N + Z F ' ( E , ) N - { S + X X £ . )
And hence, in steady state, and given F'{su) = 0 , we have:
(4.28) n(x) = - j - ^ F ' ( x ) N  ed < x< su
X+6
N
The model is then defined by the job creation condition, (4.5), the job destruction 
condition, (4.17), the reservation training cost condition, (4.18), the flow equilibrium
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condition (4 .2 0 ), (4.21) which is the Beveridge Curve, and the wage equations (4.24) 
and (4.25). It is fairly easy to show that an increase in either y/s or if/L, or both, will 
lead to an increase in both job creation and job destruction. Analytically, we cannot 
say which effect will dominate. We therefore provide some simulation results in Section 
4 below. First, however, we need to consider the policy variable in a little more detail.
Policy
We are interested in two aspects of policy, the overall level of subsidy and also the 
degree of targeting of any subsidy on the long-term unemployed. Clearly, these two 
effects are interlinked. In particular, an increase in targeting will also tend to change 
the overall level of subsidy paid out, since the long-term unemployed have a different 
outflow to the short-term unemployed, and hence the numbers of subsidy-eligible 
workers will also change.
In order to separate out these two effects as far as possible, we assume that the 
government policy rule is to allocate a certain level of subsidy per unemployed worker1, 
Jj/ , so that:
(4.30) ~ip = a9(0)\f/s + ( 1  - <7)G(aT)6q(0)if/L
The government then determines the extent to which this is targeted on the long­
term unemployed, by setting a parameter, (j), where <j>y/s = ( 1  -<j>)y/L, so that if 
^ = 0  , subsidies are only available for the short-term unemployed, and if (f> = 1 , 
subsidies are only available for the long-term unemployed. It follows that:
(4.31) iffL - ------- p-------- — ---------------T
9q{d)[{ 1 -  (f>)(t +  <f>G(ar){ 1 -  or)]
(4.32) ¥ ,  = ------- .----- (1~ ^   T
dq(0)[( 1 -  <f)oT + <f>G{ar)( 1 -  O’)]
Hence a change in targeting only affects the aggregate subsidy level to the extent 
that targeting also affects the underlying unemployment rate. If targeting is neutral 
then a change in (j> will have no effect on uy even if the overall subsidy level is non-
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neutral. There is, however, an element of automatic stabilisation here, since a targeting 
policy that is more effective will tend to reduce the aggregate level of expenditure, 
by reducing the level of unemployment. We believe that this more accurately reflects 
actual policy decisions than the alternative assumption of a fixed total expenditure, 
although the evidence suggests that increases in active labour market policy are less 
than proportional with increases in unemployment in most countries (Grubb, 1994). 
However, none of our simulation results are fundamentally altered by assuming instead 
a fixed total expenditure.
4.4 Simulations
Algebraically, the effects of changing either of the policy parameters, <j) or y/ , are 
generally ambiguous. Increasing the overall subsidy level can be shown to increase 
both inflows and outflows from unemployment, leaving the overall effect ambiguous, 
whilst increasing the degree of targeting on the long-term unemployed has ambiguous 
effects on both inflows and outflows. Hence, we use numerical simulations to consider 
the predicted effects of wage subsidies.
We parameterise the model using the technique of Millard and Mortensen (1997) 
and Mortensen (1996). We start by setting values for the parameters from empirical 
evidence wherever possible, using the same values as Millard and Mortensen (1997). 
We then set the remaining parameters so that, with no subsidy, the model’s predictions 
match observed patterns of unemployment. Below, we test the model’s sensitivity to 
our assumptions.
We normalise the maximum per period productivity to equal unity. From Millard 
and Mortensen, we have values of r equal to 0.01 per quarter, S equal to 0.014 per 
quarter, k equal to 0.275, y  equal to 0.33 per quarter, X equal to 0.1 per quarter and 
rj equal to 0.4 (on the assumption that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas). 
Income in unemployment is treated somewhat differently in Millard and Mortensen, 
so we set b equal to 0.32, in order to give a replacement ratio of 0.37 as found by 
Blondal and Pearson (1995). We set the base price f> to zero.
We follow Millard and Mortensen in assuming that idiosyncratic productivity levels 
are distributed uniformly, so that:
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Table 4.2
Structural parameter Value
Maximum productivity, £u 1 per quarter
Minimum productivity, £mtn 0.580 per quarter
Vacancy cost, y 0.33 per quarter
Training cost for stu, k 0.275 per worker
Interest rate, r 0.01 per quarter
Exogenous turnover, 8 0.014 per quarter
Matching elasticity, Tj 0.4
Shock arrival rate, A 0.1 per quarter
Base price, p 0
Worker’s share, (5 0.626
Max. ltu training cost, ao  7 max 1.313
Min. ltu training cost, OL .O 7 mtn 0.590
F (* )=  * £j,ln
£ - £  u mm
and we suppose a similar form for the long-term unemployed s training cost, a. We 
then calibrate the remaining parameters, and a ^ n so that the model
correctly predicts the unemployment rate, inflow, and the ratios of short- to long­
term unemployment and of the outflow rates of the short- and long-term unemployed. 
To be consistent with Millard and Mortensens values, short-term is defined here as 
one quarter. We use average values for male claimant count unemployment in Great 
Britain over the period July 1987 to June 1996. Only the claimant count provides us 
with the outflow data that we require, but because of well-known problems with the 
claimant count as a measure of female unemployment, we follow Layard etal (1991) 
in using the male unemployment rate as the best proxy for overall unemployment. 
This gives aggregate unemployment of 10.6%, inflow of 4.6%, short-term 
unemployment/total unemployment of 0.28 and long-term outflow rate/short-term 
outflow rate of0.375. This results in the parameter values shown in Table 4.2.
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Job creation and job destruction
Figure 4.1a shows the job creation and job destruction curves, equations (4.5) and
(4.17), for various values of the subsidy level, lj/ , targeted equally at the long- and 
short-term unemployed (ie (f> =0.5). The job destruction curves slope upwards because 
as the labour market tightens, (9  increases), the opportunity cost of employment 
rises -  workers are more easily able to find an alternative job. Hence the surplus 
value within a filled job falls, making job destruction more likely. This is not the 
same as firms laying off workers and replacing them with subsidised workers in the 
same jobs, something that is disallowed under the rules of the UK’s New Deal and 
many other wage subsidies. Rather, jobs across the whole economy become more 
liable to break up because new jobs are also cheaper to create: whether or not they 
are filled by subsidised workers. The effect is similar to reducing a hiring cost: both 
hiring and firing increase. The job creation curves generally slope downward because 
as 9 increases it becomes more costly to fill vacancies, requiring that jobs last longer 
to offset the higher costs. There is, however, an additional effect here. As 9 increases, 
a greater proportion of the unemployed are short-term unemployed, who are less 
costly to hire. Hence, at high values of 9 , the job creation curve can start to slope 
upwards.
Increased subsidies reduce the cost of creating vacancies, increasing job creation. 
However, they consequendy reduce the option value of maintaining an existing match, 
increasing job destruction. Increases in the outflow rate also push up the worker s 
fallback position, moving us up the job destruction curve. We can see these effects in 
Figure 4.1a. However, the job creation curve gives only part of the outflow picture 
here. The outflow rate from short-term unemployment is solely a function of 9 , but 
the long-term unemployed outflow rate is also a function of a r .
As we can see in Figure 4.1b, an untargeted wage subsidy has little effect on a r , as 
we might expect. However, Figures 4.2a and 4.2b show that there is a substantial 
effect when the subsidy is more heavily targeted on the long-term unemployed (here 
(f> =0.95). An increase in subsidy now makes the long-term unemployed relatively 
more attractive to employers, causing a r to increase, but 9 increases correspondingly 
less than in the untargeted case.
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The job creation and destruction curves are less useful in analysing the effects of 
targeting a given level of subsidy, since as we can see in Figure 4.3a, the effects are 
ambiguous. The job creation curves for different levels of targeting cross. Whilst the 
job destruction curve shifts up, the job destruction rate, determined by e# is also 
ambiguous, first rising and then falling as <f) increases. Instead, we observe a fall in 
the outflow rate of the short-term unemployed (equilibrium values of 6 fall), and 
an offsetting increase in the relative attractiveness of the long-term unemployed, 
shown in Figure 4.3b. Changes in the equilibrium level of job destruction appear to 
be much smaller. To obtain the overall effects, however, we need to solve the complete 
system.
Unemployment
Figure 4.4 shows the unemployment rate against both the level of subsidy and the 
extent of targeting. The thick black line represents the minimum unemployment 
level for any given level of subsidy -  the optimum degree of targeting. We set fi 
equal to one-half, equivalent to assuming that unemployed workers flow out at a 
constant rate throughout the period. Figure 4.5 shows the subsidy rates as a proportion 
of average annual wages implied by the combinations of 7^ and <j) plotted in Figure 
4.4.
Three main features of Figure 4.4 are notable. Firstly, the effect of the subsidy is 
generally to reduce unemployment, but this is not true everywhere. In particular, 
large subsidies targeted mainly at the short-term unemployed increase unemployment. 
The combination of higher inflows, and increased wage pressure leads to rising 
unemployment. For this calibration, unemployment always falls at low levels of 
subsidy, but more generally, this may not be the case. Unemployment may rise at low 
levels of subsidy, before falling at higher levels of subsidy, as we will see below when 
we consider the sensitivity of our results to changes in the parameters.
Secondly, the magnitude of the policy effect is potentially significant, around 4 
percentage points (40% of the level) for a combination of subsidies for the short­
term unemployed of 5.4% of average annual earnings (16% of annual benefit 
payments), and for the long-term unemployed of 13% of average annual earnings 
(38% of annual benefits).
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This, of course, is a high level of policy commitment. By comparison, the UK 
government’s proposed wage subsidy for the long-term adult unemployed is about 
11% of average annual earnings, with no subsidy for the short-term unemployed 
(subsidies for the short-term unemployed are more costly because considerably more 
of them flow out each period). This would be sufficient to generate a 1.5 percentage 
point fall in the unemployment rate within the model. However, the definitions of 
long-term unemployed used in the model and in the New Deal are significantly 
different, so that this overstates the predicted impact.
Finally, at least some targeting on the long-term unemployed is desirable, but the 
extent of targeting desired reduces as the level of subsidy increases. At low levels of 
subsidy, the optimal policy would be to target all subsidies on the long-term 
unemployed. Beyond a certain point, however, the optimum policy path is at neither 
extreme, but requires a gradual shift of the increasing resources, though always less 
than half, towards the short-term unemployed.
Increasing the extent of targeting on the long-term unemployed has two effects. 
There are positive externalities to targeting the long-term unemployed. Wage pressure 
is lower, and because more workers are ‘employable’, vacancy durations are shorter. 
This reduces the cost to firms of opening vacancies, so that more vacancies are 
opened. Outflow rates increase (see Chapter 3 for details). Inflow rates also increase, 
because the higher outflow rates improve the worker’s outside option, but targeting 
is only a relevant issue if the outflow effects dominate the inflow effects, since 
otherwise we would prefer zero subsidy. Hence targeting subsidies onto the long­
term unemployed can reduce equilibrium unemployment.
However there are also diminishing returns. Employers respond to the expected 
subsidy per hire. However, the overall cost of subsidies is a function both of the 
subsidy per hire, and the number of hires — the outflow rates. In particular, as we 
target subsidies more and more onto one group, we increase the relative outflow rate 
of that group, increasing the cost of any given marginal increment to the per hire 
subsidy level for that group. Hence, as we transfer a fixed level of resources from the 
short-term unemployed to the long-term unemployed, we obtain a diminishing 
marginal increment in the per hire subsidy for the long-term unemployed, y/ L, and 
hence a diminishing marginal increase in their outflow rate, relative to the marginal
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decrease in the outflow rate of the short-term unemployed. If this effect outweighs 
the gains to targeting from the positive externalities, then further targeting will 
increase the unemployment rate, as we observe in Figure 4.4 (see technical appendix 
for a formal derivation).
Short-term and long-term unemployment
Much of the debate surrounding wage subsidies has been concerned with substitution 
and displacement effects -  the extent to which subsidies for the long-term unemployed 
simply increase short-term unemployment, rather than reducing overall 
unemployment. Figure 4.6 shows both short- and long-term unemployment. Long­
term unemployment is initially (ie at zero subsidy) higher. The most notable feature 
of Figure 4.6 is that, as the subsidy level is increased, short-term unemployment 
always rises and long-term unemployment nearly always falls, regardless of targeting. 
Of course the magnitude of both changes is greater when the subsidy is targeted on 
the long-term unemployed, but the direction is the same. The only exception is that 
where subsidies lead to overall unemployment rising, long-term unemployment also 
rises. In fact it is this rise that drives the increase in aggregate unemployment.
We can see what underlies Figure 4.6 from the inflow and outflow rates in Figures 
4.7,4.8 and 4.9. In Figure 4.7, we can see that a subsidy targeted on the short-term 
unemployed increases their outflow rate sharply, whilst reducing the outflow rate 
from long-term unemployment, but more gently (from a low base). However, because 
the inflow into unemployment also rises (see Figure 4.8), short-term unemployment 
increases. The effects of a subsidy on the short-term unemployed are seen not 
primarily on short-term unemployment, but through a sharply reduced inflow into 
long-term unemployment, shown in Figure 4.9. This is generally more than sufficient 
to offset the lower outflow rate from long-term unemployment, so that long-term 
unemployment falls.
With a subsidy targeted on the long-term unemployed, the outflow rates from both 
short- and long-term unemployment rise, although the increase for the long-term 
unemployed is much greater as we would expect. Hence the concern that subsidised 
long-term unemployed workers will ‘take the jobs’ of the short-term unemployed is 
misplaced. The positive externalities are sufficient to increase the outflow rate even 
of the short-term unemployed. However, the subsidy does displace existing workers
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out of jobs, increasing the inflow rate. This pushes up both short-term unemployment 
and the inflow into long-term unemployment. The increased outflow from long­
term unemployment, though, is sufficient to reduce both long-term and overall 
unemployment.
Wages
In the UK context, the assumption in the Mortensen-Pissarides model that displaced 
workers re-enter employment at the highest wage level is not borne out empirically 
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995). The model’s predictions about wages, and hence 
also about taxes, are therefore likely to be less robust than those for unemployment. 
It may be more illuminating to consider the effects of policy on wages at a given 
productivity (we report results at the highest productivity, but the pattern will be 
the same for any productivity level above ej. However, it is worth noting that it was 
an explicit aim of the Swedish model to put pressure on the least efficient industries 
and to use active labour market policy to redirect displaced labour into high 
productivity industries (Robinson, 1995).
Figure 4.10 shows the effects on average wages, and the wage of the highest 
productivity jobs. Both increase slightly as the subsidy increases, with the average 
increasing faster than the maximum. From equation (4.24), we can see that the 
wage of a job at any given productivity rises with the worker’s fallback position, ie as 
outflow rates rise. This drives the increase in wages at the highest productivity. 
However, average wages rise faster than this because the distribution of productivities 
also changes. With more job destruction the minimum productivity increases, pushing 
up the tail of the distribution, whilst at the same time, more job creation implies 
more jobs at the highest productivity, since all new jobs start at that level.
Taxes
So far we have ignored taxation in the interests of simplicity, implicitly assuming 
that the costs of wage subsidies are met in some non-distortionary fashion. This 
assumption is unsatisfactory, and we extend the model to incorporate taxation in the 
technical appendix. Taxes increase job destruction since they remove a part of the 
surplus value of a filled job. Since this reduces the expected lifetime of a filled job, 
and thus its value, job creation falls. Hence unemployment is higher. Millard and 
Mortensen (1997) estimate that abolishing payroll tax in the UK would reduce
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unemployment by two percentage points, although they do not discuss how this 
should be financed and do not link taxes with the costs of subsidies.
We assume a balanced budget constraint, so that tax revenues raised from a 
proportional wage tax equal total expenditure on labour market policies, 
unemployment benefits plus subsidies. This allows us to ask whether subsidies can 
ever pay for themselves in terms of savings on benefit payments, as well as to check 
that our previous results are robust to the introduction of distortionary taxes.
Figure 4.11 shows the unemployment rate in a model with taxes. Base level 
unemployment is now around 0.7 percentage points higher than without taxes, at 
11.3%, but the effect of policy is very similar, with a reduction in unemployment 
again of around 4 percentage points at the highest subsidy level. The shape of the 
plot is also very similar.
Figure 4.12 shows the implied tax rate. Unsuprisingly, taxes rise sharply where the 
subsidy increases unemployment. More generally, we can see that, compared with 
the zero subsidy point, taxes always rise, so that the savings from reduced benefit 
payments are never sufficient to cover the costs of subsidies. The rise is modest 
though, around one-half of a percentage point (8 % of the level) and, at the margin, 
an increase in subsidy along the tax-minimising path for <f) reduces the tax rate, so 
that a marginal increase in subsidy can pay for itself.
Furthermore, even allowing for the increase in taxation, average wages still rise. 
Figure 4.13 shows the average and maximum after-tax wages. The subsidy always 
increases the average wage. However, this reflects in part the increased rate of job 
destruction implied by taxation, which increases the lowest wage by eliminating less 
productive jobs. The effect on the wage of jobs at any given productivity is more 
complex. Figure 4.14 shows the after-tax wage at the highest productivity. After tax 
wages now only rise when the subsidy is sufficiently large and effectively targeted, 
otherwise the gains from lower unemployment are offset by the costs of higher 
taxation. The magnitude of these changes though is small relative to the level of the 
wage.
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Table 4.3
Parameter Initial
unemployment
Minimum
unemployment
Proportional
change
Unemployment 
rises before 
falling?
Baseline 10.6% 6.3% 40.7% No
a  =1.25max 10.6% 6.3% 41% No
a  =1.5max 10.6% 6.4% 39.6% Yes
a  . =0.8rmn 10.4% 6.8% 34.0% Yes
a  . =0.4mm 10.4% 5.9% 42.8% No
e . =0.65rmn 7.5% 5.7% 23.8% Yes
u->oII 13.2% 6.8% 48.6% No
y=0.26 10.5% 4.5% 57.8% No
y=0.4 10.5% 7.4% 29.2% Yes
£=0.35 10.6% 7.3% 31.1% Yes
£=0.2 10.6% 4.4% 58.9% No
r=0.02 9.9% 6.3% 36.8% Yes
r=0 11.2% 6.3% 43.5% No
5=0.02 11.4% 6.7% 41.1% No
5=0.01 10.1% 6.0% 40.4% No
77=0.5 10.6% 6.0% 43.5% No
77=0.3 10.5% 6.6% 37.6% Yes
A=0.12 9.5% 7.1% 25.7% Yes
A=0.08 10.6% 5.4% 49.0% No
£=0.4 12.9% 7.8% 39.4% No
£=0.25 9.1% 5.1% 43.7% No
£ = 0 5.5% 3.6%* 34.5%* No
0=0.7 10.1% 9.0% 11.4% Yes
0=0.55 8.2% 4.0%** 50.1%** No
* y/ = 0.09; **^ = 0.14
Sensitivity
It is important to test how sensitive our findings are to our choice of parameter 
values. Table 4.3 shows the effect of variations in each of the parameters on the 
initial unemployment rate, and on the impact of policy. The underlying 
unemployment rate is relatively insensitive to the choice of parameters, with 
most variations leaving the initial unemployment rate between 9.5% and 11.5%. 
The main exception is which has a much larger effect on the underlying 
unemployment rate. However, this may in part reflect the choice of a uniform
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distribution for F(s) so that the extremes of the distribution are as important as 
the centre.
The effect of policy varies somewhat more, but unemployment is always reduced at 
an optimally targeted subsidy of Tp -  0.18. It is also always optimal to target some 
proportion, but less than half, of resources onto the short-term unemployed at higher 
levels of subsidy. However, in about one-third of the cases considered, unemployment 
rises at low levels of subsidy, before falling as the policy stance increases.
In most cases, where the impact of policy is significantly reduced, this is associated 
with a fall in the initial (ie zero subsidy) unemployment rate, so that policy is less 
effective when it is less needed. The principal exception is that as /? rises, policy 
becomes less effective without an offsetting fall in initial unemployment. However, 
our baseline value is relatively high already: Millard and Mortensen (1997) set 
ft = 0.584, Mortensen (1996) has ft = 0.44. These reflect a high value of leisure in 
their parameter choices, which offsets the need for a high worker s share in generating 
the initial unemployment rate. Table 4.3 suggests that policy would be even more 
effective in our model if we had a lower value of /? and a higher value of b.
Overall, our basic findings that policy is effective and that targeting on the long­
term unemployed should be less than total are robust to variations in our choice of 
calibration.
The effect o f  ]u
All our simulations so far have been presented on the basis of fi equal to one-half, 
as if workers flowed out at a constant rate throughout each period. We consider this 
to be the best basis for estimation. However, it is important to test whether our 
results are robust to changes in fj, , in particular to the assumptions that f i - 1  or 
ji =0 . Only the unemployment rate (Figures 4.4 and 4.11), and hence also the short- 
and long-term unemployment rates (Figure 4.6) are affected by jjl , since none of 
the equations that determine the model include it. The effect of increasing n  is 
simply to weight the inflow more heavily in calculating the unemployment rate.
Figure 4.15 shows the unemployment rate that would obtain with fj, = 1  in the model 
without taxes (with taxes the plot is much the same shape but somewhat higher, as
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with Figures 4.4 and 4.11). We can see that the basic shape of the unemployment 
plot is sustained, but that subsidies are now initially harmful at low levels, and the 
subsequent downward slope is less steep. Hence larger levels of subsidy would be 
required for any given reduction in unemployment, but nonetheless policy remains 
effective. Figure 4.16 shows the effect with fi =0 . Again the shape is basically 
unchanged, but subsidies are correspondingly more effective.
4.5 Welfare
Simply reducing unemployment may not be our sole policy objective. Given that 
there are real resource costs involved, especially with distortionary taxation, we need 
also to consider the welfare effects of policy. At an aggregate level, we can measure 
welfare by total consumption. Total output is given by:
(4.33) Y  = n(eu + s u) + f “«(*)(/> + x)dx
We can then evaluate total consumption as output less the cost of training new hires 
and of holding open vacancies:
(4.34) C = Y - u Q{6q(6)(jk + G(aT)6q{6Xl-G)E(a\a < ar) + fy}
Where uQ is the pre-matching pool of searchers, ie the number of people unemployed 
after inflows but before any outflows have occured (see technical appendix, equation 
4.A3). Figure 4.17 shows total consumption, which can be seen to rise as 
unemployment falls, although by less than the increase in total output, since the 
costs of hiring also rise. Much of this increase is driven by our assumption that job 
creation occurs at the highest productivity whilst job destruction occurs at the lowest. 
Hence increased churning tends also to increase aggregate productivity. In Figure 4.18, 
we show what aggregate consumption would be at the initial productivity distribution. 
Of course this is not an equilibrium, but it allows us to see the relative contributions to 
increased consumption made by increasing employment and by shifting the productivity 
distribution. It is clear that most of the rise in aggregate consumption within the model 
is due to the assumptions regarding productivity. Indeed over much of the surface, aggregate 
consumption would otherwise fall. Nonetheless, at high levels of Tj/ , the unemployment 
effects of the policy are sufficient to increase aggregate consumption.
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Even if a wage subsidy increases aggregate welfare, we may also be interested in 
distributional issues, in particular the welfare effects on those whose jobs are lost
because of the policy Saint-Paul (1995) argues that wage subsidies may not be enacted,
employed. From equations (4.7), (4.12), (4.14) and (4.16), we have (in the absence 
of taxes -  see technical appendix for equivalents with taxes):
We can see from Figures 4.19 and 4.20 that wage subsidies generally increase the 
welfare of the unemployed (NB these, and the following figures, are plotted for the 
model with taxes). However, subsidies targeted predominantly on the short-term 
unemployed tend to reduce the welfare of the long-term unemployed. Equally, it is 
notable that the welfare of the short-term unemployed is higher if subsidies are 
targeted to some extent onto the long-term unemployed. The short-term unemployed 
gain both from the effects of the positive externalities, and because they face a risk 
of becoming long-term unemployed, and these gains are sufficient for the short­
term unemployed to prefer policies targeted somewhat onto the long-term 
unemployed.
However, of more interest is the effect on the employed. Employed workers gain 
because their outside option improves, but they also lose because the surplus value 
of a match, of which they obtain a share, declines. In some cases this decline is 
sufficient to render the match no longer viable, and some workers who would be 
employed in the absence of policy become unemployed. Figure 4 . 2 1  is illustrative. 
The upper surface is the asset value of employment for a worker in a match with 
idiosyncratic component £=0 .8 . The lower surface is the asset value of short-term 
unemployment, so that where the surfaces meet, the job is being destroyed. We can
even though they would reduce unemployment, because of opposition from the
r r(r + S + /l)[l -  6q{6) + r + G(ar )^(^)]
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see that the rise in value of the worker s outside option is more than sufficient to 
offset the reduction in the surplus value of their existing match. The implication is 
that the welfare of the employed rises, even if they are at risk of losing their jobs.
Even if this result holds for all £, it is not quite sufficient to imply that the policy is 
Pareto-improving. The asset value to the firm of a filled post falls as unemployment 
falls, and hence the owners of existing firms make a loss. Hence distributional welfare 
will depend also on the ownership structure of firms, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper.
Optimal targeting
Welfare analysis raises the question of what we mean by ‘optimal’ targeting. So far, 
we have used the term to imply minimising the level of unemployment for any given 
level of subsidy, y/ . However, from Figure 4.22, we can see that the desired extent 
of targeting on the long-term unemployed depends on our objective.
In general, maximising consumption requires rather less targeting onto the long­
term unemployed than minimising unemployment. The long-term unemployed are 
more expensive to train, and hence the real resources that have to be allocated to 
training are higher, the higher the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed. In 
addition, output is determined both by the level of employment, and by the 
distribution of productivities, and hence by the inflow rate. Although the inflow and 
outflow rates broadly shift together, the maximum inflow rate arises at a somewhat 
lower degree of targeting on the long-term unemployed than that which minimises 
unemployment. The discounting effect which lowers wage pressure when subsidies 
are targeted on the long-term unemployed also lowers the job destruction rate. Whilst 
this tends to reduce unemployment, it also tends to reduce output, and hence 
consumption, by altering the distribution of productivities within the economy.
The remaining two curves on Figure 4.22 show the paths that maximise the welfare 
of employees in maximum productivity jobs, and of the long-term unemployed. The 
path for the short-term unemployed is not shown, because it is virtually identical to 
that for the employed. Unsurprisingly, each group prefers somewhat greater targeting 
towards itself (or the immediate outside option for the employed), than policies 
which optimise aggregates. However, with the exception of the long-term
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unemployed, who always prefer substantially greater help targeted on themselves, 
the paths of optimum targeting for the various outcomes converge substantially as 
the overall subsidy increases.
4.6 Conclusion
In a world of endogenous job creation and job destruction, wage subsidies will 
generally increase both the inflows and the outflows from unemployment. We have 
extended the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework to analyse these effects within 
a model with both short-term and long-term unemployed. This allows us to assess 
the calls by Layard, Snower and others for wage subsidies targeted onto the long­
term unemployed. By using this general equilibrium framework, the oft-cited issues 
of deadweight, displacement and substitution can all be treated endogenously, rather 
than on the basis of frequently ad hoc estimates of their magnitude, often derived 
from partial equilibrium analysis. Furthermore the suggested advantages of targeting 
the long-term unemployed arise endogenously so that we obtain a basis for rigorous 
comparison of their likely magnitudes compared to those of displacement and substitution.
Our findings are broadly encouraging for advocates of active labour market policies. 
We find that unemployment can be reduced, even accounting for the increase in 
inflows. However, small subsidies maybe worse than none, increasing unemployment.
Furthermore, targeting policy towards the long-term unemployed is desirable, and 
generates a further reduction in unemployment, not merely a churning of the existing 
pool. However, the justified emphasis on the long-term unemployed should not be 
to the complete exclusion of the short-term unemployed. Because of diminishing 
returns, as subsidies increase it becomes more effective at the margin to target resources 
towards the short-term unemployed than to target the long-term unemployed still further.
This appears to have been a problem with Working Nation in Australia, where an 
extensive redirection of policy towards the long-term unemployed was undermined 
by a consequent rise in the inflow into long-term unemployment. Furthermore, 
long-term unemployment generally falls even when subsidies are targeted exclusively 
on the short-term unemployed, because of the consequent fall in the inflow into 
long-term unemployment.
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With access to multiple policy instruments, there may be more effective alternatives 
to job subsidies for the short-term unemployed, such as job search assistance. But 
the clear policy implication is that, if there is a substantial commitment to active 
labour market policy, some resources should be reserved for the short-term 
unemployed.
1. Strictly, y/ is the subsidy per member of the pool o f job searchers, ie the pool o f unemployed 
after inflows have occurred but before any outflows have occurred.
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Technical Appendix
A) The unemployment rate
Conventionally, we solve for the unemployment rate, in steady state, by equating the 
flows into and out of each state. However, this approach leaves an ambiguity as to 
whether we should measure the unemployment rate before or after outflows have 
occurred. Rather than make an essentially arbitrary choice, we wish to extend this 
dichotomy into a continuous choice, allowing us more accurately to simulate what 
we actually measure in the unemployment statistics.
Consider the time-line for a single period in stationary equilibrium:
Inflow Matching O utflow
From the value functions (4.10) -  (4.12), we assume that workers flow into 
unemployment at the beginning of the period, and if matched, flow out at the end of 
the period. We suppose that the matching process takes place at some point within 
the period. If we measure unemployment immediately before workers flow out, ie at 
uQ> the flow equilibrium conditions are:
(4.A1) [XF{Sj) + S \ \ -u , )  = uso
(4.A 2)«so[l-%(0)] = G(ar)fy(0Ko
Giving:
(4A3) u
"° G (a ,)% (0 )+ [A F (£ , ) + ^ ] { l - ^ ( 0 )  +  G ( a r) ^ ( 0 ) }
Whereas, if we measure unemployment immediately after the outflow, at iq, the 
flow conditions are:
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(4.A4) [AF(£,)+<5](l-«,)[l-l%(0)] = «sl
(4.A5) «S1 [l -  G(a,)6q(8)) = G(a,)Oq(e)uLl
Giving:
1 G(«r) ^ )  + [AF(£,)+<y][l-^(0)]
In practice, however, when we measure unemployment, we capture some fraction of 
those of who will exit during the period, not all as in (4. A3) nor none as in (4. A6 ). 
Suppose that workers flow out of unemployment over some interval, At . We might 
then measure unemployment within that interval.
Inflow M atching O utflow
At
0 u I
The value functions for unemployment (4.11) and (4.12), and hence the job 
destruction condition (4.17) should now be treated as approximations, since the 
appropriate degree of discounting will vary slightly between workers.
Let ju be the proportion of the outflow remaining at the point where we measure 
unemployment, u. The flow equilibrium conditions are now given by:
(4.A7) [XF{ed ) +  -  u p  -  ( 1  -  =
(4.A8) [«s - /j8q(djlF(e1 ) + £>'](l- u)|l - ( 1  - iu)G(ar)9q(8)\ = G(a,
Which solve to give equation 4.21. In the limit as A /-»0, the value functions 
(4.1 0 ) and (4.1 1 ) will become exact provided r is finite. Moreover, in this limit there 
is no transition state between unemployment and employment.
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A fraction 1  -  // of those who will flow out during the period do so before we count
the unemployed, and thus are not counted, whilst the remainder, // , do so afterwards, 
and are thus counted as having a full period of unemployment. Hence, for the purposes 
of calculating u, this is equivalent to assuming that workers flow out across the 
entire period, with an average incremental duration equal to ( 1  -  fj).0 + y/.l = ju.
B) Targeting
Consider the impact of an increase in <j) , so that subsidies are targeted more heavily 
onto the long-term unemployed. Subsidies for the long-term unemployed, y/L, will 
tend to rise, whilst those for the short-term unemployed, y/ s , will tend to fall. If 
both subsidies are effective in reducing unemployment, we would expect to obtain 
offsetting effects. Formally, we have:
( 4  b i) du du dy/L [ du dy/s
d<j> dy/L d<f> dy/s d<f>
Differentiating (4.5), (4.17) and (4.18) and substituting into the differential of (4.21),
) +<?][G(ar ) ( 1  -  <j)AG(ar ^ ( l  -  v) + r6)1CD2 + ^ / 7y G '(a J [ l- 0 <y(0 )]]]
gives:
(4.B2)
B G(ar ) ( 1  -  cr\r+G(a, )]r/9)(l -  tj) + < +  nyG'(a, )[l -  <%(£)]
(4.B3)
-0-  = -A{[AF(ff, )+ S\[aAG(a, -  rj)-  rco1a>2] -  B(j[r + G(ar )]q(0)( 1 -  77)}
where:
A =
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A  = [r + S+AF(e, ) J l  -  6 0 ) +r+G(a, )<%(<?)]+0 O 0 \ r +G(a, )] > 0 
B  = A F '(s j  )G(a, )6^6)a1 [ l -  6g(6)+ G(a, )%(<?)] > 0
m  K g , - ^ X 1 + r ) . 0
1 [1 - e 0 ) + r + G { a r)Oq{e)}
„  (1 -  P) G \ a r )%(g)[l -  6 0 \ 0 j \  -1 7 ) . 0
0)2 (r + S+A) [l-e<0)+T + G(ar)60)]  >
{;={a ,-k  + y/s - y /L)-G(a,'far - E{a\fx < a r))>0
< r + ( l - a ) G ( a r) + £
D  =
d a
d a . (r + S + yI)
^ i[ r +G(ar) ] 0 ( \ - t ! ) +
0 (0 ) dO
>0
Note that strictly f>0 requires that y/L is not so great that ex ante firms would 
prefer to contact a long-term unemployed worker rather than a short-term 
unemployed one. Equally, D>0 implies a lower bound for Tf to prevent changes in (7 
from reducing the expected cost of hiring as the labour market tightens, because 
more of the unemployed are cheaper short-term unemployed. We impose both of 
these assumptions, which seem certain to hold for empirical estimates of 1) and 
realistic subsidy levels.
The first sets of terms in 4.B2 and 4.B3 are the outflow effects, and the second sets 
of terms (those in B) are the inflow effects. Targeting is only an interesting issue if 
both subsidies reduce unemployment, since otherwise we should always target the 
whole of the subsidy where it is effective, or have no subsidy at all if neither is 
effective. Hence, we can assume that the outflow effects dominate in the case we are 
interested in.
There are three effects on the outflow in 4.B2. The first is the direct effect of a 
reduced cost of hiring on labour demand — the availability of subsidies reduces the
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expected cost of opening vacancies, and hence more vacancies are opened. This 
effect is also present when subsidies are targeted on the short-term unemployed (ie 
4.B3). The second effect (r(o1co2) is the wage pressure effect. When subsidies are 
targeted on the long-term unemployed, the utility gain for the long-term unemployed 
is discounted relative to the utility cost for the short-term unemployed (from 
substitution), which tends to reduce wage pressure (see Chapter 2). This effect 
operates in reverse when subsidies are targeted on the short-term unemployed. The 
final effect arises because subsidising the long-term unemployed increases the 
probability that contact with a long-term unemployed worker will lead to hiring. 
The ‘employability’ of the long-term unemployed increases, which reduces the 
expected duration of all vacancies, hence lowering their cost.
We can broadly consider the first effect as the direct effect and the second and third 
as positive externalities to targeting the long-term unemployed. From 4.B2 and 
4.B3 we can see that an increase in y/L combined with a decrease in y/s in the same 
proportions as the long- and short-term unemployed’s share of the total 
unemployment outflow (ie G(ar)(l-a)dyrL = -crdy/ s ) would leave only these 
externality effects (and their corresponding effects on the inflow).
However, a change in the extent of targeting will also change the outflow rates of 
the short- and long-term unemployed, and hence the aggregate outflow rate. This, 
in turn, will alter the total cost of subsidies. Given a fixed total cost of subsidies (per 
unemployed worker here), any increase in outflows will imply a corresponding 
reduction in the level of subsidy per hire. Since it is the (expected) level of subsidy 
per hire that firms respond to, this introduces an offsetting effect. As the outflow 
rate of a group rises, so the cost of increasing the subsidy to that group also rises and 
hence there are diminishing returns.
Let as -0q{0), the outflow rate from short-term  unemployment, and 
aL =G(ar)$q{$), the outflow rate from long-term unemployment. From (4.31) 
and (4.32) we have:
(4.B4)
G{ar\  1- ct) *Vl _ d<f>
dw. 1 I da. . daT r da
= W ) r a ^ + 'Wl{ <T)^ f + W i ,<v_l
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Where the term in parentheses is the marginal cost of subsidising the additional 
outflow arising from a change in targeting. Finally, combining (4.B1) to (4.B4), we 
obtain:
du -1
d(f> [(l-0)aas +<Kl-cr)aL]
[XF{ed) + S\ra)^)2 +ArjyG'(ar)9q{0)[l-<%(<9)]]
(4.B5)
A y/,
-B vrG'<,arW e\  i -  W ]
+
du du
¥s-rr—+¥L dy/
Where the first term is the net effect of the externalities and the second term is the
marginal loss in subsidy per head multiplied by the unemployment impact of a
reduction in subsidy. If we assume that the outflow effect dominates the inflow
effect, then the net externality effect tends to reduce unemployment as we target
subsidies increasingly onto the long-term unemployed. However, we are assuming
that bo th  and   are negative. Hence, at high levels of (f>, the externalities
dy/s dy/ L
can be offset by the reduction in subsidy per head required to finance further targeting.
What we can show is that, provided:
i) outflow effects dominate inflow effects; and
ii) shifting subsidies towards the long-term unemployed increases their outflow 
rate, a j
then it is always optimal to target subsidies more onto the long-term unemployed
than the short-term unemployed. Suppose this were not the case, so that —  > 0
d<f>
for some (f> < y2. If outflow effects dominate, then an increase in unemployment 
with increasing (j) implies a decrease in the aggregate outflow rate cras + (1 -  c)uL. 
Hence, we would have:
du & /. \ du j / \ d& A
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From (4.20) and (4.21), it follows that if the aggregate outflow rate is falling, leading
to an increase in unemployment, must be negative. Since, by definition, as > aL,
d<j>
and by assumption, 1 -  0 0, it follows that:
In which case, from (4.B5), we would have —  < 0 contradicting our initial
dtp
assumption. Hence at least some preference for subsidising the long-term unemployed 
is always optimal.
C) Taxation
We extend the model here to include a proportional wage tax, r , used to finance 
both the subsidy and benefit payments. Taxes do not affect the job creation condition, 
(4.5) nor the reservation training cost condition (4.18), in line with the neutrality of 
taxes in the previous chapter. However, they do affect the job destruction condition. 
If we let zu(£) be the post-tax wage, then the value functions for firms and workers 
of filled jobs become:
(4.9') r/(f) = p + e - u ie t l  + r) + ^ J ' J { x)dF{x)-J(e) S J ( e )
(4.10') rW(£) = ^ e )  + ^ y { x)dF{x)+F{£ jp „ - W { s ) L ^ U ^ - W { s ) ]
The value functions for unemployment will not be affected, since we assume that 
unemployment benefit is untaxed. Hence, adding up the value functions will give:
(4.13’) (r + d+X)S(e) = p + £ -v ie )T  + ^ \ euS{x)dF{x)-rU^Jej
The presence of taxes will also affect the sharing rule arising from Nash bargaining. 
An increase in the worker’s return will now impose an additional cost on both parties 
by increasing the share of total surplus that goes in tax. Hence, the worker’s share 
will be lower the greater is the tax rate. In particular, Nash bargaining will yield a 
solution of the form:
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and hence:
(4.7
(4 .8 ')  / ( g )  = (1
w  l+ ( \ - f S ) T
We can then substitute (4.8') into (4.9') to give:
(4.C2) vie) = (r + S +X^ ~ P \ (e )+ -X^ z i )  ?’s(x)dF(x)
^  '  1 + r l + (l-/?)r  ^ ’ l+(l-/?)rJ«. w  w
which we can substitute in turn into (4.13') to give:
(4.C3) (-r- +-S + '^  S(g) = £ t f +— J : ^ ^ ( ‘’s(x)dF(x)-rUST 
1+(1 - 0 ) r  v ' 1 + r  l+ (l-y 3 )r" . w  v u
Hence, we have:
l+(l-/3)r5 ' ( g )  =
(1 + r)(r + <5 + A)
and thus:
(r+S + X) . . p + £ X r ✓ -.n ----- -—5(f) = - b + -----------—-----   I [l — F{xS\dx
l  + ( l- /? )r  1 + r (r + S + A)(l + t) ^  K n
(4 15')
l% ( f l[ r  + C (ar)]S(g.)
l-0y(0) + r + G(ar)<%(<9)
Which, together with the condition that 5(f ^ ) = 0 gives:
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(4.16') S(e) = S (s)-S (e ,) =
(g-g ,)[l+(l->3)r] 
(1 + r  )(r + 8 + X)
and:
£/l . \ . W 6’)[r + G(a r )](«. “  £J I 1 + (! -  P )T\p  £ j  — ^ ( 1 + r H - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - p- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ; ---- -- - - - - - - - -
(4 .17') ( r + < ? + l ) [ l - ^ ( 0 ) + r  + G (a r )%(0)]
1
r + S + yI
J *[l — F{x)\dx
Which is the new job destruction condition. Note that an increase in the tax rate 
increases the job destruction rate, because taxes reduce the surplus available from 
filled jobs, making them less valuable to the firm and the worker, and hence more 
prone to destruction.
We can then obtain the new wage equation by substituting (4.15') into (4.C2) to give:
^ g ) [ r  + G (a,)](e.- e d)
i  +
(;r+S + 2)[l -  6 0 )  + r + G(ar )& 0 j\
Finally, to close the model, we need to impose a balanced budget condition. From 
the value functions (4.11) and (4.12), we can see that all those who become 
unemployed, even if they flow out again in the same period, receive benefits. Hence, 
total benefit payments per period are bua where uQ is given by (4. A3). Similarly, we 
assume in (4.30) that y? is the subsidy per person searching, so that the total cost of 
subsidies per period is y/u0. The balanced budget condition is then given by:
(4.C4) w r(l~uQ) = {b + lp)uQ
Where the mean wage, w , is given by equations (4.24') and (4.25). Hence the 
model is determined by the original job creation and reservation training cost 
conditions, (4.5) and (4.18), together with the new job destruction condition (4.17'), 
the wage equations (4.24') and (4.25), the balanced budget constraint (4.C4) and 
the Beveridge curve (4.A3). As before, we can address the problem of the appropriate 
point to measure unemployment using equation (4.21) and an appropriate choice of fj. .
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Figure 4.2a
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Figure 4.3a
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Figure 4.4
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Figure 4.6
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Figure 4.8
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Figure 4 .10
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Figure 4 .12
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Figure 4 .14
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Figure 4 .16
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Figure 4.20
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5. Do Wage Subsidies Enhance Employability? 
Evidence from Australian Youth
We examine a panel of unemployed Australian youth to investigate whether 
participation in a wage subsidy programme offers merely a temporary respite 
from unemployment, or whether there are longer-lasting positive employability 
effects. Controlling for selection bias using a bivariate probit analysis, we 
estimate the effect of participation in the SpecialYouth Employment Training 
Program on the probability of being employed in subsequent waves of the 
data, up to an average of 26 months after subsidy expiry. We find that far 
from breaking up when support expires, subsidies extend short duration jobs. 
Furthermore, we find  large and significant effects of participation on 
subsequent employability. Much of this arises from retention of subsidised 
jobs, but even excluding this we find evidence of longer-term positive effects.
5.1 Introduction
Most of the existing empirical literature on the effects of wage subsidies has focused 
on short-term effects -  whether eligibility for subsidies increases the individual’s 
probability of getting a job, and, if so, to what extent this is at the expense of other 
job-seekers. However, it is increasingly being argued, in both policy and academic 
circles, that the main effect of wage subsidies is to enhance the longer-term prospects 
of participants. The claim is that subsidised workers will not merely enjoy a brief 
period of employment, but a permanent increase in their employability. Layard, for 
example, states that‘the main justification for [a wage subsidy] is not that it employs 
people on a subsidised basis, but that, by doing so, it restores them to the universe of 
employable people. This is an investment in human capital.’ (1997, p. 336).
This claim is almost completely untested. Few studies have tracked participants 
even until subsidy expiry, and those that have have often suffered from selection 
bias: those who go on the programme are not a random sample of the eligible 
population. Any difference in outcomes between participants and non-participants 
may simply reflect pre-existing, but unobserved, differences between the two groups.
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We use a sample of unemployed Australian youth to examine the impact of 
participation in a subsidy programme, the Special Youth Employment Training 
Program (SYETP), for slightly over two years after subsidy expiry. By using bivariate 
probit analysis, we are able to control for selection bias. We find evidence of large 
and significant positive impacts on the probability of being employed in subsequent 
years. Much of this effect seems to stem from retention of jobs after subsidy expiry, 
contradicting the concern that firms will simply lay off participants as soon as the 
subsidy finishes. We find very little evidence of such lay offs. Instead subsidies appear 
to extend the duration of jobs that would otherwise have lasted for less time than 
the subsidy. We also find some evidence that participation helps workers to obtain 
other jobs, not merely to retain their initially subsidised positions.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing 
evidence on the long-term effects of wage subsidies. Section 3 looks at the SYETP 
and the potential sources of selection bias. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 
sets out the methodology that we adopt to estimate the employability effects of 
wage subsidy participation. Results are presented in Section 6, whilst Section 7 
concludes.
5.2 Long-term Effects ofWage Subsidies
Long-term unemployed workers may lose skills, become demotivated, or suffer 
discrimination from potential employers. This will reduce their chances of getting a 
job, and hence the outflow rate of the long-term unemployed, but it may also lead to 
an increase in overall unemployment. If the economy is hit by a shock and long­
term unemployment rises, then, on average, unemployed workers become less 
attractive to employers. Firms then find it harder to find suitable workers, increasing 
the cost of hiring and leading them to offer fewer vacancies. This, in turn, can 
perpetuate the high long-term unemployment and consequent loss of skills or 
motivation, locking in the higher rate of unemployment (Pissarides, 1992).
At the same time, workers with poor or outdated skills are disproportionately likely 
to become long-term unemployed. If unemployed workers are credit-constrained 
they may find it hard to update their skills, whilst at the same time they are denied 
the opportunity of learning on the job. Higher mismatch between the skills demanded
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by employers and those available in the pool of unemployed workers will also lead to 
higher aggregate unemployment.
But if skill atrophy or other negative employability effects arise from a period of 
unemployment, then they may be reversed by a period of employment. Hence even 
a temporary subsidy may have permanent effects, both for the individual worker, 
who may be retained or who will find it easier to obtain a subsequent job, and 
potentially for the aggregate unemployment level. If active labour market policies 
lead firms to hire and train workers with poor skills, then mismatch may be reduced, 
shifting the Beveridge curve inwards and reducing aggregate unemployment 
(Calmfors, 1994).
These effects are potentially far more important than the short-term impact on 
labour demand. Subsidies could bring about a considerably larger reduction in 
unemployment than that measured simply by taking the number of people placed 
and netting off those who would have been hired anyway (deadweight) or who were 
hired at the expense of other workers (substitution and displacement). Furthermore, 
the fiscal cost-benefit analysis would be transformed if subsidised workers were not 
merely removed from unemployment for a temporary spell, but were less likely to 
claim unemployment benefits in future years. If positive effects were long-lasting, 
and especially if they were permanent, then the case for concentrating on younger 
workers, as in the UK’s New Deal, would be stronger, since their lifetime gains 
would be greater.
However, little is known about the subsequent employment histories of those who 
go on wage subsidy programmes. This is despite the existence of a substantial literature 
tracking participants in training and job search assistance programmes (see for 
example, Lalonde, 1995; US Department of Labor, 1995; Friedlander and Burtless, 
1995). Furthermore, where these studies have increasingly made use of either random 
assignment or statistical methods to control for selection bias, the same is not true 
for studies of wage subsidy participants.
Most studies of wage subsidies have surveyed employers currently using the subsidy, 
and therefore provide little or no evidence on post-subsidy experience. Breen and 
Halpin (1989) re-surveyed a sample of employers who had hired workers under the
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Irish government’s Employment Incentive Scheme (EIS), an average of 8 months 
after subsidy expiry. They found that 54% of EIS employees remained with the firm, 
whilst in a further 11% of cases the job, but not the specific worker, remained. 
However, they provide no counterfactual to compare these figures against. RSGB 
(1996) surveyed participants in the UK Workstart pilot projects, which provided a 
12 month subsidy to firms hiring workers who had been unemployed for at least 2 
years. They found that 40% were still with their Workstart employer 3 months after 
the subsidy expired, and a further 15% were employed elsewhere. Only 35% had 
returned to claiming unemployment benefit (a further 4% were unemployed but not 
claiming). Again no counterfactual is provided but the findings do compare favourably 
with the 51.8% of all unemployed workers exiting to employment who re-claim 
unemployment benefit within 12 months (Sweeney, 1996).
Stretton (1984) compares employment outcomes six months after the end of the 
programme for participants in five Australian active labour market programmes, 
including the SYETP. Hence the counterfactual is the outcome for participants in 
other programmes, rather than those who received no intervention. He finds that 
those who took part in wage subsidy programmes were significantly more likely to 
have been employed at the time of the survey, or to have had any full-time job since 
the end of the programme, than those who went on a training programme. However, 
this finding is likely to be heavily affected by selection bias. Wage subsidies require 
the involvement of employers, who are likely to seek to cream off the best available 
candidates, whereas training programmes can be expanded administratively, and 
may be used for those for whom a subsidised job could not be found. In this case, 
Stretton’s results may reflect more on the different make-up of the participants than 
on the relative effectiveness of the programmes1.
A more recent Australian evaluation, DEETYA (1997), uses administrative data on 
all participants in Jobstart, which replaced the SYETP. These were then compared 
against a matched control group. Three months after the subsidy expired, 50% of 
Jobstart participants were in unsubsidised work, compared with 22% of non­
participants, suggesting a substantial impact of participation on short-term 
employment prospects. After 12 months the effect was smaller, mainly due to ‘catch­
up’ by the controls, but still positive. However, the use of such matched control 
groups may give seriously misleading results if there are important unobserved
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characteristics of the treatment group which are not controlled for in matching. If, 
for example, more motivated workers were more likely to take advantage of wage 
subsidies, and to be hired once eligible, then the programme effect would be over­
estimated. Alternatively, if employment service staff sought to target programmes 
on more disadvantaged workers, then the estimated effect would understate the 
true impact.
The overall picture presented by these few studies is positive. The studies do suggest 
that an excessive concern with churning -  that employers will simply lay off workers 
when subsidies expire -  is misplaced. Retention rates are generally high. RSGB 
(1996) found that among Workstart participants who survived until subsidy expiry, 
77% were still with their employer three months later. Where workers are laid off it 
appears to occur before subsidy expiry, presumably due to poor matches. Up to a 
year after subsidy expiry, programme participants appear to enjoy an advantage in 
their employment prospects. But all these studies are open to considerable criticism. 
In particular, they are all prone to potentially severe problems of selection bias. In 
addition, they only look at a relatively short post-subsidy period.
Two studies of US programmes avoid both these problems. They use random 
assignment to avoid the problem of selection bias, and by making use of administrative 
data are able to track participants over a much longer time period than either previous 
studies or, indeed, this study. However, the programmes they examine involved 
substantial elements of training and support in addition to subsidies, so that it is 
impossible to separate out the effect of subsidised employment alone. The use of 
administrative records also restricts their focus to earnings, rather than employment, 
which is our principal concern here. Both studies, however, reinforce the generally 
positive findings previously covered.
The National Supported Work Demonstration (Hollister et al, 1984) provided a 
highly structured environment over 12-18 months of subsidised employment. For 
women on Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, then the main benefit 
for single parents in the US), earnings gains were sustained for at least 8 years after 
participation (Couch, 1992). However, there were no positive effects for other target 
groups. A similar, but less intensive, approach was adopted in the Homemaker- 
Home Health Aide Demonstrations (Bell and Orr, 1994). These provided specific
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training and support to lone mothers on AFDC, as well as subsidised employment, 
and again led to significant increases in earnings, for at least 5 years after the 
programme (US Department of Labor, 1995).
5.3 The Special Youth Employment Training Program
The Special Youth Employment Training Program was introduced in September 
1976, following a rapid rise in teenage unemployment in the mid-1970s. This, together 
with the earlier failure of a large scale direct job creation programme (the Regional 
Employment Development Scheme, REDS), led the government to introduce what 
was Australia’s first wage subsidy (Chapman, 1985). The SYETP continued until it 
was superseded in December 1985 by Jobstart, a wage subsidy for both youth and 
adults, which has continued until the present.
The SYETP was initially targeted at teenagers, unemployed for four months or 
more. Subsequently it was extended to cover 15-24 year olds. There was no 
requirement that jobs be ‘additional’, nor that the firm retain the worker after the 
subsidy period (Stretton and Chapman, 1990). Despite the scheme’s name, there 
was little emphasis on training (Scherer, 1985).
Subsidies were paid at a flat rate, so that they were proportionately greater for low 
wage workers. In 1984, the main part of the scheme (‘Standard SYETP’) offered 
employers a subsidy of A$75 per week for 17 weeks, about half of average teenage 
wages (Smith, 1984). Standard SYETP was targeted on 15-24 year olds who had 
been unemployed and not in full-time education for at least 4 of the preceding 12 
months. There were two other smaller components. Commonwealth SYETP fully 
reimbursed agencies of the Commonwealth government for the costs of employing 
eligible participants for 17 weeks. Extended SYETP offered a subsidy of A$100 for 
17 weeks, and A$75 for a further 17 weeks to employers taking on 18-24 year olds 
who had been unemployed for at least 8 of the preceding 12 months. In practice, 
however, participants in both Standard and Extended SYETP often had much longer 
durations than those required for eligibility (Smith, 1985).
In order to obtain the subsidy, employers had to register their vacancies with the 
Commonwealth Employment Service (CES), and accept workers referred by the
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CES (Department of Employment and Youth Affairs, 1982). Employers had to 
agree a ‘training plan’ with the CES for the individual worker, although in practice 
such plans could simply cover normal orientation (Smith, 1983). In 1979 the 
government issued guidelines that employers were expected to take people below 
their normal hiring standards in order to qualify (Chapman, 1985), although these 
were withdrawn in 1982.
Selection
Selection onto the SYETP required both referral by the Employment Service and 
acceptance by the employer. Either, or both, of these could have led to systematic, 
but unobserved, differences between those who went on the programme and those 
who did not. Failure to control for these differences would lead to biased estimates 
of the programme effect. For example, if employers creamed the best workers, then 
selection biases would lead to an overestimate of the effectiveness of SYETP. 
Conversely, if the Employment Service referred more disadvantaged workers, as 
they were required to between 1979 and 1982, then this would lead to a downward 
bias, and an underestimate of the programme effect.
In addition, individuals who were more likely to get employment anyway may have 
acted in such a way as to increase or decrease their chances of being referred. For 
example, if participation on SYETP was seen as advantageous, then more motivated, 
or better informed, individuals might have lobbied CES staff to refer them. 
Alternatively, if subsidised employment was seen as ‘second best’ then more 
employable people might have tried to avoid being referred, knowing that their 
chances of obtaining a regular job were high anyway.
A priori we cannot say which way these biases will work. However, assuming that 
participants were randomly drawn is unlikely to be satisfactory. Instead we need to 
control for the process by which unemployed youth, who were in the SYETP target 
group, were selected onto the programme. This can be done by estimating bivariate 
probits of the joint probability that an individual was both selected onto SYETP, 
and subsequently employed. We set out this methodology in Section 5 below. First 
we consider the data that we use.
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5.4 The Data
Our sample is drawn from the list sample of the Australian Longitudinal Survey 
(ALS). The ALS contains two distinct datasets. The ALS ‘area sample’ consists of 
8,995 youths, aged 15-26 in 1985, and is nationally representative of all Australian 
youths in 1985. Four waves were carried out by interview between 1985 and 1988 
(subsequent waves were carried out using postal questionnaires, with a consequent 
sharp fall in response rates). The ALS ‘list sample’, which we use, is drawn from the 
records of the Commonwealth Employment Service and is a nationally representative 
sample of Australian youth, aged 15-24 on 1 September 1984, who had been 
registered as unemployed with the CES for at least 3 months in June 1984 (McRae 
et aly 1984-1987). The sample frame coincides almost exactly with the eligibility 
criteria for the SYETP. The sample were initially interviewed in September or 
October of 1984, and then re-interviewed annually until 1987, so that 4 waves of 
data are available. The ALS list sample was specifically designed to examine questions 
around long-term unemployment, and contains a wide range of individual and family 
background characteristics.
More details on the ALS can be found in the papers collected in Gregory and 
Karmel (1992), in particular Chapman and Smith (1992) and Junankar and Wood 
(1992) in this context. James (1989) finds negative duration dependence of 
unemployment using the ALS area sample in contrast to Chapman and Smith (1992), 
whilst Trevedi and Alexander (1989) find evidence of scarring in the list sample: 
duration of previous unemployment spells lowers the reemployment probability.
In each wave, respondents were asked to fill in a weekly job calendar for the period 
starting a week after the previous interview and finishing in the week of the current 
interview (the ‘reference period’). The 1984 reference period started on 1 January 
1984, or the week in which they entered the labour force if later. Subsequent reference 
periods typically started in September or October and ran until the following 
September or October.
The initial sample consisted of2403 individuals. Of these, we excluded those who 
were over 25 at the first interview (ineligible for SYETP), who entered full-time 
education at any point, or who did not provide a full set of responses for at least the
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first three waves. This left us with 1283 individuals whose employment status in the 
1986 reference period could be established (the ‘1986 sample’). Table 5.1 gives some 
summary statistics for the 1986 sample. Of these, 1084 survive into the 1987 wave, 
and make up the ‘1987 sample’. Table 5.2 contains summary data for them.
The treatment group consists of all those who went on the SYETP between 3 June 
1984 and their 1985 interview. Although this means that there were quite considerable 
differences in the elapsed time since programme participation between treatment 
group members, we had to use such a long period to obtain a large enough treatment 
group. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of programme start times for treatment 
group members. Roughly half entered the programme in 1984 and half in 1985, 
with the mean start week beginning 13 January 1985.
The overall picture given by Tables 5.1 and 5.2 is unsurprising for a sample of 
unemployed youths. There were more males than females. Levels of human capital 
were relatively low, with over 10% having less than year 10, the school leaving age. 
More than half had never held a job for more than 1 year, and they spent an average 
of over 60% of the period from 1 January 1984 (or when they first entered the labour 
force if later) until 3 June 1984 in unemployment.
The observed characteristics of those lost through attrition are broadly similar to 
those of the sample. In particular the characteristics of the 1986 and 1987 samples 
are virtually identical. Those who are dropped from both samples were somewhat 
more likely to have less than year 10 education, but were more likely to have held a 
job for at least 1 year, and less likely never to have had a job. On the basis of observable 
characteristics attrition biases appear to be only a minor problem.
However, if unobserved characteristics vary systematically between those lost through 
attrition and those remaining, our sample may no longer be representative. Van den 
Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) examine the relationship between duration of 
employment or unemployment and duration within the panel, using Dutch data. 
They find that the duration of survey participation is independent of unemployment 
duration, but that there is a negative relation between job duration and survey duration. 
If this result generalises, then we maybe under-representing those with a propensity to 
short job durations, and this should be bome in mind in interpreting the results.
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More striking is the contrast between those who went on SYETP and the control 
group. On average, SYETP participants were less likely to have any post-school 
qualification (17.3% versus 27.9%) and correspondingly more likely to have year 11 
or 12 as their highest qualification. In addition they were less likely to have had any 
job for 3 years or more, but more likely to have had a job of less than 1 year as their 
longest. SYETP participants were an average of one year younger, which may partly 
explain their poorer labour market experience. They spent slightly more of the pre- 
June period unemployed.
The summary statistics suggest that SYETP participants were younger and more 
disadvantaged than non-participants, which would be in line with the apparent 
targeting of the programme. The most disadvantaged, though, those with below 
year 10 education or who had never held a job, do not appear to be over-represented 
on the programme, perhaps because employers were unwilling to hire them even 
with a subsidy. Yet despite their generally poorer characteristics, SYETP participants 
were nearly 14 percentage points more likely to have been employed at some time in 
1986 than non-participants. By 1987, with the economy growing, this difference 
had fallen to around 5 percentage points, but was still positive.
These findings are reinforced if we examine the durations of SYETP jobs compared 
with those of other jobs. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of lengths of all regular 
jobs held after 3 June 19842, whilst Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of subsidised 
jobs. Since this includes all subsidised jobs in the four waves, some may have been 
obtained through Jobstart as well as through the SYETP. At this time Jobstart was 
available for 26 weeks. Two features are notable in these diagrams. Firstly, there is 
little or no evidence in Figure 5.3 of a peak in job durations at the length of the 
subsidy. There is a slight peak at 17 weeks (though none at 26 weeks), but certainly 
no evidence of widespread lay offs on subsidy expiry.
More noticeable though is the difference in the distributions between Figures 5.2 
and 5.3. SYETP jobs are clearly less likely to be very short, with markedly lower 
densities below 13 weeks, and correspondingly higher densities between 13 and 33 
weeks. The average length of SYETP jobs is 46.0 weeks, compared to 37.1 weeks 
for regular jobs. However, the averages for SYETP and regular jobs that last more 
than 13 weeks are 58.8 and 58.5 weeks respectively. From the raw data, the effect of
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SYETP appears to be to extend very short duration jobs somewhat, perhaps up to 
the duration of the subsidy
However, these plots will be affected by a number of biases. Any one person can 
have more short duration jobs over some given period than long duration jobs. Hence 
short duration jobs are ‘over-represented’. The same effect could apply to SYETP 
jobs, since a short SYETP spell would not affect the individual’s entitlement to go 
on the programme again. But it seems unlikely that the CES would continuously 
place the same individual into a series of short duration SYETP jobs, and we observe 
very few people going on SYETP more than once in any wave of the data.
Since we only have data until the 1987 interview, any jobs still held then will be 
right censored. Aggregate unemployment was falling over this period, so that we 
would expect a larger proportion of unsubsidised jobs to start towards the end of the 
period, whilst more of the subsidised jobs start towards the beginning of the period, 
when unemployment was higher. In Figure 5.4, we plot the distribution of all jobs that 
started immediately after a period of unemployment. This will compensate somewhat 
for right censoring bias, and also for the possibility that entry jobs are less stable, or less 
desirable, than subsequent jobs. The comparison with SYETP positions is even more 
marked here. Fully 40% of entry jobs last for less than 13 weeks, whereas fewer than 25% 
of SYETP jobs end by then. Again the effect of SYETP appears to be in extending 
otherwise very short duration jobs, rather than on the distribution at higher durations.
Figures 5.2-5.4 take no account of differences between participants and non­
participants. We can control for this by looking at before-and-after experiences of 
SYETP participants. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the length of unemployment spells 
before going on SYETP and after participation, again including any subsidy 
participation in the sample period after 3 June 1984, and not just those counted as 
the treatment group. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the equivalent for employment spells 
(ie periods of continuous employment, which might include job-to-job switches). The 
pattern is clear: periods of unemployment are shorter, and periods of employment are 
longer, after going on SYETP.
Of course, we still have the problems of censoring and exogenous changes in the 
economic climate. Pre-SYETP periods are inevitably earlier, on average, than post-
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SYETP periods, so that Figures 5.5-5.8 may simply reflect improvements in the 
macroeconomy. At the same time, most SYETP spells are earlier in the period, so that 
left censoring will tend to shorten pre-SYETP spells (spells starting before 3 June 1984 
are excluded). This undermines the apparent increase in duration of post-SYETP 
employment spells, but strengthens the finding that post-SYETP unemployment spells 
are shorter. Right censoring leads to the opposite bias: post-SYETP spells will be 
shortened by right censoring, strengthening the apparent effect on the duration of 
employment spells post-SYETP, but weakening the findings for unemployment spells.
The overall picture from the data is highly supportive of a positive employability 
effect from SYETP. Subsidised jobs last longer than unsubsidised jobs, mainly because 
of a substantially lower probability of jobs terminating within the first quarter. There 
is at most weak evidence of a concentration of lay offs at the time of subsidy expiry, 
with two-thirds of participants retaining their subsidised job beyond 17 weeks3. 
Furthermore, unemployment spells are shorter, and employment spells are longer, 
after participating. Nonetheless, these findings may be affected by biases arising 
from differences between participants and non-participants, censoring, or changes 
in the economic environment.
5.5 Modelling Employability
We want to determine what happens to subsidised workers beyond the subsidy period. 
In particular, do they obtain a lasting improvement in their employability? We can 
control for biases arising from changes in the economy, and from censoring, by 
considering individual outcomes over the same time period. We can control for 
individual differences by including a wide range of background data available to us 
in the ALS. In addition, we can control for selection biases by using a bivariate 
probit, giving us an unbiased estimate of the effect of SYETP participation on 
subsequent employability.
Employability, of course, is not observed. What we observe instead is employment. 
Nor is there a precise definition o f‘employability’, despite the growing use of the 
term. We do not propose to enter the debate as to what exactly is meant by 
employability. Instead, we shall assume that there is a simple mapping between an 
individual’s underlying, but unobserved, employability and the employment outcome
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which we observe. We assume that employability is a latent variable, y  *, such that:
(5.1) y* = adi +p'xi +£,
where di is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the person goes on the wage 
subsidy programme, and 0 otherwise; xi is a vector of individual characteristics; and 
E t is a disturbance or error term. We observe employment, y, where y=l if the person 
is employed in some period, and y=0 otherwise. If y = 1 wheny* > 0 andy = 0 
otherwise, then provided £• is distributed as a standard normal, we can estimate
(5.1) using standard probit estimation.
The selection problem arises because programme participants are not randomly 
selected from the population. In particular, suppose that the likelihood of being 
selected onto the programme is represented by d *, which is determined by:
(5.2) d *  = y'z. + v ; such that: d. = 1 if d *  > 0 and d. = 0 otherwise.
where zt is a vector of individual characteristics and Vi is an error term. Provided Vi
is distributed as a standard normal, we could again estimate (5.2) by a univariate 
probit. However, if there are unobserved characteristics which affect both selection 
onto the programme and subsequent employability then ei and V ■ will be correlated 
and univariate probit estimates will be biased.
Using a technique originating with Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981), we can address 
this problem by estimating a bivariate probit of the joint probabilities of selection 
and employment of the form:
y i* = adi +p'x.+ei
(5.3) d*  = y'zi + v i where: E{eiy^) = p
Prob (y.t = \ d i = l)  = <&2(adi +p'x i,y'zi)p)
Where 0 2 is the cumulative distribution function for the standard bivariate normal. 
This is essentially an extension of the well-known Heckman (1979) two-stage
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procedure, where the second stage here also has a discrete dependent variable. This 
approach has been applied to a number of economic problems which suffer from 
selection bias. In particular, O’Higgins (1994) uses it to examine the effect of 
participation in the UK Youth Training Scheme on subsequent employment, whilst 
Zweimuller and Winter-Ebmer (1996) use it to look at the effect of Austrian training 
programmes on employment stability. Both find that selection bias is important in 
their studies, with those who would otherwise be less likely to be employed tending 
to be selected onto these programmes.
Duration analysis
An obvious alternative to using a bivariate probit methodology would have been to 
use a hazard function approach, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, along the 
lines of Gritz (1993), Thomas (1998) and Cockx, van der Linden and Karaa (1998). 
This would have advantages in handling censoring and attrition, provided we were 
prepared to assume that the process driving attrition was independent of that driving 
transitions between states (van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder, 1994). Duration 
methods would allow a more sophisticated treatment of multiple unemployment 
spells and the potential for scarring effects (Trivedi and Alexander, 1989). However, 
we do control for the duration of unemployment, and the longest previous job tenure, 
prior to 3 June 1984, which will control for general pre-SYETP scarring effects. 
Clearly, any impact of multiple spells post-SYETP participation are part of the 
effect we are estimating: one intention of such policies is precisely to reduce scarring 
effects of the type investigated byTrevedi and Alexander (1989).
In addition, duration models allow selection to be modelled without requiring 
parametric or ad hoc exclusion restrictions: Gritz (1993) and Thomas (1998) both 
use a discrete distribution of individual types with a finite number of mass points, 
the location and density of which are estimated parameters. However, the appropriate 
number of individual types cannot be formally tested, requiring the use of informal 
approaches (Gritz, 1993). Furthermore, a log-logistic baseline hazard of the type 
used by both Gritz (1993) and Thomas (1993) would not accommodate any possible 
spike in exits from SYETP jobs when the subsidy expired. The alternatives of fully 
flexible or piecewise constant baselines would have been considerably more demanding 
on a dataset with relatively few observations of SYETP participation. We considered 
carefully using an approach similar to that of Gritz (1993), but in the end concluded
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that limitations arising from the small number of observations of SYETP would require 
us to invoke parametric assumptions possibly as restrictive as those implied by a bivariate 
probit approach, and could lead to considerable computational difficulties4.
The dependent variables
For the selection equations, the dependent variable is whether the person went onto 
the SYETP at any time between 3 June 1984 and the end of the 1985 reference 
period. For the 1986 sample, the dependent variable for the employment equation is 
whether the person held any regular, unsubsidised, job during the 1986 reference 
period, but excluding the first 17 weeks. Retained jobs that were previously subsidised 
in 1984/85 are included, but any subsequent SYETP/Jobstart jobs are excluded. 
Jobs obtained through other government programmes are also excluded. We exclude 
the first 17 weeks after the 1985 interview, since anyone entering SYETP in the 
week of their 1985 interview would still be being subsidised for those 17 weeks. 
Hence the relevant period starts four months later, at the end of January 1986.
In principle, some of our treatment group might have gone onto Extended SYETP, 
in which case they would be subsidised for up to 34 weeks. Unfortunately, we cannot 
distinguish between the two types of SYETP in our data. Of the treatment group, 
23 people started their subsidy in the last 17 weeks of the 1985 reference period, and 
hence might still have been on Extended SYETP 18 or more weeks into their 1986 
reference period. However, of these, 21 were either ineligible for Extended SYETP 
or had already lost their subsidised job before the 17 week cut-off period. Both the 
remaining people were employed for the entire 1986 reference period, and hence 
were clearly employed after subsidies had expired. Therefore, we believe that we can 
safely ignore any problems arising from Extended SYETP.
For the 1987 sample, our dependent variable in the employment equation is whether 
the person held any unsubsidised job, excluding those obtained through another 
government programme, at any time in the 1987 reference period (October 1986 -  
September 1987). Again we include any previously subsidised jobs retained from 
1984/85, but exclude any obtained with subsequent subsidies, even if they are retained 
beyond the subsidy period. Thus we are looking at the effect on subsequent regular 
employment, and not simply any propensity for participants to cycle between 
government programmes and periods of unemployment.
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On average, for the 1986 sample, we look at employment in the period starting 1 
year after participants entered SYETP (8 months after subsidy expiry), and ending 
17 months after programme entry. The 1987 reference period starts 18 months after 
entry, and ends 30 months after entry (26 months after expiry).
Identification
Our model is identified provided there is at least one variable in zi which is not in xi 
(Maddala, 1983). Hence, we need at least one variable which affected the probability 
of selection, but not the subsequent probability of being employed. Selection onto 
SYETP required both that the individual was hired by an employer, and that they 
were referred by the employment service. Any variables that affected the employers 
decision are also likely to have affected subsequent employment prospects, and should 
be in both the selection and the employment equations.
To identify the model, therefore, we need a variable that affected the individuals 
probability of being referred by the CES. We only observe SYETP referrals if they 
lead to employment, but we do observe how many times an individual was referred, 
in 1984, to another programme, the Community Employment Programme (CEP), 
whether or not they went on the CEP. If employment service staff pushed the same 
individuals towards a range of available programmes, then we would expect this to 
be correlated with selection onto the SYTTP. Given an element of discretion in the 
referral decisions of employment service staff, and that we control in the employment 
equation for whether the person actually went on the CEP, it seems reasonable to 
assume that referrals onto the CEP would not affect subsequent employment 
prospects.
However, if employment staff pushed those who went onto the SYETP, but returned 
to unemployment, onto the CEP, then the CEP referrals variable might be 
endogenous. We minimise the risk of this by using only CEP referrals in 1984. For 
endogeneity to arise would require that an individual went on SYETP after 3 June 
1984, returned to unemployment, and was then referred to the CEP, before the end 
of their 1984 reference period (in September or October 1984). Since the CEP was 
targeted at the long-term unemployed (Stretton and Chapman, 1990), and those 
re-entering unemployment after going on SYTTP would be short-term unemployed, 
there should be no possibility of this having happened. In addition, only four people
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started on SYETP after 3 June 1984 and returned to unemployment before the end 
of the 1984 reference period, two of whom were never referred to the CEP. Hence 
we do not consider that endogeneity of the CEP referral variable is likely to be a 
problem.
Furthermore, our model is also identified in two other ways. Formally, the model 
will always be identified, since time varying characteristics, such as human capital 
and marital status, are 1984 dated in the selection equation, but 1985 or 1986 dated 
in the employment equations. Presumably because of the age group of the sample, 
there is considerable variation in a number of personal characteristics, even over 
such a relatively short time period. Since the model will remain identified, formally 
at least, if the employment and selection equations differ only in time varying 
characteristics, we can test our identifying assumption. We always find that CEP 
referrals are insignificant in the employment equation, but significant in the selection 
equation, and so we conclude that excluding CEP referrals from x. and including it 
in z. is a valid identifying assumption.
Furthermore, SYETP places were predominantly taken up by teenagers (Stretton 
and Chapman, 1990), and we find that age has a negative and strongly significant 
coefficient in all our selection equations. However, age is never significant in the 
employment equation. This seems surprising at first sight, although the narrow age 
range of the sample may provide an explanation. Using the area sample of the ALS, 
James (1989) finds age does not affect duration of unemployment, whilst Trivedi 
and Alexander (1989) drop age from their duration analysis of re-employment 
probabilities using the ALS list sample. Hui (1986a,b) also finds age insignificant in 
determining unemployment duration in the ALS list sample.
Given the consistency of these findings, it seems reasonable to use age as an alternative 
to CEP referrals in identifying our model, at least to test the robustness of our 
identification. We find that our results are virtually unchanged if we include CEP 
referrals in the employment equation, and identify the model using age (and time 
varying characteristics) alone.
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5.6 Results
Table 5.3 gives the results of univariate probit estimates of the probabilities of being 
employed in 1986 and 1987. We can see that SYETP participation has a positive 
effect on employability in both years, although it is only significant in 1986. The 
magnitudes of the marginal effects of participation in both years are similar to raw 
differences in the summary statistics. Most other coefficients are much as we would 
expect. Women are less likely to be employed than men, women with children 
overwhelmingly so. Marriage has no significant effect, but having an employed spouse 
is significantly positive in 1986. Employment prospects are worse in South Australia 
and the Northern Territories. More human capital or past work experience increases 
the probability of being employed, whilst health problems reduce it.
Participation in a government employment programme, other than SYETP, between 
June 1984 and the 1985 interview, has a strongly negative effect on employment. 
The main other programmes at the time were the Community Employment 
Programme and the Wage Pause Programme, both direct job creation schemes 
targeted specifically at those with particular labour market disadvantages (Stretton 
and Chapman, 1990). Thus this may reflect these disadvantages rather than any 
negative effects of the programmes themselves.
Controlling for selection
If selection biases are a significant problem, then the results in Table 5.3 maybe misleading. 
We present the bivariate probit results for the employment equation, controlling for 
selection, in Table 5.4. Columns 1 and 2 are the 1986 results, and columns 3 and 4 those 
for 1987. The corresponding selection equations are given in Table 5.5.
The results in Table 5.4 are coefficients from the bivariate probit. We report marginal 
effects below. However, the pattern of signs and significant coefficients is almost 
identical to the univariate probits, except that now the effect of SYETP is positive 
and significant in both years, falling just below 5% significance in 1987, but easily 
significant at 10%.
In both cases the correlation coefficient, p , is negative, implying that those most 
likely to be selected onto the programme have unobserved characteristics that make
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it less likely that they would otherwise be employed. Wald tests on p reject the 
hypothesis that the errors are uncorrelated. This shows the importance of allowing 
for selection biases. Failing to control for selection would underestimate the impact 
of SYETP participation on subsequent employment prospects. In particular, the 
univariate probits imply an insignificant effect in 1987, whereas the effect is significant 
when we allow for the selection process. A negative value of p is consistent with 
employment service staff targeting programmes on those who are more disadvantaged.
Marginal effects
Table 5.6 gives the marginal effects. The first part shows the marginal effect of the 
SYETP, averaged across the whole sample and across various sub-samples. For 
example, the marginal effect of SYETP for females is the result of calculating the 
individual marginal effect for each of the females in the sample, and then averaging5. 
This method takes account of any systematic differences in other characteristics 
between females and males, as well as the effect of being female per se. The bottom 
half of the table gives the marginal effects (averaged across the whole sample) of 
various other characteristics, which are all fairly similar to those in the univariate 
probits.
The effect of SYETP participation on subsequent employability is found to be not 
only significant, but also large. After controlling for selection biases, the effects are 
substantially greater than those reported in the univariate probits, consistent with 
our finding that more disadvantaged workers were selected onto the programme (p 
negative). Going on SYETP increases the average probability of having a job at 
some time between 8 and 13 months after subsidy expiry by 26%. Between 14 and 
26 months after subsidy expiry, the effect is still nearly 20%.
Looking at the various sub-sample effects it is clear that participation in SYETP is 
most useful for those with greater disadvantage: females, those with lower human 
capital or poorer work records and from more disadvantaged families6 all gain more 
than the average, as do those living in South Australia or the Northern Territories. 
The effect is also stronger for younger people. By contrast, the effect is roughly 
halved for those who went to private school, have an apprenticeship or have had a 
previous job for 3 or more years.
198
D o Wage Subsidies Enhance Employability?
The pattern of effects across the different sub-samples is very similar in the two 
years, with the same groups gaining more or less than the average in every case. The 
effects are always smaller in 1987. This fall-off probably reflects a combination of 
‘catch-up’ by the control group, against a background of falling unemployment, and 
depreciation of the advantage of participation, especially as retained jobs break up. 
Although there is no particular reason to suppose that this fall-off was linear, a 
simple extrapolation would imply that SYETP participants had an employability 
advantage for 4 years after subsidy expiry.
Comparing the marginal effect of SYETP with those for other variables reinforces 
our conclusion that programme participation has a very large impact. Only the 
negative effect for women with children is larger in magnitude than the average 
SYETP effect, even in 1987.
Job retention and subsequent employability
Much of the positive effect arising from SYETP participation probably arose from 
retention of subsidised jobs after subsidy expiry. This was clearly part of the point of 
the programme, to get disadvantaged workers into jobs and support them for long 
enough that they could remain profitably employed in those jobs subsequently, without 
the need for a subsidy. However, we are also interested in what happened to 
participants after they left their initially subsidised job: did they then find it easier to 
obtain another job than they would otherwise have done?
Ideally, we would want to measure employment outcomes after all the retained jobs 
have terminated, but this is not possible given the data. Hence we have to restrict 
the sample in such a way as to exclude those who retained their subsidised jobs 
throughout the period. We do this by excluding all people who were continuously 
employed from the time when they first got a job, or went on SYETP, until the end 
of the 1986 reference period. Since we only consider SYETP participants who entered 
the programme between June 1984 and the end of the 1985 reference period, we 
similarly only exclude people whose jobs started within that period and were 
continuously employed until the end of the 1986 reference period.
By restricting the sample in this way, we are excluding the most employable workers. 
Implicitly, we are assuming that they would have obtained, and kept, jobs with or
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without the subsidy. Amongst those whom we exclude, exactly the same proportion 
(79%) of those who went on the SYETP, and those who did not, remain continuously 
employed until the end of the 1987 reference period. The proportion of SYETP 
participants remaining in the restricted sub-sample is virtually unchanged from the 
full 1987 sample (7.6% vs 8.0%). In addition, we saw in Section 4 that at long 
durations the distribution of job tenure was broadly the same for SYETP and regular 
jobs. Hence we believe that it is reasonable to assume that restricting the sample in 
this way will not introduce any biases.
Table 5.7 shows the employment equation, from the bivariate probit, for the 
probability of being employed at some point in 1987 for the sub-sample of less 
employable workers. The dependent variable is now employment in a job that has 
never been subsidised, nor obtained through any other government programme. 
The coefficient on SYETP is positive and significant, suggesting that participation 
in the SYETP had a positive employability effect even for those who lost their 
initially subsidised job. The correlation coefficient, p , is again negative and significant, 
implying that, within the restricted sub-sample as well as the whole sample, those 
selected onto the programme were less likely to have been employed otherwise. The 
marginal effect of participation, averaged over the sub-sample, of SYETP 
participation on the probability of being employed in 1987 is 23.7%. However, this 
is not comparable with the whole sample effect, since we saw in Table 5.6 that the 
effect of SYETP participation was highest among those with initially greater 
disadvantage.
Participation in the SYETP therefore appears to have had a positive employability 
effect beyond just the advantage from retaining initially subsidised jobs. Even those 
who lose their initially subsidised job are more likely to be employed at some time in 
1987 than if they had never been on the programme. Hence the evidence implies 
that a period of subsidised employment can mitigate the damaging effects of 
unemployment, even for those who return to unemployment after going on the 
programme.
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5.7 Conclusion
The impact of wage subsidies on subsequent employability has been much discussed 
but little researched. Despite the copious equivalent literature for training 
programmes, and job search assistance, we know surprisingly little about what happens 
to participants in wage subsidies after the subsidy runs out. Using a panel of Australian 
youth, we have attempted to answer two main questions. Firstly, do subsidised jobs 
break up when the subsidy expires, so that they only offer a temporary respite from 
unemployment? And secondly, are there longer-term benefits for participants, in 
the form of higher future employability?
We find little evidence that subsidised jobs break up when the subsidy expires. Instead, 
subsidies appear to extend the life of very short duration jobs, that would otherwise 
have broken up before the subsidy expired. For jobs lasting longer than 13 weeks, 
subsidised and unsubsidised jobs have almost identical average durations. This finding 
is consistent with subsidies being used to overcome fixed costs of hiring and training, 
after which subsidised workers become sufficiently productive that the job is viable 
even without the subsidy (as in Chapters 3 and 4).
Furthermore, we find a large and significant positive effect on subsequent employment 
prospects. Controlling for both a wide range of individual and family background 
characteristics, and for selection biases, we estimate that participants in the Special 
Youth Employment Training Program were 26% more likely to have a job at some 
point between January and September 1986, and 20% more likely to have a job at 
some point between October 1986 and September 1987. The effects are larger still 
for more disadvantaged and younger workers.
A large part of this effect, particularly in 1986, stems from retention of the initially 
subsidised job. Nonetheless, by 1987 there was also a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of obtaining a subsequent, never subsidised, job.
These findings suggest that wage subsidies do far more than provide a brief period 
of employment. Instead they appear to offer a lasting improvement in employment 
prospects, both through retention of initially subsidised jobs, and through improved 
employability once the initial job breaks up. However, further research is needed to
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establish how long these effects last for, and how quickly they die away. This would 
make possible a proper cost-benefit analysis of policies that are all too often evaluated 
only on their immediate effects. Data covering a longer period would also allow an 
investigation of the kinds of jobs subsequently obtained by participants.
1. In an earlier version of this paper (Stretton, 1982), Stretton notes the availability of techniques to 
correct for sample selection, but states that their use was ruled out through lack of time.
2. To minimise problems from right censoring, Figures 5.2-5.8 are plotted for the 1987 sample.
3. The effect is slightly stronger, if we exclude those jobs which might have come under the longer 
Jobstart subsidy, with 69.1% exceeding 17 weeks duration against 65.5% for all subsidised jobs in 
the data. O f these, 45.4% last beyond the 34 week maximum subsidy for Extended SYETP.
4. I am grateful to Mark Gritz for his advice not to pursue the hazard function approach.
5. Greene (1997, p. 876) states that current practice favours this approach over the alternative of 
evaluating at the sample mean.
6. The pattern of coefficients for mother’s status is similar to that for father’s.
202
Do Wage Subsidies Enhance Employability?
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics, 1986 Sample
Variable Whole sample SYETP Non SYETP Attrition
Personal characteristics 
Male 58.8% 56.7% 59.0% 61.6%
Female 41.2% 43.3% 41.0% 38.4%
Average age, 1984 20.0 19.0 20.1 20.2
Aboriginal/TSI 3.0% 1.0% 3.1% 3.2%
Other ethnic minority 7.9% 7.7% 7.9% 8.3%
Married, 1984 II.7% 2.9% 12.5% 11.0%
Spouse employed 5.9% 1.9% 6.3% 4.0%
Children, 1984 5.5% 1.9% 5.8% 3.4%
Human capital 1984 
Degree/diploma 11.9% 7.7% 12.2% 11.0%
Apprenticeship 8.1% 2.9% 8.6% 7.4%
Other post-school qualification 7.1% 6.7% 7.1% 6.6%
Year 12 14.7% 23.1% 13.9% 13.2%
Year 11 13.9% 17.3% 13.6% 11.9%
Year 10 31.5% 31.7% 31.5% 32.3%
Year 9 or below 12.5% 10.6% 12.6% 17.0%
Parental background at age 14 
Father post-school qualification1 33.9% 26.0% 34.6% 31.9%
Mother post-school qualification1 18.3% 20.2% 18.2% 19.1%
Father manager, (para-) professional1 25.7% 25.0% 25.8% 23.7%
Father not-employed1 5.5% 3.8% 5.6% 4.1%
Father not present 15.7% 19.2% 15.4% 19.1%
Mother manager, (para-) professional1 9.6% 6.7% 9.8% 8.7%
Mother not-employed1 54.7% 48.1% 55.3% 54.4%
Mother not present 5.3% 8.7% 5.0% 6.7%
Longest ever job by 1984 
Never held a job 11.6% 11.5% 11.6% 8.7%
<1 year 42.1% 55.8% 40.1% 42.1%
1 year 13.5% 13.5% 13.5% 19.4%
2 years 14.1% 13.5% 14.1% 11.2%
3 years + 18.7% 5.8% 19.8% 18.5%
Average pre-June unemployment2 61.6% 68.5% 61.0% 66.4%
Employment 
Ever employed 19863 74.0% 86.5% 72.9% n/a
N 1283 104 1179 645
Notes:
1. Only asked if that parent was present when the respondent was aged 14.
2. Proportion of 1984 reference period up to 3 June spent unemployed.
3. Ever held any non-subsidised, non-government programme job in the 1986 reference period, after 
the first 17 weeks.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics, 1987 Sample
Variable Whole sample SYETP Non SYETP Attrition
Personal characteristics
Male 57.8% 54.0% 58.1% 62.2%
Female 42.2% 46.0% 41.9% 37.8%
Average age, 1984 20 19 20.1 20.1
Aboriginal/TSI 2.3% 1.1% 2.4% 4.0%
Other ethnic minority 7.2% 9.2% 7.0% 9.0%
Married, 1984 12.3% 3.4% 13.0% 10.4%
Spouse employed 6.5% 2.3% 6.9% 3.6%
Children, 1984 5.6% 2.3% 5.9% 3.6%
Human capital, 1984
Degree/diploma 12.0% 6.9% 12.4% 11.0%
Apprenticeship 7.9% 3.4% 8.3% 7.7%
Other post-school qualification 7.4% 6.9% 7.4% 6.3%
Year 12 15.0% 24.1% 14.2% 13.0%
Year 11 13.9% 19.5% 13.4% 12.3%
Year 10 31.6% 29.9% 31.8% 31.9%
Year 9 or below 11.5% 9.2% 11.7% 17.1%
Parental background at age 14
Father post-school qualification1 34.3% 27.6% 34.9% 31.8%
Mother post-school qualification1 18.7% 19.5% 18.7% 18.4%
Father manager, (para-) professional1 26.2% 25.3% 26.3% 23.6%
Father not-employed1 5.4% 4.6% 5.4% 4.6%
Father not present 15.0% 20.7% 14.5% 19.2%
Mother manager, (para-) professional1 9.5% 6.9% 9.7% 9.0%
Mother not-employed1 54.8% 50.6% 55.2% 54.3%
Mother not present @14 4.7% 6.9% 4.5% 7.2%
Longest ever job by 1984
Never held a job 12.0% 12.6% 11.9% 8.9%
<1 year 42.0% 56.3% 40.7% 42.3%
1 year 12.7% 12.6% 12.7% 19.0%
2 years 14.2% 11.5% 14.4% 11.7%
3 years + 19.1% 6.9% 20.2% 18.1%
Average pre-June unemployment2 62.2% 68.0% 61.7% 64.5%
Employment
Ever employed 19873 77.1% 82.8% 77.9% n/a
Ever employed 1986 74.3% 86.2% 73.2% n/a
N 1084 87 997 852
Notes:
1. Only asked if that parent was present when the respondent was aged 14.
2. Proportion of 1984 reference period up to 3 June spent unemployed.
3. Ever held any non-subsidised, non-government programme job in the 1987 reference period.
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Table 5.3: Univariate Probits
Dependent variable: ever employed 
in regular,; unsubsidised job
Univariate Probit 
1986 
dF/dx1 *
Univariate Probit 
1987 
dF/dx1 t
SYETP 0.1338*** 3.26 0.0424 0.96
Female -0.1 188*** -4.15 -0.0950*** -3.14
Married -0.0301 -0.51 0.0366 0.68
Children -0.0771 -1.00 -0.0476 -0.68
Children x female -0.4549*** -3.84 -0.2963*** -2.94
Spouse employed 0.1329** 2.48 0.0134 0.23
Aboriginal/TS Islander -0.1077 -1.48 -0.1655* -1.85
Other ethnic minority -0.1033* -1.66 -0.0421 -0.67
State initially interviewed in 
Victoria -0.0158 -0.44 0.0401 1.14
Queensland -0.0020 -0.05 -0.0723* -1.71
S.Aus/NT -0.1098** -2.33 -0.1152** -2.38
W. Aus/Tas -0.0091 -0.22 0.0578 1.45
Education 
School overseas -0.0134 -0.16 -0.1538 -1.46
RC school -0.0186 -0.37 -0.0146 -0.29
Private school 0.1198* 1.79 0.1173* 1.75
Degree/diploma 0.1274*** 3.41 0.1280*** 3.68
Apprenticeship 0.1015** 1.97 0.0816 1.57
Other post-school 0.0157 0.35 0.0550 1.37
Year 12 -0.0003 -0.01 0.1066*** 2.71
Year 11 0.101 \*** 2.62 0.0840** 2.17
Year 9 or less -0.0763* -1.79 -0.0778* -1.71
Initial labour market experience 
Longest job by 1984: None 0.0054 0.11 -0.0516 -1.01
<1 year 0.0651* 1.79 0.0542 1.42
2 years 0.0721* 1.70 0.0852** 2.04
3 years + 0.1488*** 3.71 0.1269*** 3.12
Other government programme2 -0.2223*** -5.55 -0.1680*** -4.12
Pre-June unemployment % -0.1281 *** -3.87 -0.0723** -2.13
Work restricted by health -0.1 120*** -3.07 -0.1995*** -4.89
Family background 
Other city before 14 -0.0818** -2.15 -0.0352 -0.95
Country town before 14 -0.0209 -0.63 -0.0396 -1.15
Rural area before 14 -0.0690 -1.25 -0.0877 -1.58
Overseas before 14 0.0968 1.09 0.0839 0.82
No. of siblings -0.0091* -1.64 -0.0105 -1.61
English good 0.0951* 1.77 0.0554 0.95
English poor 0.1732** 2.44 0.0704 0.74
Sexist3 -0.1369** -2.19 -0.0198 -0.32
Sexist x female 0.0922 1.02 0.0429 0.44
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Dependent ’variable: ever employed 
in regular, unsubsidised job
Univariate Probit 
1986 
dF/dx1 *
Univariate Probit 
1987 
dF/dx1 t
Fathers occupation @14
Father not present @144 -0.0651 -0.94 -0.0268 -0.41
Labourer 0.0325 0.48 0.0787 1.31
Plant operative 0.0127 0.19 0.0667 1.14
Sales -0.0219 -0.27 0.0224 0.29
Tradesperson -0.0801 -1.18 -0.0146 -0.24
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.0312 0.50 0.0485 0.84
Not employed 0.0269 0.36 0.0463 0.68
Father post-school qual. @14 0.0269 0.87 0.0327 1.04
Mother’s occupation @14
Mother not present @144 -0.0782 -0.99 0.0014 0.02
Labourer -0.0385 -0.53 0.0005 0.01
Plant operative -0.1622* -1.92 -0.1297 -1.56
Sales -0.1203 -1.68 0.0029 0.04
Tradesperson -0.0603 -0.59 0.0698 0.79
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.0560 0.91 0.0094 0.15
Not employed -0.0215 -0.41 -0.0173 -0.34
Mother post-school qual. @14 -0.0101 -0.27 -0.0399 -1.02
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.0955*** 2.85 0.0642* 1.87
Presbyterian 0.1 136** 2.35 0.0410 0.79
Methodist 0.0402 0.84 0.0416 0.87
Other Christian -0.0236 -0.38 -0.0073 -0.12
Other Religion -0.0073 -0.16 0.0235 0.50
No religion 0.0871** 2.11 0.0104 0.23
N 1283 1084
Log likelihood -569.76 -451.02
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory 
(state), government school, Year 10 (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly 
in (state) capital city till 14, English first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, 
Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean.
2. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and 
their 1985 interview.
3. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if  they gave reactionary 
answers to more than 5 of the 7.
4. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was 
present at 14.
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Table 5.4: Bivariate probit employment equations
Bivariate probit analysis Ever employed 1986 Ever employed 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
SYETP 1.590** 2.45 1.133* 1.93
Female -0.398*** -3.99 -0.359*** -3.20
Married -0.055 -0.28 0.154 0.74
Children -0.238 -0.98 -0.154 -0.62
Children x female -1.212*** -3.79 -0.857*** -2.93
Spouse employed 0.542** 2.40 0.052 0.24
Aboriginal/TS Islander -0.272 -1.17 -0.465 -1.63
Other ethnic minority -0.318* -1.66 -0.179 -0.81
State initially interviewed in
Victoria -0.061 -0.51 0.136 0.97
Queensland 0.027 0.19 -0.222 -1.45
S.Aus/NT -0.306* -1.94 -0.362** -2.18
W. Aus/Tas -0.101 -0.67 0.170 0.96
Education
School overseas -0.095 -0.33 -0.513 -1.56
RC school -0.010 -0.06 -0.001 0.00
Private school 0.603** 2.07 0.681** 1.96
Degree/ diploma 0.513*** 3.22 0.585*** 3.43
Apprenticeship 0.43 I** 2.10 0.365 1.60
Other post-school 0.049 0.32 0.210 1.27
Year 12 -0.063 -0.40 0.403** 1.98
Year 11 0.357** 2.18 0.319* 1.81
Year 9 or less -0.222 -1.59 -0.251 -1.58
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None 0.042 0.25 -0.161 -0.88
<1 year 0.190 1.40 0.175 1.15
2 years 0.252 1.56 0.374** 2.05
3 years + 0.657*** 4.00 0.615*** 3.32
Other government programme1 -0.624*** -4.74 -0.53 7*** -4.12
Pre-June unemployment % -0.473*** -4.19 -0.309** -2.39
Work restricted by health -0.306** -2.43 -0.580*** —4.07
Family background
Other city before 14 -0.218 -1.61 -0.118 -0.87
Country town before 14 -0.001 -0.01 -0.098 -0.74
Rural area before 14 -0.128 -0.65 -0.229 -1.14
Overseas before 14 0.494 1.36 0.446 0.96
No. of siblings -0.028 -1.49 -0.038 -1.51
English good 0.403* 1.91 0.234 0.96
English poor 1.050*** 2.75 0.442 1.05
Sexist2 -0.440** -2.35 -0.108 -0.47
Sexist x female 0.463 1.25 0.187 0.47
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Bivariate probit analysis Ever employed 1986 
coefficient t
Ever employed 1987 
coefficient t
Father's occupation @14
Father not present @143 -0.180 -0.79 -0.070 -0.29
Labourer 0.134 0.55 0.392 1.49
Plant operative 0.058 0.25 0.325 1.33
Sales -0.049 -0.18 0.145 0.48
Tradesperson -0.214 -0.95 0.009 0.04
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.114 0.52 0.220 0.96
Not employed 0.146 0.55 0.249 0.88
Father post-school qual. @14 0.141 1.26 0.158 1.29
Mother's occupation @14
Mother not present @143 -0.335 -1.33 -0.066 -0.22
Labourer -0.151 -0.64 -0.005 -0.02
Plant operative -0.576** -2.30 -0.531* -1.94
Sales -0.392* -1.80 -0.022 -0.09
Tradesperson -0.229 -0.70 0.220 0.56
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.217 0.97 0.031 0.13
Not employed -0.087 -0.49 -0.091 -0.46
Mother post-school qual. @14 -0.067 -0.52 -0.161 -1.14
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.327** 2.52 0.249* 1.79
Presbyterian 0.413* 1.88 0.116 0.54
Metbodist 0.133 0.77 0.164 0.84
Other Christian -0.102 -0.50 -0.018 -0.08
Other Religion -0.045 -0.28 0.077 0.42
No religion 0.280 1.58 -0.018 - 0.10
P -0.622** 2.17 -0.553** 2.24
N 1283 1084
Log likelihood -875.96 -711.58
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory 
(state), government school, Year 10 (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly 
in (state) capital city till 14, English first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, 
Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and 
their 1985 interview.
2. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if they gave reactionary 
answers to more than 5 of the 7.
3. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was 
present at 14.
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Table 5.5: Selection Equations
Bivariate probit analysis SYETP participation, 1986 SYETP participation, 1987
coefficient t coefficient t
Female 0.088 0.71 0.074 0.56
Age, 1984 -0.107*** -3.16 -0.100*** -2.73
Married, 1984 -0.855 -1.52 -0.779 -1.36
Children, 1984 0.465 0.78 0.439 0.71
Children x female -0.296 -0.37 -0.168 -0.20
Spouse employed, 1984 0.498 0.81 0.365 0.57
Aboriginal/TS Islander -0.451 -1.01 -0.238 -0.49
Other ethnic minority 0.081 0.33 0.121 0.46
State initially interviewed in
Victoria 0.112 0.72 0.137 0.80
Queensland -0.279 -1.30 -0.135 -0.62
S.Aus/NT -0.157 -0.77 -0.071 -0.33
W. Aus/Tas 0.317* 1.78 0.337* 1.70
Education
School overseas 0.078 0.22 0.251 0.64
RC school -0.310 -1.30 -0.296 - l . l  1
Private school -0.636 -1.38 -0.746 -1.42
Degree/diploma, 1984 0.120 0.51 0.014 0.05
Apprenticeship, 1984 -0.129 -0.42 0.027 0.08
Other post-school, 1984 -0.036 -0.14 0.1 10 0.42
Year 12,1984 0.433** 2.46 0.441** 2.30
Year 11,1984 0.101 0.53 0.285 1.49
Year 9 or less, 1984 -0.074 -0.35 -0.020 -0.09
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None -0.348 -1.34 -0.377 -1.40
<1 year -0.020 -0.11 0.000 0.00
2 years 0.173 0.80 0.035 0.14
3 years + -0.326 -1.26 -0.344 -1.18
CEP referrals, 1984 0.144** 1.97 0.164** 2.27
Pre-June unemployment % 0.487*** 2.92 0.387** 2.19
Work restricted by health, 1984 -0.633** -2.53 -0.561** -2.23
Family background
Other city before 14 -0.244 -1.48 -0.140 -0.79
Country town before 14 -0.473*** -2.94 -0.379** -2.23
Rural area before 14 -0.446* -1.69 -0.340 -1.24
Overseas before 14 -0.757 -1.48 -0.556 -1.06
No. of siblings - 0.011 -0.70 -0.003 -0.08
English good -0.185 -0.72 - 0.001 0.00
English poor -0.591 -1.13 -0.468 -0.89
Sexist 0.317 1.22 0.238 0.96
Sexist x female -0.903 -1.38 _i
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Bivariate probit analysis SYETP participation, 1986 
coefficient /
SYETP participation, 1987 
coefficient t
Fathers occupation @14 
Father not present @14 -0.309 - l . l  1 -0.191 -0.66
Labourer -0.263 -0.84 -0.332 -1.02
Plant operative -0.267 -0.96 -0.343 -1.14
Sales -0.086 -0.26 -0.277 -0.73
Tradesperson -0.300 -1.10 -0.338 -1.17
Manager, professional, para-prof. -0.153 -0.59 -0.201 -0.73
Not employed -0.457 -1.29 -0.435 -1.15
Father post-school qual. @14 -0.315** -2.14 -0.234 -1.45
Mother's occupation @14 
Mother not present @14 0.480 1.49 0.370 1.03
Labourer 0.176 0.57 0.041 0.12
Plant operative 0.697** 2.26 0.677** 2.05
Sales 0.190 0.66 0.085 0.26
Tradesperson 0.1 19 0.28 0.188 0.42
Manager, professional, para-prof. -0.247 -0.85 -0.198 -0.60
Not employed 0.041 0.17 0.084 0.32
Mother post-school qual. @14 0.266* 1.66 0.178 0.99
Religion brought up in 
Catholic 0.061 0.38 0.006 0.03
Presbyterian 0.322 1.34 0.390 1.53
Methodist 0.017 0.06 0.018 0.06
Other Christian 0.075 0.27 0.001 0.01
Other Religion 0.176 0.80 0.151 0.63
No religion 0.138 0.66 0.205 0.95
N 1283 1084
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory 
(state), government school, Year 10 (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly 
in (state) capital city till 14, English first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, 
Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Dropped due to perfect collinearity with SYETP.
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Table 5.6: Marginal Effects
Marginal effect of SYETP 
on probability of employmentJ
1986 1987
Whole sample average 0.264 0.197
Female 0.317 0.245
Married 0.246 0.192
Married, spouse employed 0.186 0.178
S. Aus/NT 0.324 0.255
Degree/ diplom a 0.162 0.135
Apprenticeship 0.105 0.081
Year 12 0.263 0.147
Year 10 0.316 0.256
Private school 0.127 0.098
No previous job 0.371 0.306
Longest job 1 year 0.327 0.241
Longest job 3 years+ 0.133 0.101
Work restricted by health 0.358 0.307
Father not employed @14 0.317 0.258
Father plant operative @14 0.262 0.181
Father manager, (para-) professional @14 0.185 0.148
Father post-school qualification @14 0.213 0.161
Age 22+ in 1984 0.204 0.152
Age <21 in 1984 0.299 0.225
Age <19 in 1984 0.308 0.236
Marginal effect of selected other 
significant characteristics
1986 1987
Female -0.108 -0.095
Child x female -0.353 -0.237
S. Aus/N.T. -0.082 -0.094
Private school 0.129 0.129
Degree/diploma 0.123 0.130
Apprenticeship 0.104 0.084
Longest job 3 years+ 0.157 0.142
Work restricted by health -0.079 -0.154
Notes:
Q  2 ( a  + P'*><rr'z > ?p) Q 2 (P'x>?Y%qp)
<&(qy'z) <%7'z)
where G> is the standard (univariate) normal cumulative distribution function, and q takes the value 
1 if the person is selected onto the programme, and -1 otherwise.
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Table 5.7: Subsequent, never-subsidised, jobs
Dependent variable: Ever employed 1987
in a newer subsidised, coefficient t
non-programme job
SYETP 1.049** 2.19
Female -0.343*** -2.79
Married 0.185 0.87
Children -0.119 -0.44
Children x female -0.695** -2.23
Spouse employed -0.119 -0.53
Aboriginal/TS Islander -0.574* -1.84
Other ethnic minority -0.207 -0.86
State initially interviewed in
Victoria 0.097 0.61
Queensland -0.149 -0.89
S.Aus/NT -0.388** -2.17
W. Aus/Tas 0.122 0.65
Education
School overseas -0.681* -1.77
RC school -0.052 -0.25
Private school 0.693* 1.90
Degree/diploma 0.603*** 3.29
Apprenticeship 0.347 1.37
Other post-school 0.298* 1.67
Year 12 0.354* 1.72
Year 11 0.392** 2.11
Year 9 or less -0.229 -1.32
Initial labour market experience
Longest job by 1984: None -0.213 - 1.01
<1 year 0.211 1.26
2 years 0.391* 1.95
3 years + 0.559*** 2.74
Other government programme1 -0.451*** -3.19
Pre-June unemployment % -0.314** -2.20
Work restricted by health -0.497*** -3.56
Family background
Other city before 14 -0.015 - 0.10
Country town before 14 -0.105 -0.73
Rural area before 14 -0.148 -0.65
Overseas before 14 0.336 0.63
No. of siblings -0.049* -1.78
English good 0.181 0.64
English poor 0.462 0.98
Sexist2 -0.127 -0.51
Sexist x female -0.006 - 0.01
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Dependent variable: Ever employed 
in a never subsidised, 
non-programme job
1987
coefficient t
Father's occupation @14
Father not present @143 0.004 0.02
Labourer 0.428 1.42
Plant operative 0.358 1.28
Sales 0.290 0.86
Tradesperson 0.105 0.39
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.234 0.90
Not employed 0.382 1.22
Father post-school qual. @14 0.071 0.52
Mothers occupation @14
Mother not present @143 0.018 0.06
Labourer 0.036 0.12
Plant operative -0.457 -1.55
Sales -0.008 -0.03
Tradesperson 0.032 0.07
Manager, professional, para-prof. 0.031 0.12
Not employed -0.070 -0.33
Mother post-school qual. @14 -0.087 -0.56
Religion brought up in
Catholic 0.240 1.58
Presbyterian 0.193 0.81
Methodist 0.104 0.49
Other Christian -0.220 -0.79
Other Religion 0.140 0.71
No religion 0.002 0.01
P -0.63 1*** 3.77
N 781
Log likelihood -552.23
Notes:
* Indicates significance at 10% level, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
Omitted categories are: European (ethnic origin), New South Wales/Australian Capital Territory 
(state), government school, Year 10 (highest education qualification), longest job 1 year, lived mostly 
in (state) capital city till 14, English first language, Father clerical worker, Mother clerical worker, 
Anglican (religion brought up in).
1. Went on a government labour market programme, other than SYETP, between 3 June 1984 and 
their 1985 interview.
2. Respondents were asked 7 questions about women and work. Sexist equals one if they gave reactionary 
answers to more than 5 of the 7.
3. Questions about parental occupation and education at age 14 were only asked if that parent was 
present at 14.
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Figure 5.1: Start weeks o f  SYETP spells, treatment group
Figure 5.2: Length of regular jobs
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Figure 5.3: Length o f  SYETP jobs
Figure 5.4: Length of post-unemployment jobs
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Figure 5.5: Length o f pre-SYETP unemployment spells
Figure 5.6: Length of post-SYETP unemployment spells
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Figure 5.7: Length o f pre-SYETP employment spells
Figure 5.8: Length of post-SYETP employment spells
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Conclusion
The UK’s New Deal is the latest -  and one of the most ambitious -  attempts to 
tackle the problem of high and long-term unemployed that has afflicted many OECD 
countries since the 1970s. With a nice irony, the policy instrument at the heart of 
the New Deal, targeted wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed, was considered, 
but rejected, by Roosevelt in the original New Deal (Allen, 1977). We argue that 
today’s policy-makers are wise to reconsider Roosevelt’s decision.
Alongside the shifts of policy a substantial body of literature has developed, but 
little consensus. Most advocates of active labour market policy have concentrated on 
the effects of policy on labour demand, or on the outflow rate of those subject to the 
policy, and most models in these traditions have yielded positive predictions for the 
effects of ALMP. But these approaches ignore the possible effects of policy on wages. 
In particular, if the equilibrium rate of unemployment is determined by the interaction 
of wage setting with labour demand or price setting, then the effects of policy on 
wages will be crucial. Policies which improve the lot of the unemployed, by increasing 
their likelihood of getting a job, also reduce the cost of unemployment to the 
employed, leading them to bid up wages.
We argue that it is not sufficient simply to rule out this critique by setting wages 
exogenously, or using ad hoc formulations that ensure the independence of wages 
from policy. It is relevant to too many leading theories of wage setting to be ignored. 
Instead, we believe the effect on wages needs to be modelled explicitly, taking on 
board this critique, if a credible case for active labour market policy is to be made. 
At the same time, models of active labour market policy which do take account of 
the effect on wages have tended to treat ALMP as a state into which the unemployed 
are placed, and which may or may not lead to an exit into employment. This state- 
based approach is relevant only to policies of direct job creation and training.
Alternative active labour market policies, in particular job search assistance and 
subsidies to regular employment, do not constitute a separate state within the labour 
force. Instead, they act to increase the probability of making the transition from 
unemployment to employment. A growing body of evidence suggesting that
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empirically, as well as theoretically, state-based policies have largely been unsuccessful, 
has shifted policy interest towards these transition-based policies.
Our twin starting points are thus to model policy as a transition, and to take full 
account of the critique that, by improving the chances of the unemployed, policy 
impacts adversely on wage-setting. We focus on policies that are targeted onto the 
long-term unemployed, in line with the near-universal targeting of active labour 
market policies in practice. We are able to show that it is always optimal to target 
resources disproportionately on the long-term unemployed, although not necessarily 
to the complete exclusion of the short-term unemployed.
We present a number of closely-related models of active labour market policy in a 
macroeconomic framework. We start with a simple framework, taking the possibility 
of programme effectiveness at micro-level (for the participants) for granted, instead 
asking what the macroeconomic effects of such policies would be. We then extend 
our framework to model both targeted wage subsidies and job search assistance 
explicitly.
We show that, in models where the inflow into unemployment is fixed, targeted 
wage subsidies for the long-term unemployed will unambiguously reduce equilibrium 
unemployment. There are three main effects. Firstly, provided both hiring costs and 
subsidy payments are outwith the wage bargain, subsidies will involve a transfer 
from taxpayers to hiring firms, which will straightforwardly push out labour demand. 
Secondly, provided subsidies are targeted on the long-term unemployed, the gains 
made by the long-term unemployed will be discounted more heavily by wage-setters 
than the losses to short-term unemployed workers who now face greater competition 
for jobs. Wage pressure will fall, allowing unemployment to fall. Finally, a targeted 
subsidy can overcome the externality arising because firms do not take account of 
the impact of their hiring decisions on other firms. If the short-term unemployed 
are more desirable, then hiring them reduces the average quality of the remaining 
unemployed pool faced by other firms with vacancies. A subsidy targeted at the 
hiring of long-term unemployed workers can overcome this externality, increasing 
the average quality of the pool of unemployed workers faced by other firms, which 
will respond by opening more vacancies.
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Our findings for job search assistance are more ambiguous. If the unemployed have 
an unconstrained choice over the extent of their search intensity, then cutting the 
costs of search for the long-term unemployed has a similar effect to increasing their 
benefit levels. Although the long-term unemployed will search harder, they will also 
take some of the reduced cost of search as a reduced utility cost of unemployment. 
Hence, wage pressure rises and employers open fewer vacancies. This reduces the 
benefit of searching for the short-term unemployed since vacancies are a positive 
externality for them. Overall the effect is ambiguous.
The effect is very different when search intensity is mandated by the benefits system. 
Increasing search intensity requirements for the long-term unemployed, beyond their 
optimal private choice, leads both the short- and long-term unemployed to increase 
their search intensity. The combination of job search assistance and a job search 
mandate unambiguously reduces unemployment.
Both job search assistance and wage subsidies operate on the labour market in similar 
ways, and should not necessarily be seen as competing policy options. Instead, our 
findings suggest that both can be effective, and that the mix between them should 
be determined by their relative costs and marginal effects. It seems plausible, although 
we do not explicitly model it, that a combination of job search assistance and wage 
subsidies, such as in the UK’s New Deal for 18-24s, would offer a more effective 
option than either individually.
Almost all active labour market policies in the 1980s and 1990s have been targeted, 
normally using duration of unemployment as the main criterion for eligibility, 
although some untargeted policies were enacted in the 1970s. The experience of 
Working Nation in Australia, however, suggests that exclusive targeting of policies 
onto the long-term unemployed may be counter-productive. A large scale shift in 
resources from the short-term unemployed to the long-term unemployed under 
Working Nation led to a substantial increase in the inflow into long-term 
unemployment, which in turn overwhelmed the programmes targeted on the long­
term unemployed (DEETYA, 1996a).
We extend the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) framework to analyse issues of optimal 
targeting within a model with endogenous job creation and job destruction. Wage
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subsidies generally increase both the inflows and the outflows from unemployment, 
and we no longer have unambiguous effects on unemployment. We can show that, 
provided policy can reduce unemployment at all, targeting policy towards the long­
term unemployed is always desirable, and generates a further reduction in 
unemployment, not merely a churning of the existing pool. However, the justified 
emphasis on the long-term unemployed should not be to the complete exclusion of 
the short-term unemployed. Because of diminishing returns, as subsidies increase it 
becomes more effective at the margin to target resources towards the short-term 
unemployed than to target the long-term unemployed still further.
By using simulations of this model, the oft-cited issues of deadweight, displacement 
and substitution can all be treated endogenously, rather than on the basis of frequently 
ad hoc estimates of their magnitude, often derived from partial equilibrium analysis. 
Our findings are broadly encouraging for advocates of active labour market policies. 
We find that unemployment can be reduced, even accounting for the increase in 
inflows. However, small subsidies maybe worse than none, increasing unemployment. 
Our findings suggest, though, that it would be optimistic to expect policies to pay 
for themselves in terms of reduced benefit payments and increased tax revenues.
The impact of wage subsidies on subsequent employability has been much discussed 
but little researched. Despite the copious equivalent literature for training 
programmes, and job search assistance, we know surprisingly litde about what happens 
to participants in wage subsidies after the subsidy runs out. We use data on a panel 
of Australian youth to explore subsequent employment histories for young Australians 
who went on the Special Youth Employment Training Program between June 1984 
and October 1985.
We find litde evidence that subsidised jobs break up when the subsidy expires. 
Furthermore, we find a large and significant positive effect on subsequent employment 
prospects. Controlling for both a wide range of individual and family background 
characteristics, and for selection biases, we estimate that participants were 26% more 
likely to have a job at some point between January and September 1986, and 20% 
more likely to have a job at some point between October 1986 and September 1987. 
The effects are larger still for more disadvantaged and younger workers.
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Subsidies offer far more than a temporary respite from unemployment. Instead they 
appear to offer a lasting improvement in employment prospects, both through 
retention of initially subsidised jobs, and through improved employability once the 
initial job breaks up. Unfortunately, our panel does not provide sufficient data to 
examine longer-term effects. There is a growing body of evidence that long-term 
spells of unemployment have a persistent, and maybe even permanent, scarring effect 
on subsequent opportunities (Trivedi and Alexander, 1989, find this with the same 
data we use). Although far more data would be needed to establish it, our findings 
offer the tantalising prospect that a period of employment, obtained initially through 
subsidy but maintained subsequently, could have the opposite effect, propelling 
participants onto a lasting, better, life trajectory.
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